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Should We Be Afraid of TPM Chips? 112

Posted by Cliff from the trusted-by-whom dept.
AcidArrow asks: "I was looking to buy a new laptop and since I wanted to be on the bleeding edge, I thought one with the new core duo chips would be just what I need. Among the features on the laptops I was looking was 'Trusted Platform Module chip for the safety of your data'. Now, I don't know of any real uses for a TPM chip yet, but is this something that should worry me, or keep me from buying a laptop with said 'feature'? I don't intend to use it and I would like to disable it, if possible, but I don't want to make it easier for anyone to track down what I'm doing on my laptop."
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Should We Be Afraid of TPM Chips? More

Should We Be Afraid of TPM Chips?

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  • It seems slashdotters are so afraid of these chips they won't even comment on them.

  • Uses (Score:3, Insightful)

    by TheRealMindChild ( 743925 ) on Friday March 31, 2006 @02:25PM (#15036125) Homepage Journal
    TPM in itself isn't bad. It is when it is grossly abused is the concern.

    I would imagine if you want to use future version of windows (and/or media player), this chip will be necessary. I can only speculate that it aids in the decryption of copywrited content

    • Re:Uses (Score:2, Insightful)

      by Anonymous Coward
      How is it NOT bad when your personal computer, to which you entrust essentially all your documents, can hide software and data from you?

      It is Big Brother Inside. Invisible, omnipresent, and with an enhanced ability to hide backdoors that will even grab your encrypted communications when they go in the clear inside your PCs.

      But, hey, you are probably a law-abiding person and should have nothing to hide.

      • Re:Uses (Score:4, Informative)

        by Trelane ( 16124 ) on Friday March 31, 2006 @03:51PM (#15036922) Journal
        How is it NOT bad when your personal computer, to which you entrust essentially all your documents, can hide software and data from you?
        The chip does nothing of this. The chip itself only encrypts and decrypts. The rest of the nightmare scenario requires a Treacherous Computing operating system and/or application software to do this.

        Notably, a TPM has a great many advantages (provided you trust the vendor anyway)--but only when implemented on a trustable OS and application. For instance, you can use it to trusted bootstrap (using a previously signed Linux kernel (basically saying you or someone you trust created the kernel)) to avoid boot-time rootkits, and then once you've loaded a trusted kernel, it will help the kernel to check for trusted (signed) modules. It can also check that the ps you're running isn't trojaned (i.e. installed by someone who didn't have the key).

        In short, go TPM, but boot Linux (or BSD, or whatever you can trust). The critical difference between Big Brother and Best Friend is whether you or someone else is doing (or able to do) the signing.

        • Re:Uses (Score:3, Informative)

          by Anonymous Coward

          The chip does nothing of this. The chip itself only encrypts and decrypts. The rest of the nightmare scenario requires a Treacherous Computing operating system and/or application software to do this.

          Oh bullshit. The Werner Von Braun defence. "I only make the rockets go up. Others decide where they land." As things stand at the moment, Trusted Computing hardware has only one use: to remove the control of the computer from its owner. The EFF [eff.org] has a proposal to mitigate the risks and keep the benefits... an

          • The Werner Von Braun defence. "I only make the rockets go up. Others decide where they land."

            Uhhm, no. It's actually the " Hey! There's a baby in that bathwater! " "defence".

            As things stand at the moment, Trusted Computing hardware has only one use: to remove the control of the computer from its owner.

            That may well be its intended use. That does not however, mean that there are not other uses for it. Indeed, I have outlined some. Additionally, the simple fact that you have a TPM doesn't immedia

            • Re:Uses (Score:1, Interesting)

              by Anonymous Coward

              Had you read the link you would have had answers to your questions, but you obviously didn't... instead you prefer to write in bold making statements that have already been answered and trying to play specious logic games.

              When the TCG, and technology companies behind it (which includes Intel, IBM, Microsoft, AMD and many many others) come out and openly discuss this hardware and its potential for improving security, but also the very real (and currently being implemented by Microsoft) threat of massive pr

              • Re:Uses (Score:3, Insightful)

                by Trelane ( 16124 )

                but also the very real (and currently being implemented by Microsoft) threat of massive privacy abuse, survellence and near-total control it allows, instead of just spouting meaningless "It's not evil. It's just hardware" platitudes then, perhaps things will improve.

                That's basically what I said, save for the gross misrepresentation, namely "just spouting meaningless 'It's not evil. It's just hardware' platitudes"

                Your (apparently) blind hatred for all things TPM seems to have skipped the "currently being

                • Re:Uses (Score:3, Insightful)

                  by Sique ( 173459 )
                  There are issues with TPM vs. free software you didn't address. What if the kernel you want to boot doesn't have a signature the TPM module recognizes? If you or some friend or colleague of you modify a kernel, then its signature changes (that's the whole point of signed binaries). So what if you TPM module just refuses to boot from a signature it doesn't know?

                  What if the device is something like a digital video recorder or a wireless router, which in theory runs under Linux or other GPLed software, and you
                  • Um... you know... why would you buy a TPM platform if you are going to fight it the whole way? In your case, you would buy a NON-TPM platform.
                    • Better buy it quick, then, because very, very soon you won't have a choice.
                    • While valid, the particular argument will die the day that NON-TPM platforms are no longer made available or the day that the os requires the TPM to be present and enabled to run at all.

                      I can already see the day when PCs will have mod chips you can get for $25 from ebay. As in other systems, it may even be illegal to use said mod chip.

                      I have no use for a chip in my computer that can say 'no' to me when I (gasp) WANT to test a virus. (It's happened before on a secondary system I had when I was trying to figu
                  • Much better. Thank you.

                    There are issues with TPM vs. free software you didn't address.

                    As you will see, I have addressed them. Let's go:

                    What if the kernel you want to boot doesn't have a signature the TPM module recognizes?

                    Then you sign it with your key. If you don't have the key, as I said, don't buy the TPM/laptop.

                    If you or some friend or colleague of you modify a kernel, then its signature changes (that's the whole point of signed binaries). So what if you TPM module just refuses to boot fro

                    • > if you don't get the keys, don't buy the box.

                      Do you seriously believe that you are going to get the keys?
                    • Do you seriously believe that you are going to get the keys?

                      The real question is, why dont you?

                      http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/6633 [linuxjournal.com]

                      To be cynical about it, Intel makes great heaping piles of money from Linux servers. Why would they want to put an end to that again? I missed that part where Intel would suddenly go bokers and dispose of huge piles of cash just to become a Tool of the Man (tm).
                    • The whole point of the TPM is that you don't get the keys. Otherwise, you could just as well use software encryption.

                      Didn't he just say in the very post you responded to how there was an article in Linux Journal about using your own keys [linuxjournal.com]?

                    • From that article:

                      The TPM stores three important keys in non-volatile memory. The endorsement key is a 2,048-bit RSA public and private key pair, which is created randomly on the chip at manufacture time and cannot be changed. The private key never leaves the chip, while the public key is used for attestation and for encryption of sensitive data sent to the chip, as occurs during the TPM_TakeOwnership command.

                      The endorsement key pair is the interesting one. No, you don't get the private component

                    • No, you don't get the private component of the endorsement key pair, because that would make the attestation capability have no global meaning.

                      Yes, exactly - the point is that you CAN sign it yourself, in other words making the chip do whatever you like. It only verifies that chip was used to sign it.

                      TPM is a tool like any other, capible of misuse to be sure but with the power in the hands of the user also capable of great good. It is only when TPM is used to lock a user out of doing something with the ha

                    • I don't think we have the same view here. Whether you run Linux, Windows, or OS XI doesn't make a difference. You will not be able to fake attestations (that other people believe) unless you can extract the private endorsement key.

                      Bear in mind there are two things that you could dislike about TPM. The first is attestation which affects whether programs on other machines will trust you (based on the data in the attestation). The second is sealed storage, which could store data on your system that you

                    • I don't think we have the same view here. Whether you run Linux, Windows, or OS XI doesn't make a difference. You will not be able to fake attestations (that other people believe) unless you can extract the private endorsement key.

                      Yes, and? That is kind of the point of the thing. That is good. That is what it does.

                      Bear in mind there are two things that you could dislike about TPM. The first is attestation which affects whether programs on other machines will trust you (based on the data in the attestatio

                    • There's nothing to stop one from having an OS that allows you to add drivers. But whether anyone else chooses to trust attestations made by programs running on that OS is another matter entirely. I certainly wouldn't trust your OS with your drivers to obey a policy on data that I give to you, unless you can give me some proof that your OS and your drivers will not violate the policy that I ask you to enforce before handing you the data.

                    • So everything is fine then. I just use my own OS with my own data ot data that allows me to do what I like with it.

                      Sure it can be used in a DRM scenario but they can also encase kittens in giant blocks of lucite to keep you from touching them. Wouldn't buy that either.

                  • You are back to square 1, this time not fiddling with copyright, but with the TPM module, and no clever licensing gets you out of the trouble.
                    The GPL v3 would to some extent, by punishing the vendor of the closed hardware by not allowing him to use GPL v3 software at all.

                    It's just a shame Linus doesn't understand this.

                    • It's just a shame Linus doesn't understand this.

                      Or perhaps he just disagrees with this approach.

                    • The thing Linus doesn't understand is that if Treacherous Computing had existed in 1990, he never would have had the chance to write Linux in the first place, because his PC wouldn't have let him do it!

                      That's why we need GPL v3 -- because it's the only hope I see of preventing EVERY computer from becoming like the TiVo, locked down to only use "vendor" approved software!

            • Re:Uses (Score:1, Interesting)

              by Anonymous Coward

              Uhhm, no. It's actually the " Hey! There's a baby in that bathwater! " "defence".

              You don't seem to understand, or (at least) you haven't read the link. The alternative is that you are just being dishonest.

              A TPM could been a boon for security... but, as it is currently implemented, it is just a means for big brother levels of control and not security FOR the user as it should be. The link you so carefully ignore lays out a means to get the benefits of a TPM, without the huge damage it causes.

              This woul

    • Re:Uses (Score:1, Troll)

      by nizo ( 81281 ) *
      Plus if you cover your computer with tinfoil it keeps out the Bad Computer Control Rays. I wonder if it is safe to poke holes for the air vents?

  • Customize? (Score:3, Interesting)

    by DarkNemesis618 ( 908703 ) on Friday March 31, 2006 @02:29PM (#15036164) Homepage
    Is it possible to get a model of said laptop without a TPM chip? It should be. If you go to Dell and buy a laptop, you're for the most part, able to customize nearly everything to suit your needs. Would the TPM chip be any different. I read about them and see no reason for most people to have any use of them. Nothing like shoving new or unwanted technology down everyone's throats.

    • If you go to Dell and buy a laptop, you're for the most part, able to customize nearly everything to suit your needs.

      Excellent! I'm off to order an Inspiron with the highly requested "Meat Thermometer" option.

      I think that this will eventually end up being a lot like the Pentium III serial number fiasco. There will be some way to shut it off... People do eventually get frustrated and tired of technology that gets in their way. If this stuff is going to keep people from watching their movies at full resoluti

    • Re:Customize? (Score:1, Informative)

      by j0nkatz ( 315168 )
      Work bought me a Dell Latitude D610. It has the TPM chip and is is able to be turned off in BIOS.
      • But was it really turned off? Seriously think about it. Do you know for a fact that the chip was turned off? Is there a way to independently verify the chip isn't functioning?
        • Pry it off the board, see if the system boots. :)
          • Maybe someone with some EE knowledge could answer a more serious version of the same question... if the chip is really "disabled", could one install a short from input to output to bypass the chip entirely? Would this work? Would this do something horrible to the board?

            • Re:Customize? (Score:1, Informative)

              by Anonymous Coward
              You may end up frying the board if you shorted input and output, it'll at least void your warranty. And, as far as I can tell, it's definitively not worth it, since the TPM, when turned off by the BIOS stays off and is undetectable and unusable by any software run afterwards until the next system reset, by which time the bios will turn it off again.
              • I've run into two situations recently where the "BIOS" did a really crappy job of hiding devices from the OS. Both boards are mid-range PC, not expensive servers or anything like that, but still. The first was my ABIT board with a SATA RAID controller. Apparently, the RAID BIOS did a lousy job of reporting that the two drives were RAIDed, because Linux saw two different drives. WinXP saw two drives, but seemed happy enough using them as a RAID - with drivers.

                The second one was a buddy who was having tro

    • Is it possible to get a model of said laptop without a TPM chip? It should be. If you go to Dell and buy a laptop, you're for the most part, able to customize nearly everything to suit your needs. Would the TPM chip be any different. I read about them and see no reason for most people to have any use of them. Nothing like shoving new or unwanted technology down everyone's throats.

      Oh, the TPM is SOLDERED TO THE MOTHERBOARD!

      So, no. Why in the world would a low-cost manufacuter like Dell have a complete

  • Be afraid only if you can't use it .. (Score:5, Insightful)

    by torpor ( 458 ) <ibisumNO@SPAMgmail.com> on Friday March 31, 2006 @02:31PM (#15036195) Homepage Journal
    .. yourself, personally, for your own uses. If the TPM 'feature' is only something that a mfr, or software vendor, can exploit to protect data, then its something that you definitely don't want to use.

    But if there were uses for TPM which directly translated into a user feature - like being able to save .DOC files to your USB stick, encrypted to your own TPM serial, for example - then I would say yeah, its something that can be used.

    But frankly, TPM isn't there for you. Its there for software vendors and 'media suppliers' to use in branding content to your machine. Whether thats good or not, is entirely up to whether or not the end user wants less control over where the data can travel .. so far, the only use for it appears to be in keeping MP3 and other Media files, which you did not author, local to your own machine.

    I'd be interested to hear cases where TPM-stamps can be used to actually protect user-author'ed data, though. Would be handy for studio-type people .. like, if I could get my Cubase/Protools session files stamped specifically to my machine, and they can't be used anywhere else, under certain circumstances that could be very handy ..

    But that sort of protection is just as easily provided by tools like GPG and such, and still would depend on the software vendor exploiting that feature, so .. yeah .. it just goes round and round.
    • But if there were uses for TPM which directly translated into a user feature - like being able to save .DOC files to your USB stick, encrypted to your own TPM serial, for example - then I would say yeah, its something that can be used.

      I can safely say that I do not want this. I use my jumpdrive to keep a backup of three directories; a script automagically copies fresh versions of a particular tree into a branch on my jumpdrive. This is done for portability and backup purposes. If, for example, my .doc and .mpp and *.* files were encrypted with my ThinkPad's TPM serial, then recovery from another machine (lets say that my laptop is stolen, or otherwise destroyed [with fire]) is pointless - there's no way to replicate that serial.

      Long story short: TPM serialization == bad for backups.
      • ...the key phrase in the bit of parent post you quoted is 'being able to'. Your complaint is irrelevant and makes you look silly, because the proposed feature was specifically described as an option.
        • The key portion of my retort which you failed to acknowledge was the qualifying use of the word 'if'. 'If' is a conditional statement which is invoked when a particular requirement is met. The option (my emphasis, your word) is disregarded if the requirement is NOT met (read: TPM is not used in such a manner). The requirement in this case would be - obviously - implementation of such a TPM scheme. The fact that I used the term 'if' indicates that I may or may not have implemented such a scheme, even though
          • Yes, but I suppose that my point is that /your/ point was a rather obvious one with an equally obvious answer.
            • If using the optional TPM USB-key encryption scheme will have negative effects, then I should uncheck the option!

            Which has thereby led me to wonder, unless I have missed your point entirely, why the unsuitability for backups particularly counts against the scheme. Simply uncheck the option and you have no difference in functionality from before. Meanwhile,

            • If you have a document that you

      • Long story short: TPM serialization == bad for backups.

        So basically, you have to decide whether it's more important for you to have your data or for others not to have it.

        Laptop thefts have been in news in Silicon Valley lately, because people using them to transport data valuable to identity thieves. That caused the Mercury News to go to the local copies for the details of that crime wave. Laptop thieves mostly troll the main drag [wikipedia.org], looking for rental cars parked near fancy restaurants and hotels. So th

    • "like being able to save .DOC files to your USB stick"

      Could we at least on slashdot use Free file formats in examples instead of promoting the MS Word "standard"? Please.

    • But that sort of protection is just as easily provided by tools like GPG and such, and still would depend on the software vendor exploiting that feature, so .. yeah .. it just goes round and round.
      And that's the bottom line: the only thing that a TPM can do that stuff like GPG can't, is to keep your information secure against you.

  • Nothing to fear (Score:5, Informative)

    by dotslash ( 12419 ) on Friday March 31, 2006 @02:33PM (#15036205) Homepage
    Firstly you can disable the chip from BIOS or driver software

    Secondly there are some good uses for it: I use it to store web site passwords, keys and certificates. On my laptop (Thinkpad T43) it is connected to the fingerprint scanner so I can enforce two-factor auth. (finger swipe AND passphrase). I also store the keys for encrypted disk volumes in the TPM (also part of the software IBM/Lenovo offers for the TPM).

    No software can access the TPM without my consent, because it requires finger and password.

    • Re:Nothing to fear (Score:5, Interesting)

      by Jherek Carnelian ( 831679 ) on Friday March 31, 2006 @02:45PM (#15036305)
      You might want to do a little research on the efficacy of finger-print identification systems - in short it is pretty much nil. The cheap ones can usually be fooled by simply retrying a bunch of times with the finger at different angles, the more expensive ones can be easily fooled with the equivalent of a jello mold of the valid fingerprint - which can often be lifted directly off the scanner itself via the skin-oil left by the most recent user. So your 2-factor authentication is really more of a 1.1-factor authentication.
      • I too own a think pad t43. I haven't tried the jello trick, but the swipe is very good at only recognizing my finger print. Unlike other finger printer readers, the think pad version requires a swipe preventing thieves from "lifting" prints from the sensor. The sensor also responds only to live tissue from what i have tried and have read from the manual. The manual also recommends interning mutliple fingers so that in the event of limb loss, there is a backup.

        I suspect that IBM's engineering on this front i

    • Two questions (Score:3, Interesting)

      by mcc ( 14761 )
      Firstly you can disable the chip from BIOS or driver software

      1. Is this even the case with the new Intel macs?

      2. If you disable the chip from bios, can the OS re-enable it without your consent?
      • 90% of OSX Intel relies on having the TPM chip present and active, if you disable it you are going to have a very inoperative OS very quickly - unless you use one of the hacked versions. Personally, my problem is the abuse, not the technology - TPM has some great potential uses, but only the ones certain people have a problem with seem to get column inches on slashdot.
        • 90% of OSX Intel relies on having the TPM chip present and active, if you disable it you are going to have a very inoperative OS very quickly - unless you use one of the hacked versions.

          I was thinking along the exact lines of running a hacked version, yes. However, if the OS can override the BIOS settings without user input (say, perhaps there's something the people writing the hacked version missed) and turn the disabled TPM back on, there wouldn't be much benefit from this.

          TPM has some great potential use

          • TPM has some great potential uses I disagree entirely.

            Then I guess you also dont see any good uses for passwords, permission levels, memory management and various such security measures operative in most OS's these days. TPM would be a fantastic hardware assistance in securing your environment further, and would be a boon in this manner in the corporate environment (imagine a server only allowed to run one single service under one userid and nothing else, you wouldnt ever have to worry about overflow

            • But it's precisely the idea that this technology can be so readily abused, and was born seemingly for the very purpose of being so abused, that makes me believe that it must come to a halt now, so that the implications can be further and more widely understood. But that's the very thing most pushing for its adoption seem to want to hide.

              If it were under better circumstances, I might agree with you that it's OK for them to procede, and that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages; but that is not the case.
            • TPM would be a fantastic hardware assistance in securing your environment further

              No. TPM doesn't provide any advantages in security over traditional (and now-mature) encryption and operating system permissions technologies. All TPM does is create the opportunity to take all of your security needs and place them behind a single point of failure.

              TPM exists to take control of what happens on your computer out of your hands and put it into the hands of hardware and software vendors. Anything else that is claime
              • So you dont think a hardware MMU gave any benefits to computing today, because the same function can be done in software? Oh, and theres no way to circumvent software security, right? Get real. TPM is another tool in the box that can be used, sure it isnt the ultimate and it shouldnt be used alone, but dont think we shouldnt use it if its available.

                Your assertion that TPM exists solely to remove control from us is also marketing, but from a different quarter. Dont think its any different, its one vie
                • So you dont think a hardware MMU gave any benefits to computing today

                  We are not talking about hardware MMUs.

                • Your assertion that TPM exists solely to remove control from us is also marketing, but from a different quarter. Dont think its any different, its one view or opinion, not reality.

                  No, it's a considered judgement based on the history of the technology. TPM doesn't do anything that you can't already do in software with one exception: remove control from the user. MMUs unload a compute intensive task from the CPU - TPM isn't that intensive.

            • All that stuff can be done without a TPM!!

              There is only one thing that a TPM can do that software cryptography cannot: secure the system against you by hiding the master key in the silicon itself.

  • Just about every new laptop (Score:5, Informative)

    by linguae ( 763922 ) on Friday March 31, 2006 @02:37PM (#15036247)

    ...seems to have a TPM chip. Thinkpads, MacBook Pros, some Gateway machines, just about every major new laptop manufacturer that I know of has already installed TPM chips in their laptops.

    The important thing to remember, though, is that a TPM chip means nothing if you don't use an OS or software that utilizes the chip for nefarious purposes. If you stick to Windows XP, current versions of OS X (they only use the TPM chip to see if it is a genuine Macintosh), or a free OS (like Linux or BSD), then they won't utilize the TPM chip to restrict your moves. However, you might want to check out any upgrades to the proprietary OSes or proprietary software before you upgrade. You might also want to avoid DRM'd media as well and find alternatives before it is too late.

    Now, if you really don't want a TPM chip in your machine, just buy the last model of the machine that you want that doesn't have a TPM chip. Apple, for example, still sells their G4 line of PowerBooks and iBooks. You'll have to weigh the advantages/disadvantages; do you want to sacrifice performance over a trusted computing chip that has little control depending on your software choices?

  • No one knows right now? Till, I don't buy things with lots of secrets and a cloud of uncertainty surrounding it.
  • But those damn TPS reports, that's something to be afraid of!

  • educate yourself? (Score:2, Informative)

    by Anonymous Coward
    TPMs are neither good nor evil per default and there is
    nothing magic in them, just some well known crypto cast into hardware.

    If you want to know what they do or can do,
    grab the specs from the TCG homepage and read em,
    no one to stop you.

    If you want to try them yourself, grab the TPM kernel emulator module,
    or use a real chip, Linux ships drivers with every new kernel.
    Use the freely available software lib from IBM (called Trousers),
    hell, lately even first Java bindings appeared for those who
    don't want to get m

  • be afraid...be very afraid (Score:3, Funny)

    by Tumbleweed ( 3706 ) * on Friday March 31, 2006 @03:29PM (#15036697)
    Keep in mind that TPM also stands for "The Phantom Menace," and that is NOT a good thing. (Okay, except for the light sabre battle at the end, which was the best thing in all three prequels.)
  • As others have pointed out, there are a lot of factors. However, something to consider is what do you want to support? If you want to support DRM and such technologies, then go ahead and buy it. The media companies will eventually look and say "hey there's all the TPM chips out there. let's use them" and then the world is screwed over as they won't let their stuff play on something without it or with TPM disabled. So personally, I try to get something without it.

    Now, I do have an AMD64 system that has on
  • After studying up on TPM & TC, I decided to buy a box last Dec, rather than risk having TPM/Treacherous Computing inflicted on me this year. Anybody care to guarantee that the TPM modulule & TC is impossible for HW & SW vendors to abuse? If not, I'm confident I made the right decision.

  • TCPA claims rebuttal, from IBM research (Score:3, Informative)

    by Fry-kun ( 619632 ) on Friday March 31, 2006 @06:49PM (#15038306)
    Just found this article, it's an interesting read:
    http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa/tcpa_rebutta l.pdf [ibm.com]

    In short it says, chip does nothing more than encrypt/decrypt data. It can't execute any code and is not made to be resistant to owner attack (e.g. timing cryptanalysis will work on it!). The only key(s) it controls are generated on-chip and never leave the chip [unencrypted]; there's no external "trusted authority" which manages the keys - so remote revokation is out of the question.
    Ergo, you have nothing to be afraid of if you're running current version of WindeXP or any version of *nix

    • It can't execute any code and is not made to be resistant to owner attack (e.g. timing cryptanalysis will work on it!). The only key(s) it controls are generated on-chip and never leave the chip [unencrypted];

      Wait, so which is it? Can you obtain the secret key or can't you?

      If you can't get the secret key (or rather, aren't given it along with the computer), then yes, it is a bad thing because you should always have the right to decrypt your own data!

  • Intel LaGrande aims to 'protect' every IO path inside your computer, but this is still a work in progress - first TPM on every computer, the rest will be added piece by piece until the puzzle is complete.

    Gigabit ethernet controller with built-in TPM (http://www.broadcom.com/press/release.php?id=7005 09/ [broadcom.com]):

    "Broadcom® Controllers Integrate TPM 1.2, Enabling OEMs to Offer Hardware-Based Security as a Standard Feature on All PCs
    Platforms With TPM 1.2 Hardware Will Be Ready for Enhanced Security Functionalit

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