Code Red: the Aftermath 505
LiquidPC writes: "Microsoft has released a tool to help clean up the effects of the Code Red II. It removes the files and mappings installed by the worm, and reboots your system; it also gives you an option to permanantly disable IIS." So, Microsoft has given you a mop to clean up the mess they made. Start mopping! If you're not the one infected, just tired of seeing your Apache logs fill up, you might see this page.
Code Red & Others As Advocacy Tool (Score:2)
My point is this:
MS is now on the brink of a win so big that they will be nearly be unstoppable, possibly even by the government, once it happens.
This is, of course, .NET, which would give them a strangle-hold on ecommerce, and a hand in the pocket of nearly everyone on Passport.
MS, and even Passport, have had huge security and service blow-ups in the past (Hotmail outages, etc.), and it hasn't even been a blip on the radar as far as most average people are concerned. It hasn't even registered on a corporate level, outside of the IT departments, who are just being blamed by the executives for not taking "proper care" of their single-platform fiats.
Now, a high-profile virus that keeps going on and doesn't go away (like, for example, Code Red)and forces the public's attention on the issue and becomes a constant and increasing embarassment to MS as it continually claims to have fixed the problem just before a new version shows up.
Now, people have this in their heads, even if it is the wrong way. ("That evil Russian hacker wrote this awful virus that takes over my computer.") The point being, that even executives will start to notice it, and may take the time to read their half-page summary sheet on the problem that it only affects MS, especially their new products that they want everyone to upgrade to.
Ultimately, only a sustained, media-covered security crisis will have any sort of effect on MS. Public opinion will only be turned when the average user is affected by it. It will happen after .NET launches and the first hack happens that compromises personal data, but it won't matter unless it happens *before* then.
Just a thought.
Put the blame where it belongs (Score:2)
What is everyone else doing? (Score:2, Interesting)
Now, the feeling seems to be shifting. According to this message and its threads, scripting a reply to reboot the machine is accepted as a response. I am still not comfortable with this but I am willing to go along with the group.
What does everyone else feel about this?
Automatically block IP under IIS? (Score:2)
While we're at it, can the net send command be used to inform the infected system of its "condition" without resorting to exploiting the Code Red II install of root.exe?
Anyone have any ideas for using Perl or ASP to do this?
Re:Automatically block IP under IIS? (Score:2)
If you want to test it, find an IIS box. Shut off the default route, so nobody can hit you while you're doing this. Copy cmd.exe to root.exe in the scripts folder. Open a browser on the IIS box, and point it at default.ida?XXXXX an Apache system running PHP and the script. If it works, it'll pop up a window on the IIS system.
When you're done, remove root.exe, restore your default route.
If you've had a corporate hit on your network... (Score:2)
It basicly looks for Vulnerable servers so that network admins can track them down and get the web admins to patch the machines before they get infected.
Nice to see someone has come up with a clean, pro-active method to kill this little menace off.
Re:If you've had a corporate hit on your network.. (Score:2, Informative)
The root.exe left in their scripts directory would be their own problem.
No, this is another common misconception. The exploere.exe trojan makes Code Red ][ infected machines survive the reboot.
Also I've seen many people expressing that they could stop the IIS service. I have tried this and it doesn't work.
I've even seen another
Files on an infected machine, can be accessed via the http://lusers.ip.net/scripts/root.exe, but there are restrictions as to what you can do.
The infected machines are Win2k (ie WINNT based) - if they're running NTFS then there are specific permissions on the file directory structure. I believe that this restricts what you can do with root.exe.
Aftermath? (Score:2, Informative)
Re:Aftermath? (Score:2)
It definitely isn't over - Code Red Vigilante [dynwebdev.com] still reports dozens of attempted Code Red II attacks. Hopefully, at least some of the decaffeinations get through and get people to patch their machines.
Port 80 may still be blocked by @Home, but I'm still getting attacks from other @Home customers. When are @Home's admins going to start cutting off the connections of infected machines? It's drastic, but it seems to be the only way to get the attention of some people.
Warhol Worm proposed: 15 minutes to total infectio (Score:5, Interesting)
Here's the scoop (more meat at K5):
Beware of Interlock (Score:3, Insightful)
I've had similar thoughts. I've been reading Multiagent Systems: A Modern Approach to Distributed Artificial Intelligence [amazon.com] and with the Code Red outbreak, I've taken to reading it with malware in mind.
What I've come to realize is that a worm could become real scary if its author, like me, were to be a fan of multi-agent systems. There's a plenthora of research on agent-to-agent communication, just waiting for that big experiment to take place.
Ponder this: interlock. The worms work together to reach a situation in which a host cannot be cleaned without data from another host, and vice-versa, thus making disinfection extremely hard
I've been sketching on scenario where relationships are created via the infection plus one level. if A infects B (first level of interconnect), then B would tell A about every other host it infects in turn (second level). These hosts would form a cluster, where each member is free to initiate contact with another and request services.One of these could be the encryption or decryption of data. Hosts would say "Please encrypt this data (hands it over) and return the encrypted result". Say host A tells host B this. Suddenly we're in a situation where we cannot simply disinfect host B, because if we do we'll lose the key that decrypts data on host A! Of course, the worms would negotiate the complement, and host A would contain the key to unlock data in host B. We then expand this scenario to a great interconnection between members of the cluster. We can strengthen the connections by allowing unrelated hosts to negotiate interlocks.
In the same vein worms can negotiate and divide the search-space between them. Each worm could contain a compressed/simplified representation of the IP-search-space (just a couple of masks maybe? Haven't thought too hard about it). Relatives would communicate which parts have been scanned as to not duplicate (too much) work. This then becomes a parallell binary search!
I think I'm gonna have to write a short doomsday article too, there's just so much cool things that someone wicked could do.
Re:Warhol Worm proposed: 15 minutes to total infec (Score:4, Insightful)
Some don't know they have IIS (Score:5, Insightful)
This is a bigger fix than one might think. At the university at which I work, the major problem was not the sys admins who did not patch their servers, it was the professors who had Win2K Professional on their workstations with IIS on and didn't even know it. Some of them knew about the worm, even made sure that the department's IT teams patched their servers, but did not know that they were running a web server in their office, let alone that they were infected.
Re:Some don't know they have IIS (Score:2)
I'm on Win2K Pro right now, freshly installed last night. IIS is not running, because it isn't installed by default. You have to go to Add/Remove Programs and install it yourself. So how the heck do the Win2K Pro boxen that people run somehow spontaneously install IIS on them without their knowledge? IIS is installed by default on the server varieties of Win2K, but these people shouldn't be running those. So I wonder, what's going on?
At Last, the Professor Teaches the Easy Way (Score:2)
Re: (Score:2)
Use the tool, then format anyways? (Score:2, Interesting)
Microsoft has developed a tool that eliminates the obvious damage that is caused by the Code Red II worm.
Then they say this:
MICROSOFT RECOMMENDS THAT INFECTED INTERNET-FACING SERVERS BE REBUILT ACCORDING TO THE GUIDELINES PUBLISHED ON THE CERT WEB SITE.
It should be noted that among other things in the CERT guidelines, they tell you to do a clean install of your OS after you've been comprimised. So what's the point of this tool if MS thinks you should just R&R your OS anyways?
Conspiracy Theory (Score:2, Interesting)
CodeRed, the first version was fairly lame, and didn't infect beyond a separate IP block. Microsoft gets scared and realizes that their "iminent" release of WinXP might be blocked, or worse yet, shunned by the consumers. "Oh no, now we can't track all those stolen copies of Windows".
Then CodeRedII comes out, a bit nastier, going after more machines. Then Microsoft is denied their appeal.
CodeRedIII comes out, infection is much worse, and now opens the machine up to more attacks than before. It gets so deep into your Windows system that you must reinstall anyway. Not only that, but allows anyone who reads their logs to go in and cause damage ("polluting blame" as we say). Now compromised machines are being hacked in many more ways than just being opened up.
What does Microsoft recommend? You download this "patch" (audit tool) which you run and then it "cleans" (audits) your system, then as their own CERT document recommends, you reinstall your OS (i.e. find your original, licensed install media, and hit our website for the latest (intentionally trojaned) copies of drivers and IE/ActiveSetup installation tools).
What's a bit odd about this process though, is that Microsoft requires that you run their "cleanup" tool to purge the infection, THEN reinstall. If I'm going to fdisk and reinstall anyway, why do I have to run this "cleanup" tool? (audit?)
Curious that nobody has thought of this angle. Why do we not hear about hundreds of FBI agents tracking down the author of the virus in the Faroese Islands or whatever. Usually these people are caught within days of the outbreak. There hasn't been a single peep about any investigation in two full weeks. It's not like we don't have a HUGE audit trail, we all have dozens of logs. Plot it out, find the dates/times, narrow the search,and find them.
Oh wait, perhaps they're the same entity which supplied you with the infectable OS in the first place.
What was that they were saying about Linux being "potentially viral" a few weeks ago?
And it keeps going (Score:4, Informative)
From: security@cfl.rr.com
To: Our Valued Customers
Subject: Security Notification
ROAD RUNNER ALERT
VIRUS ALERT. YOUR IMMEDIATE ACTION IS REQUIRED.
Dear Road Runner Subscriber:
Road Runner, like many other ISPs and, indeed, the entire Internet, has
experienced an attack on its network that apparently is attributable to a
strain of the Code Red virus. It is possible that this virus has infected
the PCs of Road Runner customers using the Microsoft Windows NT Server or
Microsoft Windows 2000 Server operating systems. Infected PCs may
continue to flood the Internet and the Road Runner network with
virus-generated messages (even without your being aware of it).
Road Runner is working to alert all of its subscribers to this problem
and to instruct them on where to find and install the patch necessary to
eliminate the virus. In the meantime, Road Runner customers may
experience slow network response, flashing data lights on their cable
modems, and other symptoms (such as unusual port scan log activity or
increased firewall activity) while Road Runner and the Internet community
work to control the impact of this virus.
IF YOUR PC IS RUNNING WINDOWS 2000 SERVER OR WINDOWS NT 4.0 SERVER,
PLEASE IMMEDIATELY DOWNLOAD THE CODE RED PATCH FROM MICROSOFT'S WEBSITE
(www.microsoft.com/security) AND RESTART YOUR PC.
IF YOUR PC IS RUNNING WINDOWS 98, WINDOWS 95, OR WINDOWS ME, OR IF YOUR
ARE A MACINTOSH USER, NO ACTION IS REQUIRED ON YOUR PART.
We ask for your patience while Road Runner continues to work with the
Internet community to address this virus.
Thank you.
Road Runner Security
But that doesn't help if... (Score:2)
But the trojan modifications by the newer version of the worm are permanent, and will NOT be removed by rebooting and installing the patch. The patch just prevents reinfection by the original buffer overflow bug.
Look here [securityfocus.com] for a tool to TRY to clean up the system.
But note that once the system has had the FIRST backdoor installed, that may have been used to install other backdoors, unknown to the author of the cleanout tool. And in infected machine is advertising its vulnerability to the entire net by the infection attempts it makes.
The only real solution is to reinstall the whole machine, and install the patch before going live on the net.
(And while you're at it - why not install Linux or a BSD instead, and switch to the Apache web server, which doesn't HAVE this problem.)
Re:And it keeps going (Score:2)
But its so easy to install a trained monkey could do it. In 2k its just "Add/Remove Programs" and hit a checkbox. Its more difficult in NT in my experience, I've had horrible experiences trying to install IIS4 with anything other then SP3 as the current service pack level. IIS4 is also part of the Option Pack, and not included in NT itself (thats IIS2, which afaik is not vulnerable to Code Red).
They should be telling people who are running NT/2k of any variety to install the patch, that would go a lot farther towards solving the problem.
That script (Score:2)
I have a PHP script set up to do a `net send %COMPUTERNAME%'. If I can find an FTP server with Microsoft's new tool, I may start downloading that with an FTP script and running it.
However, I also heard that IIS doesn't run with many privileges at all on Win2k boxes. It may not be possible to do anything at all.
About time! (Score:3, Informative)
About time Microsoft showed people how to secure a Windows web-server! Turn off the web daemon! *sigh*
Leter from MS: (Score:5, Funny)
To: Registered_Users@iis.microsoft.com
CC:
Subject: RE: IIS Code Red Worm Patch
Attachment: Instructions.doc
Body:
Hi, how are you?
We are writing you in response to the Code Red worm that has recently attacked our premium enterprise gold standard web portal system, Microsoft Internet Information Server. We have compiled a set of directions for patching the server, and have included these instructionsin a easy to read Word document. If MS Outlook didn't automagically open this attachment for you, double click on the attachment link above.
If you have any advice on this file, please email us back!
See you later!
Microsoft Assumes... (Score:2)
Once your system has been compromised in this fashion, the only way to be sure is fdisk, format, and reinstall.
rude link on main page. (Score:2, Informative)
Linking to a page that could potentially shut down/restart your machine without warning is rude, virus or not.
~jeff
What I'd like to see... (Score:2)
Dumbest thing they could do (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Dumbest thing they could do (Score:2)
Re:Dumbest thing they could do (Score:2)
Re:Dumbest thing they could do (Score:3, Interesting)
We have a policy of formating the hard drive and reinstalling the OS once a machine has been compromised. This policy applies to any OS we run. To make it easy we've automated the process. To test the process we reinstall all of the machines on a regular basis, even servers. We spent some time years ago convincing vendors like RedHat that this was a useful thing (think jumpstart).
Stop blaming microsoft (Score:4, Funny)
They're the ones who are responsible for buffer overflows.
Re:Stop blaming microsoft (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:Stop blaming microsoft (Score:3, Funny)
More specifically... (Score:3, Insightful)
This may not be the cause of this particular overflow, but it causes a very large number of them.
The main reason you'd use strncat rather than strcat is to avoid buffer overflows, yet instead of the obvious choice of feeding it the buffer size, you have to feed it the maximum number of characters to add. So to use it to prevent buffer overflows, you not only need to remember the buffer size, you have to track the current string length!
Avoid strncat! Even if you understand it, someone who changes your code might not.
Make something more intuitive:
char *buf_strcat(char *dest, char *src, size_t buflen){
char *cur=dest;
int i=0;
while(*cur && i<buflen-1){cur++; i++;}
while(*src && i<buflen-1){*cur++ = *src++; i++;}
*cur='\0';
return dest;
}
Actually: authors of strncat() MAN PAGE and gets() (Score:5, Informative)
strncat() isn't a problem by itself. The problem is improper usage patterns.
When you're builiding a string by repeated strncat()s to a buffer, and you don't have guarantees about the size of the things you're concatinating, you need to prevent (or check for) overflow, something like this:
strncat(dest, src, MIN((BUFFSIZE-1)-sizeof(dest), chars_wanted_from_src));
Without such an example in the man page it's easy to forget to guard against buffer overflow. And once code is writing with guards for overflow the guard code will serve as a reminder to later programmers maintaining or upgrading the code.
But strncat() isn't the main culprit.
Most of the buffer overflow attacks come from reading an input using gets(). That bad boy should have had a buffer size argument, ala fgets(). And it's the decision to keep it in the standard library "for compatability" that causes all the pain.
The gnu compiler will warn you if you use it and the man page has a warning, so there's no excuse for it to show up in new code any more. And there's no excuse for not fixing ALL the warnings in a piece of production code, or for using (or writing) a compiler that DOESN'T warn about gets().)
yes-but (Score:2)
Re:Stop blaming microsoft (Score:3, Insightful)
I rarely use C's or C++'s overflowable library routines. If I do it's only in a quick hack. One dosen't need to use the standard library routines.
Re:Stop blaming microsoft (Score:2, Funny)
Re:Stop blaming microsoft (Score:3, Funny)
Re:Stop blaming microsoft (Score:3, Flamebait)
No, no, no.
When you buy a house, you know for a FACT that glass will break when hit with a hammer.
The people who buy MS products THINK they're getting something secure, since it's one of the many buzzwords (READ: lies) that MS always uses.
Your analogy just doesn't do justice to the situation.
Rich...
Re:Stop blaming microsoft (Score:2)
The people who buy MS products THINK they're getting something secure, since it's one of the many buzzwords (READ: lies) that MS always uses.
Many people look to buy house in a "safe" neighborhood. Most people want cars with a good "safty rating". People install alarm systems in their homes and cars to make them "safer".
You know what... none of that works either. Determined people will always find a way to break things. It doesn't matter if it is a house, a car, an alarm system, or an operating system.
You simply shouldn't try to blame one entity for the malicious acts of another.
Re:Stop blaming microsoft (Score:5, Insightful)
The only people that think they are getting something secure when they buy/download any operating system are the unwashed masses. The ones that don't know any better. These are the same people that allow the Code Red-style worms to spread.
The rest of us applied the patch supplied by Microsoft more than a month before CR came out...
You see, as an admin in charge of machines running IIS and other Microsoft software, I am subscribed to several alert lists, including Microsoft's security list. And when Microsoft releases a patch for anything that can be used to "arbitrarily execute code of the attacker's choice" on a port not blocked by my firewall, I immediately install that patch. The end.
I'm so sick of people blaming Microsoft. The released a patch well before Code Red. Get over it.
Re:Stop blaming microsoft (Score:5, Informative)
And were still vulnerable until we disabled URL forwarding.
The Microsoft patch alone is not useful. You are still at risk. See Incidents home page [incidents.org]
I'm so sick of people blaming Microsoft. The released a patch well before Code Red. Get over it.
Microsoft STILL hasn't released a patch that makes their webserver secure and allows URL forwarding. Their patch has its own security hole !!
Blame Microsoft, or simply use Internet server software that is secure. All mine is written by Dan Bernstein
Blame Microsoft! (Score:2)
Even thought the kiddies did it,
Microsoft will take shit for it!
Well, they're not a real company anyway.
(apologees to the southpark people)
Start blaming Microsoft again (Score:5, Interesting)
Apache is more of a monoculture (about twice as much) than IIS, yet Apache worms this bad generally don't happen because:
* Apache is not design-insecure, as is practically every Microsoft product - for example, Exchange's security goolies are still flapping in the breeze (have to be due to fundamental design) and I expect to see another CodeRed appear targeted for it Real Soon Now;
* If you want active facilities, you have to install them - or at least switch them on - because they either don't come with the base server (e.g. PHP) or aren't available in default pages to exploit (e.g. XSSI);
* The active facilities can only touch as much as the webserver can touch. Users named ``apache'' or ``nobody'' generally don't have write access to a great deal of the file system;
* Even though Apache as such is a monoculture, there is great variety between Apaches. They run on a wide variety of CPUs and OSes. Your binaries might be in
* Apache adheres to standards; a lot of IIS holes have been in Microsoft special features;
* Apache's code (including most common add-ons) has been examined by a wide variety of eyes using a wide variety of techniques.
Using Microsoft software costs you all of these advantages and more.
Re:Stop blaming microsoft (Score:2)
Hrm, I seem to recall the Morris worm exploiting a Sendmail vulnerability. Patching sendmail hardly seems like "play[ing] around with the reall fun stuff." Not to mention the recent BIND hole...
Re:Stop blaming microsoft (Score:2)
Re:Stop blaming microsoft (Score:3, Insightful)
Windows is sold as shatter proof glass..
This means it will not break.
Linux is sold as theft resistent..
This means it can break but it's difficult to gain entry..
Microsoft says:
When Windows breaks "well all software breaks"
When Linux breaks "See it breaks.. everyone breaks..."
Linux says:
When Windows breaks "Where is the patch?"
When Linux breaks "Here is the patch"
Security experts say:
"Get the operating system patched ASAP..
If you have the source code.. fix it yourself NOW don't wait for an offical patch"
Microsoft security experts say:
"Wait for an offical patch.. don't do it yourself"
RL security experts say:
"Fix it now.."
RL theafs say:
"BWAR.. Break Window And Run.... thwarts any security system....
Wait a while. If they don't fix the window quickly they'll soon forget...
Once they relax.. walk in the openning and walk out.." (taken from a 1980's text file on how to steal...)
From TV:
"We have to wait for Microsoft to relase a patch and then we have to test the system to be sure it works correctly and all the apps continue to work correctly." - Microsoft certifyed System admin being interviewed by a reporter...
Re:Stop blaming microsoft (Score:2)
Re:Stop blaming microsoft (Score:2)
IIS go bye-bye (Score:2)
Red Hat must be pleased that Microsoft is now bundling the Red Hat installer with their newest patch...
CI Host sucks rocks (Score:3, Informative)
If anyone is thinking of using CI Host, let me tell you THEY SUCK. About twice a year something major like this happens where I'm down for a week or more. In December of 1999 I went down for almost a whole month (their press releases will tell you it was a much shorter time than this but that is BULLSHIT).
I'm looking at maybe switching to PrimeMaster Online (http://www.primemaster.com). Anyone here have experience with them?
Microsoft made this mess? Huh? (Score:3, Insightful)
No, Microsoft gave us a mop to clean up after the mess the Code Red author(s) made.
You see, more than a month before Code Red came out, Microsoft gave us the patch for the security breach that allowed Code Red to take place.
Remind me again... (Score:3, Informative)
Software has bugs. They get found, they get fixed, move on. The only reason MS exploits get more press and greater impact than Linux exploits is that MS is on more boxes. If, as you claim to desire, Linux takes off, the same people shrieking to the sky about what a crappy system MS has will be defending Linux and saying, hey, it happens. Stupid users who don't patch aren't Bill Gates' fault.
It's just the same crap from folks who attack NT as buggy and crashprone (which is almost always due to 3rd-party drivers) while extolling the stability of Linux, which they keep rebooting because they have wonky drivers. A ha! they say, I was using a beta driver, its to be expected. Well, that driver has been in beta for over a year, that's as good as it gets. Software has bugs, move on.
You want to ignore your own faults and start a religious war? I'm betting you can get some cheap flights to Tel Aviv right now. Knock yourself out.
-reemul
who wishes 2k wasn't so buggy, either, but doesn't want to hear the bitching from folks who need 2 hours and a phone call to a friend to get a soundcard working
Here's a clue about "Linux worms" (Score:2)
It attacked the brainstems of morons who had left notoriously insecure network-daemon software [linuxmafia.com] running unpatched for a year or more. That's what we call being too stupid to live.
Rick Moen
rick@linuxmafia.com
You know 'Ramen' is dutch for 'windows' :) (Score:2)
Re:Remind me again... (Score:2)
Well, the first item in that list isn't actually an Apache exploit. It's a piece of trojan code that people are tricked into running by telling them that it's an exploit detector.
If you expect a count of google hit results to somehow bear any weight in this argument, you're an idiot. One, any given exploit will have 5-10 hits as google indexes mailing list archives. Two, it will catch all mention of 'Apache' and 'exploit' whether or not the thing being mentioned really IS an Apache exploit.
Next step: automate it! (Score:3, Redundant)
For extra credit: reboot twice, as Micro$oft recommends.
For a straight A: fix the problem forever by replacing NT with Linux...
Service Pack MAXINT, step by step (Score:2)
Shouldn't be too hard to alter one of the standard installers to:
What have I forgotten?
Next step: read the damn articles (Score:2)
It's a pointless enadeavour though. Of the 1300+ unique hosts that have bounced off my apache machines in the last ~70 hours, only 10 seem to actually be accepting requests for root.exe... the rest throw back either a 404 or a 403, with alot refusing connections, or just returning a "server overloaded" message. Of those ten accepting requests for root.exe two returned some kind of funny response, one redirected to goatse.cx, and the other seven seemed to actually accept commands.
Only gets SOME of 'em. (Score:2)
That only works if the server is infected by the version that installs the trojan.
With a little more work one could take advantage of the fact that being infected by any version of the worm shows the server is vulnerable to the original buffer-overflow attack. So one could:
Get a copy of the worm.
Modify it to take the web server down (or whatever) rather than infecting it.
Install a launcher for it as default.ida in the document root of your webserver.
Note that by now any worm-infested machine - benign or backdoor version - may have several diverse rootkits installed. So it should be reinstalled (preferably with linux or a BSD and apache B-) ) rather than cleaned out and patched. And a machine infected with the benign worm, if merely crashed, will no doubt be brought back up and eventually infected with the backdoor-installing version.
Some authors of retaliatory-strike software will no doubt chose to disable the web server on a more permanent basis - as by removing the unpatched DLL (along with the several backdoors the worm installs - see a patch tool here [securityfocus.com]) - rather than merely shutting it down.
While this may get them in trouble, chosing to reformat the drives would be a hostile action, since it might destroy unbacked parts of the web site. (It would also likely lead to the administrators installing a backup, complete with vulnerability. So it is a less effective retaliatory strike.)
Finally: I do NOT recommend actually doing this, as it may be illegal. The more damaging alternatives certainly are illegal (and also unnecessary, given the availability of less damaging alternatives).
Anybody who thinks... (Score:4, Insightful)
08/10/01 I received a total of 132 probes to tcp:80 on my 12.82.x.x dynamic IP via my dialup to worldnet.att.net
These are exclusively from other dialups and small-scale hosts in AT&T's 12.x.x.x class A; AT&T has introduced ingress filtering and I'm seeing almost nothing from outside (Note: almost - some stuff is still leaking through..)
But the problem is the enemy within: there's got to be thousands of home/SOHO small systems, maybe single boxes, put together by the hotshot early-adopters and techno-yuppies who think it's cool to go through the checkout stand at CompUSA and purchase a copy of Win 2K Professional, or whatever, and put it on their home systems with all the bells and whistles installed.
None of these boxes are under *any* formal administrative control, and it's going to be up to each and every one of these thousands of techno-yuppies to patch each and every single one of their boxes.
So far today 08/11/01 at 10:00am I've had 69 probes.
As far as I can see, getting all these systems disinfected and patched hasn't even started yet.
t_t_b
Not the mess they made... (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Not the mess they made... (Score:2)
posting it enough will make such lazy sysadmins
go away?
You're dead wrong... (Score:2)
Re:Not the mess they made... (Score:3, Informative)
I haven't seen it posted here on Slashdot yet, but there's a neat little Java Applet (it's even GPL) over at:
http://www.dynwebdev.com/codered/ [dynwebdev.com]
It auto-replies to any machine that tries an
Re:Not the mess they made... (Score:4, Insightful)
Does this really surprise anyone? MCSE's are trained (and tested) to solve everything by "reboot, reload, reinstall", because Microsoft's way is to "take the easy way out" instead of actually FIXING the problem.
And, so many MS service packs BREAK servers and software when installed, can you also not blame people for NOT rushing ot install them? Even where I work, where we do OS compatibility testing on servers we don't start using new MS service packs until they've been tested and found safe by our internal test group...
I for one expect use of IIS to drop as a consequence of the Code Red virus... Were IIS open source, these holes and backdoors would have been seen LONG ago and fixed. Apache runs MUCH more of the web than does IIS, yet you don't see anywhere near the number of bugs, exploits and DOS worms as does IIS.
Re:Not the mess they made... (Score:3, Offtopic)
Talking about rebooting - check this news.com video out [cnet.com].
Everybody but Bill Gates thinks it's pretty funny :)
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Not the mess they made... (Score:4, Insightful)
You just have to go look at the Netcraft survey's to understand. In the past they've pointed out that half of SSL enabled sites run IIS. Then about a month or two ago they started trying to identify individual machines and found IIS/Windows combination again on half of the overall web.
What we do know is that Apache is used in many more cohosting situations. Jimmy and Susy set up a web page and pay $0-10/month for it. Is it a signifigant thing that companies providing low price service with no service level agreements use a free OS/web server? I don't think so, but you be the judge.
Two other points:
Microsoft fixed the problem before there was a problem. I don't see how Open Source would be any better in this regard.
You should *ALWAYS* test patches and new releases before installing them into a production environment. That applies not only to Microsoft, but also to Linux, Sun, HP, Oracle, Peoplesoft, everything!
In our testing service packs don't usually break apps. But they do have a tendency to break drivers or low-level hardware monitoring tools provided by the manufacturer. Is this surprising? No. Again we have the same problems on our Unix servers with OS patches.
Here's how open source would be better... (Score:3, Insightful)
Its true that Microsoft put out a patch before the virus took off, so that's a good thing. But Microsoft releases patches all the time, and that is a bad thing. I'm on the security mailing list from MS, and I get at least 3 or 4 alerts a week. I'm also on the slackware list, and I have received 3 or 4 alerts in the last six months.
The reason for this is because Open Source projects tend to fix their security bugs before they are released. If Apache shipped with something that allowed this kind of remote exploit in one of the 2.0 betas, there is a better chance that someone else out there will see it. What is the chance that someone can do an independent security audit of Windows XP?
Closed source can be perfectly good at closing holes, if the company is as big as Microsoft. But Open Source is much better at closing those holes before they are shipped: many eyeballs make all bugs shallow. Open Source doesn't catch every bug, of course; but enough are found that when the odd hole is announced, it is a big enough deal that the patches are more likely to be installed.
Closed Source hurts Microsoft security in more ways than one. Not only are all default installations compromised, but since so many new patches come out every week most admins don't keep up with them. While this is partially the admin's fault, it is also the fault of the software model that prevents these problems from being found quickly.
-Mike
PS: how do we know that "Microsoft fixed the problem before there was a problem", anyway? The patch came out before this big worm hit, but how many servers were quietly compromised in the last year?
Re:Not the mess they made... (Score:3, Insightful)
The default.ida patch, a fix for a root-level compromise, was not placed in Critical Updates. Without either searching the site or being told of the correct URL to download the patch, users could not find it. People who used Windows Update religiously in the expectation of keeping their systems up to date were screwed. Sites which instructed their users that setting Windows Update to perform automatic updates would help keep them secure were screwed.
Once again, Microsoft created an expectation and failed to live up to it.
Re:Not the mess they made... (Score:3, Insightful)
However part of the problem is the use of huge monolithic programs, which attempt to do everything including the "kitchen sink". For quite a while with Windows we have been seeing what amount to explots through "bells and whistles". Frquently where most people don't even know something is even there...
Re:FUD ALERT (Score:2)
Start over with installing Win2K Pro, but the SP is either the very next step or will not happen.
In retrospect, it could have been that I removed permissions from Outlook Express (obviously an essential part of the operating system).
I can certainly understand how anyone would be paranoid about installing something in Windows.
Re:FUD ALERT (Score:2, Informative)
However, in this case, Windows DOES suck, regardless of the (moron|genius) at the keyboard.
Any system that *requires* OS updates to be bundled and installed along with the application (IIS) updates is broken. It matters not if you have an intern "administering" the box or a 10-year-vet.
If, for some reason, the latest bugfix from Apache broke compatibility with a current or previous Linux kernel, I can always pop a new kernel in there. On my own time. Checking to make sure that none of my other apps will break. Even if I'm not paying attention and blindly upgrade Apache without checking its deps, I'm left with an unusable Apache - my data is still there. I can just backpeddle to my previous Apache and I'm up again.
Not so with (2K|NT)/IIS. Install SP, hose machine...reinstall...
One of these situations takes a little more time than the other...
Re:FUD ALERT (Score:2)
Any good admin would have important data backed up prior to installing.
"
How do you back up the IIS settings on NT 4?
Answer - you can't.
Re:FUD ALERT (Score:4, Funny)
Oh gods, someone PLEASE tell me how I could get a job bashing Microsoft. I do it for free all the time.
And here's a security hole for you. Service Pack 6 (that's the original Service Pack 6, not 6a) not allowing anyone but Administrators to access the TCP/IP stack. You think that possibly some of Microsoft's vaunted legions of crack QA people might've possibly tried testing the service pack as something other than an Administrator?
Re:FUD ALERT (Score:2, Informative)
Re:FUD ALERT (Score:2, Interesting)
No, they'd need access to the subnet, not the machine. The security issue isn't with the machine that was patched, but the machines it communicates with
There's also a 6a, which is why I wasn't sure whether it was 5 or 6.
I don't know how much the issue is "new security holes" from the patch but "will it still work?". Look at 5->5a, 6->6a, DX8->DX8a, 3(!) attempts to fix that hole in Exchange, etc. Every MS patch needs to be regression tested on a non production box before being really attempted. It's too dangerous to do otherwise. It's also too dangerous not to immediately patch now as well. SNAFU.
Re:Not the mess they made... (Score:3, Interesting)
Microsoft's Problem! (Score:5, Insightful)
After all, they became an MCSE after a couple months of hitting the books, rather than a few years of hacking old hardware. They got a certificate and the sense that the Microsoft way is the best way - If you don't understand what a dialog box is asking, just hit 'Enter' and go with the recommendation. That's how IIS got installed on all of those PCs and this 'Default.ida' nonsense too. I still don't know what a 'default.ida' is used for, and I'm a pretty technical guy. - Something to do with indexing? Whatever.
Some of my friends are MCSEs. - Not all of them are 'hackers' who actually watch what happens in their systems. They trust that MS will send them a shiny new CD with a 'Service Pack', along with a few other goodies to play with when an update is needed.
The problem is compounded by the fact that these Win2K CDs got passed around - Microsoft knows this and whether or not they admit it, it's part of their marketing. From what I've seen, I'd suspect that the bulk of the problems are coming from the home users who are running a borrowed copy of Win2K on their PC/Cable Modem setup. The ones who don't get the service packs and don't log into Microsoft.com too read the bulletins for fear of being asked for proof of purchase.
You Microsoft has these thousands of unlicenced customers that they know are using their software in a dangerous manner - Everything installed, every service running - all the lights on, but nobody home. What is MS's liability?
With all of the talk about the signifigance of an AOL icon vs. an IE icon on the desktop, MS *knows* how people will react when running an install - They know that if the user gets a dialog that says "Activate IIS?" that an unsure user will probably say yes, even if he has no idea what IIS is or what the risks are.
Microsoft has got to accept the blame for this mess - It is their doing.
Unfortunately, this is the first step in the process of requiring people running servers of any kind to be *licenced* - Now won't that be fun?
Cheers,
Jim in Tokyo
False sense of security (Score:2)
The Windows GUI follows many of the same design principals that Mac followed for years which is why Apple never marketed the Macs as servers-- the abstraction is great in a workstation but in a complex server environment it is dangerous not to have the ability to participate in the system in the way one does with UNIX. Apple sold servers too, but they ran on UNIX.
Now you have trainied monkeys who think they know everything about NT, which really ammounts to "reboot when it bluescreens." They think that they are secure because of the quality of Microsoft's software. Yet they don't know really how TCP works so they have no clue how to begin to think about security from the outside-- all they know is security from the inside which is all the exams cover, and all Microsoft want's you to think about because that is where they have the most features (yeah, if yo can break in from the outside, you can break in from the inside, though).
So now, Microsoft has issued a patch to remove a backdoor-- one loudly advertised. Where is the ecurity in that? They should have, on their web site, in no uncertain terms, exactly what their engineers are telling their customers and exactly what the rest of the security community is saying: If you are infected, reload your computers.
There is false sense fo security in using this patch. Your IIS server has a backdoor which was heavily advertised to the net. Anybody could have installed another backdoor and you, as the admin would probably never find it. Not, at any rate, until someone used it to deface your site, publish your confidential information, destroy critical information, or other such activity...
Re:Microsoft's Problem! (Score:4, Informative)
Since you asked... Most people install IIS because they want to serve HTML or ASP pages, or maybe just FTP.
What Microsoft doesn't tell you is that Internet Information Service_s_ automatically installs a bunch of other ISAPI services which enable crap that you most like do not want. Examples include:
+ The ability to query Index Server indexes (idq.dll)
+ Internet Printing
+ Remote data queries
etc etc
Some of these things, particularly idq.dll have *repeatedly* had security holes. And that's why installing the the patch is not a fix, because it's only a matter of time until Code Red IV is exploiting another IIS bug to similar effect.
The real fix is to disable the extention mappings for things like
And the REAL real fix is for Microsoft to ship Win XP with a sane out-of-box IIS configuraiton. Anyone who needs value-add services can certainly find a way to turn them on. If Linux distros shipped with a thousand Apache modules installed and configured, you'd probably have much of the same problems.
The Real Fix (Score:2)
The real fix is to install some other web server. If it supports PHP you can also migrate your VB ASP scripts using ASP2PHP [naken.cc]. But maybe you don't want to drag extinct-but-doesn't-know-it-yet methodology and technology across to your shiny new server?
And... since you're changing such a major server component, why not change the whole server so that you're not, one day, forced to upgrade to Windows XP and bleed money for insecure software for the rest of your life? Install Service Pack MAXINT [linux-mandrake.com] today!
Re:Microsoft's Problem! (Score:2)
Actually a real fix would be to move away from monolithic programs. But NT since process creation is expensive under NT multi threading (of multi function programs) is prefered
Anyone who needs value-add services can certainly find a way to turn them on. If Linux distros shipped with a thousand Apache modules installed and configured, you'd probably have much of the same problems.
Except that it would be less of obscure to find a fix. IIS isn't modular...
But how many know that? (Score:3, Interesting)
Has anyone tried running this under Windows? (Score:2)
Re:setting this up? (Score:4, Informative)
AddHandler cgi-script
Re:setting this up? (Score:2)
Re:I don't think this is funny... (Score:2)
the reboot stuff only triggers when an infected machine tries to break into the machine running that script.
Re:strikeback fun, but not working very often... (Score:2)
Liability for software defects (Score:5, Interesting)
Re:Liability for software defects (Score:2)
We need laws to make software companies liable for one reason -- US software already has a reputation for being of poor quality [read microsoft]. In 5 years that could become a SERIOUS economic issue for the US, maybe german software will become the avant guard (like german engineering is thought of now), or japanese software will be the highest quality (like japanese steel is now). And suddenly we'll find outselves out of the software market like were out of the car market and out of the electronics market
Re:Liability for software defects (Score:3, Insightful)
The major difference in this case, and the reason that any case against Microsoft would ultimately lose (at least for the Code Red attack), is that Microsoft released a patch well before Code Red came out.
Ford and Firestone, on the other hand, tried to cover it up for as long as possible.
Re:Liability for software defects (Score:2)
The GPL grants you the privlege of copying, redistributing, and making derivitive works of copyrighted material, in exchange for agreeing to certain provisions. You only need to agree to the GPL if you want to do one of the above. When you buy GPL software, you are buying the software. If you so choose, the GPL provides you with a superset of the rights you atomatically get by buying a copy.
"normal" EULA's attempt to specify how you can and can't use the software in any case. They claim that you haven't purchased a copy, and you don't have the right to use the software as you wish.
Whether the courts would choose to recognize this distinction depends on how much corporate america bribes them.
In any case, this has no direct bearing on the liability issue.
Re:Why is the admins fault? (Score:2)
No. (Score:2)
Here is what they should have done to get this thing patched quickly.
"Everybody running a version of Windows on their computer should go to http://windowsupdate.microsoft.com , and download all of the items in 'Critical Updates' (which has the security patches selected by default when you first load it anyway)."
If you are vulnerable to Code Red and your a home user, the patch appears in the list of updates and will be installed. If not, well no harm done.
Thats the whole point of Windows Update, if we could just get people to go to it even if they don't think they are open to Code Red, we could put a stop to this thing really fast.
Thats the problem here, not IIS. A bunch of clueless home users who don't know whats going on and have no reason to check because of the way its being reported will not be the downfall of IIS. If Linux had any amount of home users to speak of, we'd see the same sort of problem among them eveuntally.
EXACTLY [Re:Why no lawsuits?] (Score:2, Interesting)
QUESTION: If Joe/Jane Consumer running whatever OS/Apps that exist suffered as a result of the Microsoft Code Red I & II Worm can he/she sue Microsoft for losses???
IMPORTANT NOTE: Joe/Jane Consumer did NOT sign/accept/whatever an EULA associated with Microsoft Web Server. Joe/Jane was just "harmed" by the poorly designed, fault ridden, Microsoft Server Software. Joe/Jane NEVER signed/accepted/whatever the EULA associated with the poorly designed, fault ridden Microsoft Server Software.
Re:Microsoft PR (Score:5, Interesting)
this is what joe user will think:
A dangerous "virus" threatens the entire internet (*cough*) and then microsoft comes to the rescue with a patch and saves the internet!