Emergency Alert System Insecure 210
glebe writes "The U.S. Emergency Alert System used to issue disaster warnings and other alerts over T.V. and radio is vulnerable to spoofing and denial-of-service attacks, SecurityFocus is reporting. Apparently, 'the EAS was built without basic authentication mechanisms, and is activated locally by unencrypted low-speed modem transmissions over public airwaves.' The FCC acknowledged the security issues yesterday in a public notice seeking comment on the future of the system."
Dear FCC (Score:5, Funny)
Since you asked, I thought I would weigh in with my comments about The U.S. Emergency Alert System (EAS). I think it's appalling that anyone with a 14.4 could tap into this system and alter it for their own aims. The whole system could be crashed by terrorists during an attack, compounding the devastation of any terrorist attack by cutting off access to the system, or providing false and possibly deadly information. For example, during the 9/11 attacks the EAS could have directed people to return to their desks in the WTC, magnifying the losses suffered that day.
I suggest you rebuild the EAS and take it offline until such a time that it can be secure.
>... the EAS is designed to allow the President to interrupt television and radio programming and speak directly to the American people in the event of an impending nuclear war, or a similarly extreme national emergency.
With the audio capabilities available today, it would be quite possible to dupe the public into thinking they were listening to George Bush, when in fact they were listening to the words of Osama bin Laden. And with the stuff Bush has been saying lately, the public might actually believe it was Bush no matter how insane the babble was!
Somehow you would want to have a method for ensuring the audio was legit, encrypted and unaltered. I'm sure there are many ways to do this today, so I'm not really sure why you're asking me! Throw up a bunch of secure pipes and give the president access to them. Come up with a way to keep his message secure. Yeah, it's going to be expensive, but not as costly as 80,000 employees of the WTC returning to their offices because the EAS said it was "just a test".
Kind Regards,
Scott
Re:Dear FCC (Score:3, Interesting)
That's not a good idea. The system is currently used for many events less catastrophic than World War III, like severe weather warnings.
Re:Dear FCC (Score:3, Informative)
I've been hearing about this for years (Score:2)
Re:Dear FCC (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Dear FCC (Score:2)
What threat level color are you at today?
Re:Dear FCC (Score:3, Informative)
As a NYC area citizen who was affected by that tragedy, I would like to point out that at no time during the day did the EAS even get used, at least in my view. I never saw it go off on any of the many channels we were flipping through.
Re:Dear FCC (Score:2)
Yup (Score:3, Insightful)
But the seriousness of the insecure EAS could have been much more deadly. Like if a nuke was detonated and people were told that some city was safe to return to, even when in reality a bunch of nuclear fallout was starting to cling to everything within miles of the blast.
I'm not sure how effective hacking the EAS would be, but I am damn sure I wouldn't want to find out. I say, take it offline until they can s
Re:Yup (Score:2)
pm
Re:Yup (Score:5, Interesting)
In any population there will be those who are more tolerant of radiation that others. A nuclear war will simply select for humans who can tolerate these conditions. Sure, mankind will probably live in the stone ages for a thousand years or more, but eventually things will clean themselves up enough for civilization to re-emerge.
I wonder what such a society would be like? It would have some knowledge from the high-tech past, but little means of employing most of it...
Re:Yup (Score:5, Interesting)
"Threads" is the most depressing film I've ever seen. When I originally saw it (aged 12) I had to turn off the TV right after the nuclear attack happened and couldn't sleep for weeks because it made me realise what nuclear war was about - I hadn't even barely understood until then. I recently got it in DivX form off a friend and watched it all the way through. It is not a film that comes under the heading "entertainment".
There is a good synopsis here: http://www.ibp-intl.demon.co.uk/nuke/threads.html [demon.co.uk]
The leaflets the UK Government were publishing at the time (when we all thought nuclear war was basically inevitable - it was when not if - and we had no control over it; it was largely an American or Russian decision whether the world should be scorched): http://www.cybertrn.demon.co.uk/atomic/ [demon.co.uk]
If you google around a bit, there are some quite good descriptions of the UK's (long-dismantled) emergency warning systems - it was multiplexed on the same phone lines as the Speaking Clock and could basically start and stop the sirens centrally. The UKWMO (also now defunct, described in the 'Protect and Survive' URL above) controlled the 'all clear' etc. signals.
Re:Yup (Score:2)
tornado sirens too? (Score:5, Interesting)
high school, I wanted to make a device to activate the tornado siren.
I figured I could just implement a simple replay attack. I never got
around to researching what frequency the signal was broadcast on, and
I didn't know how to record the signal once I knew where to get it
from. But it seems simple:
record when they do the monthly test, replay whenever. Panic everyone. Good
fun.
Apparently if you modify various bits you can make them play different
sounds and even broadcast voice. Plenty of fun to be had there.
If anyone has done anything like this, I'd be interested in knowing,
just so I don't have to get myself hauled off to jail trying to do it
myself
fp?
Re:tornado sirens too? (Score:5, Funny)
Somewhat maybe related... In high school we had those fire alarms that have the handle that you pull down to trigger the alarm. Well, as one of my unlucky (and stupid) friends found out; when you pulled the alarm a big blast of marking dye shot out covering your hand, arm, torso, face and everything else with a blue/black stain that was almost impossible to wash off. Needless to say he was found and busted within minutes of pulling the alarm.
Re:tornado sirens too? (Score:2)
Or.. as it is more likely.. a super-staining mark of a retard.
Re:tornado sirens too? (Score:2)
Re:tornado sirens too? (Score:2)
Re:tornado sirens too? (Score:2)
Re:tornado sirens too? (Score:2)
Re:tornado sirens too? (Score:2)
Also, we had 2 or 3 fake fire alarm pulls within a month. For the last one, they had a fireman at every door as we were walking in checking our hands for the ink.
Needless to say they didn't find the perpetrator. But it was rumored to us anyw
Re:tornado sirens too? (Score:2)
You certainly have a strange definition of fun...
Re:tornado sirens too? (Score:2)
Re:tornado sirens too? (Score:2, Funny)
Okay... (Score:5, Funny)
10 bucks for whoever can get all of Nevada to evacuate due to imminent flooding.
Re:Okay... (Score:2)
Re:Okay... (Score:2)
Obviously, you've never spent any time in Nevada.
Re:Okay... (Score:2)
Tsunami warning in Kansas would be a lot better.
Comment removed (Score:5, Funny)
Re:US Officials realized this... (Score:2)
mysterious color purple alert
No, silly, it's a Taupe alert this week. The alert scale goes from Taupe, to off-white, then to Vanilla, and bone. You've got to learn to tell these colors apart!
BTW - shamelessly cribbed from SNL
Re:US Officials realized this... (Score:3, Funny)
Re:US Officials realized this... (Score:2)
We interupt this program . . . (Score:5, Funny)
I can see it now (Score:3, Funny)
So... (Score:5, Funny)
Re:So... (Score:2)
20 to Life... That's how long.
Re:So... (Score:2, Informative)
- Stations are only required to forward EAN ("we're about to be nuked"), EAT ("OK, I guess we *aren't* going to get nuked"), and RMT. (monthly test) Many stations don't relay any other alert. (then again, many do)
- Stations are not required to automatically forward *anything*. They may hold even EAN/EAT/RMT for a few minutes, long eno
Re:So... (Score:3, Insightful)
Good info up until that statement. The reason you're required to monitor at least two stations is for redundancy, not confirmation.
With EBS, you only monitored one upstream station, creating a weak link. EAS requires multiple sources to prevent this problem, but doesn't cross-check the other sources.
Think of a weather warning, where the local NWS office issues an EAS alert
A good reason *not* to keep these things secret (Score:4, Insightful)
This is yet another example why keeping infrastructure details secret is a bad idea. It's security through obscurity in the real world, and removes any incentive to actually fix these things. Now that there is a public report about it, there's at least a chance that pressure can be brought to bear, and get it fixed.
Re:A good reason *not* to keep these things secret (Score:4, Informative)
Re:A good reason *not* to keep these things secret (Score:5, Informative)
Not only that, but you can find the format for EAS messages on Wikipedia, along with an overview of [wikipedia.org] SAME headers and messages. [wikipedia.org]
EAS has never been a secret. Neither was EBS, nor CONELRAD. HAND.
Re:A good reason *not* to keep these things secret (Score:2)
Re:A good reason *not* to keep these things secret (Score:2, Flamebait)
Re:A good reason *not* to keep these things secret (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:A good reason *not* to keep these things secret (Score:3, Informative)
Frgw ocpw ap. a egmxugjt!
You don't know what I said, but as soon as you figure out my algorithm you will. And you'll know what anyone else using that algorithm said. That's security through obscurity.
On the other side of the coin, is SSH2 Key-based authentication. I can tell you exactly how that works, but that knowledge won't let you log into my computer. You need the key. That's real security.
Re:A good reason *not* to keep these things secret (Score:2)
good fun (Score:3, Funny)
Use this to replay a nation wide brown note [metaltabs.com]. Also good fun. Buy stock in American Standard.
Not a big deal... (Score:3, Funny)
Oh my god! The russians are attacking!!!!!
That thing is for real ? (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:That thing is for real ? (Score:3, Informative)
Re:That thing is for real ? (Score:2)
Try a radio. I've found that TV stations will simply overlay the broadcast with more useful info than EAS (audio only) can possibly provide, and they don't even broadcast the monthly EAS tests anymore. Radio stations, though, broadcast just about every EAS alert that affects their listening area.
Re:That thing is for real ? (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:That thing is for real ? (Score:3, Informative)
Re:That thing is for real ? (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:That thing is for real ? (Score:2)
Old news... (Score:5, Informative)
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/613 [securityfocus.com]
I'm sure one could find even earlier discussions of this vulnerability.
k.
Re:Old news... (Score:2)
Did you RTFA? We know it's old news --- the article mentions this itself, providing the same link you give.
The news here is that, on Thursday,
Old news. (Score:3, Informative)
not only unencrypted but a public spec (Score:5, Informative)
NWR Specific Area Message Encoding (SAME) [noaa.gov]
Full spec (pdf) [noaa.gov]
Look on the bright side... (Score:5, Funny)
If they went public with this, I'd bet good money it's a precursor to an already set up proposal from a well-connected contractor who wants to ride the wave of public fear all the way to ten times the cost of fixing it.
Re:Look on the bright side... (Score:2)
Re:Look on the bright side... (Score:2)
If it ain't broke... (Score:4, Interesting)
Seriously. We don't have to coat everything in 50 feet of kevlar, spaced 100 feet apart and communicating with 1GB encryption keys.
Unencrypted broadcasting modem: scales well and very cost-effective.
Re:If it ain't broke... (Score:2, Funny)
Well, Yeah. (Score:5, Interesting)
When it was made, that wouldn't have been a problem. It was put in to repeat a message sent in the event of soviet nuclear attack. Each node would relay to all the other nodes. Of course, modem technology was rather scarce at the time, so security wasn't the top concern. This thing was never designed for security.
This is one of the few times where I can see hacking as terrorism. If you hack this, you are, in my eyes and in those of the law, a terrorist. Leave this one be.
oh goddamn it (Score:2)
Bastards.
Re:oh goddamn it (Score:2)
Yeah, you can send out a civil emergency EAS from Bush saying "I broke into the Emergency Alert System, and I'm BUTT NAKED!", but they won't see your naked ass, and, with the way most TV stations (at least in my area) are, EAS messages aren't broadcast - they read it, and then have their meterologist set up an alert (rarely are there non-weather EAS messages in my area, and Amber Alerts they just put a ticker on with thei
In search of the perfect dam (Score:5, Insightful)
That said - don't y'all sprain yer hamstrings to jump up and point fingers at the "government" or twist this into an open-source vs. closed source issue.
Every system is designed in relation to its operating environment. The EBS was originally designed for a far more benign environment than exists today. I bet the primary goal of the designers was to come up with a system that was simple and effective and would work even if large parts of the power grid and the telephone network collapsed. It is inconceivable that they did not ask themselves if they needed bullet-proof authentication mechanisms - it is equally probable that they discarded that requirement as being potentially failure-prone. Given the fairly benign security environment that they designed for, and given the technology available and the overarching goal of simplicity - they cam up with what is really quite functional.
And then the world changed (surprise, surprise). the environment that surrounded the EMS changed, rapidly and unpredictably. Where previously it was safe to assume that natural disasters would bring people in the community together to work in co-operation to face the threat, we now wonder which sleeper cells activate in these situations. The comfortable security blanket of yore that RipVanVinkle aka RVV dozed is suddenly yanked off - exposing us to the elements.
Its like waking up one day in the shadow of a dam and suddenly seeing a thousand leaks in it. The small leaks have always been there - all dams leak and sweat a little. But now we know that there are people out there that seek to widen the cracks and stuff them with C4 and stick some fulminate in them (amazing how much chemistry you can pick up from the newspapers isnt it?). So RVV franctically tries to seal the leaks in the dam. Paranoia? Perhaps.
The real tragedy is that the time that should be spent tending to his crops, playing with his children, making hot, sweaty love to his wife and dreaming big dreams in his afternoon nap is now spent in searching and classifying and closing the leaks in the dam.
Will RipVanVinkle make his dam perfect? Can any dam be made perfectly leak free? Go figure.
Emergency Broadcast System problems (Score:5, Informative)
On February 21, 1971, an alert message announcing a nuclear war was sent over the teletype network by accident. Somebody at NORAD loaded the wrong paper tape. Almost no stations broadcast the message. One station in Florida actually did. After that, NORAD lost their authority to send emergency action messages on their own.
The current system has more input sources than the old one did. There are weather alerts, and now even child abduction alerts. If there's ever a phony message, it will probably come from some "authorized" input source.
A detailed history is here. [partnershi...arning.org]
Re:Emergency Broadcast System problems (Score:2)
Re:Emergency Broadcast System problems (Score:3, Informative)
Re:Emergency Broadcast System problems (Score:2)
Re:Emergency Broadcast System problems (Score:5, Interesting)
The previous poster is correct. There were actually two tones (853 and 960 Hz) which were broadcast at the same time for 22.5 seconds. By using two tones it prevented false detection. Usually. I built more than one EBS detector during that period with a couple of Tone detectors (NE567 if I remember correctly) and an and gate and a 555 timer to not alert unless the tone was on for more than 10 seconds or so. This was primarily used in later years for local emergencies such as tornadoes. However, for nationwide emergencies another system was used.
Each station had a "big red envelope". The station I worked for had it at the operator position in the main control room. Digging around the internet I found this site [akdart.com] which has a picture of an envelope from 73. I remember the newer ones (about 1991) being better printed, but about the same. The envelopes were sealed and were not to be opened unless the station received an EBS message via teletype which needed to be authenticated. This envelope was replaced on a regular basis.
At some point during the period I was around the station I asked the owner about the envelope, and he related the story about the February 1971 activation. Evidentally he was on duty when the message came in. (Looks like there's a copy of the message up on this site [beradio.com]). He opened the envelope and checked the authenticators. Now you have to realize that everyone pretty much knew that the only likely reason for the nationwide system to be activated was nuclear war. Saying that he was rather worried by this message is an understatement. I can't remember if he complied with the warning or if it was called off fast enough that he didn't have to, but I do remember he was either ready to shut down or did.
If you google for "1971 EBS Activation" [google.com], You will find some other stories about this event.
Re:Emergency Broadcast System problems (Score:2)
Re:Emergency Broadcast System problems (Score:2)
It must have been the most chilling false alert ever..
This is only a test... (Score:2)
It isn't as bad as it sounds. (Score:5, Informative)
The low-speed transmissions are done by 'primary' stations, who have big transmitters. 'Secondary' stations choose primary stations to monitor, and retransmit the alerts the primary stations transmit.
The low-speed transmissions are done on their broadcast frequency.
So, you know what you need to exploit this? Locally, you need to know which local station(s) is/are primary, and a transmitter big enough to override the monitored signal, or a group of transmitters big enough to override the monitored signal at each of the monitoring antennas.
Nationally, you would need to do this for EVERY primary station.
It isn't perfect, but its actually pretty reasonable security. A far bigger threat would be someone who could inject a believable warning into the primary systems, and even there, I'm not so certain its really a worry (see: 1970s NORAD mistake that no one broadcast).
Re:It isn't as bad as it sounds. (Score:3, Informative)
It's quite a bit simpler than that. Let's assume I want to get a message out to a large (local) audience via EAS. In most areas, the cable TV system will broadcase EAS alerts on all channels (or at least sound an alert tone and
Re:It isn't as bad as it sounds. (Score:2)
Re:It isn't as bad as it sounds. (Score:2)
Re:It isn't as bad as it sounds. (Score:3, Insightful)
Which isn't difficult at all...
Once you're a few miles away from the multi-megawatt signal, a transmitter of a few watts can over-power the signal locally.
Re:It isn't as bad as it sounds. (Score:2)
We had a hard enough time getting our DJs to remember to trigger the *required* EAS tests, and the incoming alerts (weather, Amber, etc.), much less getting them to remember to approve a made up one with weird info.
Emergency Alert System Insecure -- a phase (Score:3, Funny)
________________________
That's just not true...it has a password! (Score:2)
Been following EAS/EBS for a while... (Score:5, Informative)
It truly was designed for a different era, but has its uses even today. Virtually all weather emergency bulletins are sent out via the EAS protocols today, which doesn't normally affect people in, say, Silicon Valley, but makes a big difference in Tornado Alley and in Florida right now.
A few miles from here there was a fire at a chemical factory in La Mesa, CA... I was sitting there watching something on a high-cable channel when I hear a tone and see scrolling text at the top of the screen advising me to evacuate the area. Thank you EAS, and thank you Cox Cable.
When San Diego had its Cedar Fire in 2003 (largest fire in the history of CA, which altered everyone here's life [sciencemeetsart.com]) the EAS was used by the NWS, FD, and PD to provide information on evacuation across all channels on the cable systems (not sure about the radio, they might have been covering that themselves).
The California Office of Emergency Services has a Emerg. Digital Info Service [ca.gov] that uses some of the same technology and protocols as well (includes the much-reknowned AMBER alerts).
Don't think that this is some relic, this is used and tested on at least a weekly basis nationwide (SD Info [sandiegophotos.org]).
That being said, efforts to modernize and update things are great. I'd like to see some sort of emergency protocol for data packets, similar to the emergency phone service that allows infrastructure workers' phone calls to have priority in the midst of an emergency. There should be a EAS sitatuion website that is update out-of-bounds and is replicated (through some fancy AS routing) to servers all across the country, so it's always accessible. Think of a FEMA-run Akamai.
The company I work for was even considering some way to allow people to have EDIS/EAS alerts pop up (via Messenger service or some other client) whenever they were released for the area they're in (won't work because of all the RFC1918 space they use
Emergency Alert Systems, and Civil Defense systems in general ARE still around, and ARE working within their original intent, but more public attention needs to be brought to them, so that all know about them. It's not so much security, but having more eyes on them will undoubtedly help suggest further improvements.
And I agree with the earlier poster... ANYONE who hacks a system like this deserves the 20 years of time they'll get. That's just dumb. It's on a par with DOSing a 911 call center. Don't do it. You WILL cause loss of life and NO ONE will have any sympathy when you go to prison for a very, very long time. In fact, I'd love to help catch you.
Tell us something new? (Score:3, Informative)
Do you pay attention to "Emergency Broadcasts"? (Score:2)
A) I live in California, they don't pre-announce earthquakes.
B) for a few years, I lived in Nebraska, where they did broadcast, with some regularity, warnings of tornados and flooding. Flooding NEVER applied to ME (since I didn't buy a house in a low area), and after a while, I began to treat tornado warnings as special invitations to go outside and see the cool angry-green lightning. My house was well built and held up well to 100 mph+ winds. No trailer for me.
C) Al Quesodilla just nuked LA.
Perhaps this is all a set up (Score:3, Interesting)
They could have already set up monitors that could very quickly traingulate the source of an interference, while in parallel secretly laying down a secure system. Then by encouraging press coverage of the security holes, they would raise the possibility of a terrorist trying to use said security holes, and in doing so, give up their location.
Puting on my meta-tin-foil-hat.
Broadcasting is insecure (Score:2)
If you are not directly in an emergency, atleast take an effort to verify it. On 11 september 2001 my inital reaction was that it may be a 'super
Hoax - true story (Score:2)
At least it looked official... and it could be a huge disaster for the whole island and its 6,000 or so inhabitants. Local learneds debated about it on radio and TV.
No confirmation with said authorities could be obtained, and Canadian media weren't reporting the story either. What to do? There had been a devastating tsunami in Newfoundland in 1929 [lostatsea.ca]. Heck, a third of the old women in St-Pierre w
It was broken from the gitgo (Score:5, Interesting)
However, let me also point out that the huge majority of the system, if it all worked, which is rare, is secure in that the average stations gear can only accept input from the designated primary station in the area, and the NWS services which are also a part of the "network".
The rest of the secondary sites in a given area are proscribed from the generation of any spurious information by the FCC, with the penalties being both uncontestable, and damned expensive for the offender who originated the false message.
The rest of the problem is its dependability. The local system here has to jump the NRAO Quiet Zone, and is I believe now a satellite link, itself a huge problem in the event of an emp from an atomic device on the same side of the planet, or solar flares also can potentially render the link useless.
Once you get the alert up here from star city, then you have the problem of poorly designed gear foisted off on us broadcasters by the relatively short timetable mandated by the last methodology change about 15 years ago. That gear is now failing, and the maker, who was probably incorporated just to peddle the things, has since found it impossible to survive on the expendables the system requires, like its printers unique thermal paper etc. No schematics were furnished without a lot of yelling and screaming on our part, and sending it back for expert service? Fugetaboudit. Expert service does not exist in many cases.
And then the commission wants to fine us 27,000 per malfunction to boot. Most of the failures are beyond our control as the testing frequency is not sufficient to locate a malfunction before its a real malfunction.
Yes, its broken, hopelessly so. It needs to be replaced with something that actually works AND is secure from outside attacks.
And it needs to be stated up front that anyone with an idea of sueing the users for using an unknown submarine patent they ran to the patent office and got a patent on after the system was developed, will do jail time until such time as the system is declared unusable as this one s/b now. We went thru that already with this system, some jerk, smelling an easy dollar, ran and got a patent on it from our slumbering USTPO and sent all of us letters demanding $1500 a year for a license to use the system that was developed and mandated by the government. I think all of us were in close harmony during the chorus that told the commission and the equipment makers to pay it, we weren't about to pay annually for something that was mandated by them once we had purchased the original gear and installed it.
They faded away into the slime from whence they came eventually, and the patent was eventually set aside, or so we are being told.
Yah, we need a new system, one considerably more well thought out than this one ever was.
--
Cheers, Gene
Hackers: only a modest change is necessary (Score:2)
My experience (Score:2)
I always thought that the system wasn't exactly that secure, as it was a relayed system and if a primary station issued a false EAS message, it would be relayed to all of those stations designated to listen to the primary...
One time when configuring a new EAS machine, I was tempted to issue a Tsunami warning (for the Chicagoland area), but decided I'd rather not go to jail or pay
Secure? (Score:2, Insightful)
How about a virus? (Score:2)
The airwaves are secure.... (Score:3, Interesting)
Sure, there's no tech security in the EAS system itself, but there is plenty of physical security at any TV or radio station under the jurisdiction of the FCC. To put it bluntly, if their broadcast signal is overtaken by a hacker by any means, that station is at risk of having its ability to do business taking away from them forever by losing their license.
To create a false EAS message, an attacker would need to know what stations monitors what other stations in the EAS network, and also be able to overtake on of those statioons to get their own broadcast on the air. This just plain isn't likely... not to mention whatever public panic might be created would be mitigated by the real EAS system quickly publishing a "Ignore last message, we've lost control of our system!" message.
Re:The Solution has but Three Letters (Score:2)
Re:Go ahead and fuck with the system (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Simple solution (Score:3, Informative)
Re:Simple solution (Score:3, Insightful)
All you need is a central signing authority a la SSL websites. Everyone has a copy of the CA's key hardcoded into their emergency receiver equipment. You just have to make bloody sure the CA is never compromised (and there are ways to do that - the current SSL CAs seem to be remaining secure).
The bit that you distribute - the CA root cert in your box - can be sent out publically. It doesn't need a secure distribution channel.
This would be an entirely appropriate level of security for an emergency bro