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Classified Data Missing From Los Alamos
Posted by
timothy
on Mon Jun 12, 2000 11:28 PM
from the or-maybe-we-lost-them dept.
from the or-maybe-we-lost-them dept.
LightSaber writes: "Here we go again.
This time it is computers and hard disks with nuclear weapons data that are missing from the lab vaults. This is really becoming pretty much a regular feature by now." Similarly, bapya writes:
"CNN reports a
secret nuclear information leak
from Los Alamos lab. Apparently, the disappearance of the records was reported on June 1. One official said part of the problem in tracking down the missing data is that the record keeping is so unorganized it is difficult to tell who had access to the lab and who could have legitimately signed out the material. How can we manage our critical information???" Oscarfish points out coverage of same on Excite News.
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IT: US Military 'Hacked' by Emails 141 comments
An anonymous reader writes "Two of the US Military's most important science labs were apparently 'hacked'. Phishing mail was sent to a pair of research labs, where trojan programs allowed interlopers access to the otherwise secure networks. One of the sites was the infamous Los Alamos, which has been discussed many times here at Slashdot for its string of security breaches. 'Los Alamos has a checkered security history, having suffered a sequence of embarrassing breaches in recent years. In August of this year, it was revealed that the lab had released sensitive nuclear research data by email, while in 2006 a drug dealer was allegedly found with a USB stick containing data on nuclear weapons tests. "This appears to be a new low, even drug dealers can get classified information out of Los Alamos," Danielle Brian, executive director of the Project On Government Oversight (POGO), said at the time. Two years earlier, the lab was accused of having lost hard disks.'"
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Classified Data Missing From Los Lamos
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new /. topic (Score:5)
More about the missing data (Score:4)
The Reuters [excite.com] story at excite is pretty thorough; basically it's unclear whether the two hard drives were destroyed, lost, or stolen. Funny thing is, they were discovered lost May 7 - but the Energy Department wasn't notified until June 1. Employees are to take lie detector tests, and it seems they whole search setup is becoming a big mess.
The Washington Post story [washingtonpost.com] also has a good wrap-up. According to most sources, the drives were last seen in a suitcase in a vault in a Los Alamos lab. I think the confusion of the evacuation due to the recent fires might have something to do with this...
And here's the Los Angeles Times [latimes.com] article.
By morning I guess most major newspapers will have it in print and on their websites, but in the case of something like this I've always thought earlier is better. Let's just hope the drives are recovered...
Hmmmm (Score:3)
all persons, living and dead, are purely coincidental. - Kurt Vonnegut
Re:the irony... (Score:3)
In the case, say, of an SLBM launch that may not be readily feasible in the time before impact.
In the case of accidental launch (possible, given that systems have been breaking down to the point where incoming ICBMs have been reported (falsely) by alarm systems), you generally don't WANT to retalliate, as if it's a single launch it's a bit petulant to destroy all life on Earth.
And so forth. MAD works only versus known enemies, like nations, that don't launch anonymously.
the irony... (Score:4)
most of the comments go along the lines of "stealing OUR information". Hrm. So like, it's evil for a company to not disclose source code of its competitive assets (ie: MS's kernel), but it is ok for America to keep its competitive assets (ie: nuclear tech) secret?
Isn't there something wrong here? Everyone on
And don't tell me its because atom bombs are far more destructive than the source code to a kernel. Go look at how Open Source tackles security - ie: Bugtraq, vunl-dev. That's all "open" - and everyone benefits because we can protect ourselves from attackers much better if we know their tools. So, likewise this should be the case on a larger scale - if we knew what weapons existed, we could better prepare ourselves against them.
See my point?
But Seriously, Folks...It *Shouldn't* Matter... (Score:4)
Why oh why is my fetish for doggie porn and Britney Spears fakes more well-guarded than classified data? If I can get into the habit of entering a passphrase to access my data drives, why can't the DoD, State Department, et al. make disk encryption an across-the-board standard for all employees dealing with sensitive data? We can be sure that this isn't the case, because otherwise the government would be downplaying its irresponsibility by mentioning that the stolen data encrypted and secure. So the question becomes, why isn't this policy, and when will they wake up and make it policy?
[For the curious, I use a free Windows program called Scramdisk which can make encrytpted "virtual drives" or encrypt whole partitions. Its source code is freely available, but is not GPL. It's very secure with a choice of 256-bit Twofish or eight other ciphers. It ensures that family and friends will not uncover my secret she-male fixation. Oops, did I type that out loud?]
We've got a Broken Arrow (Score:3)
Oops!
-- Give him Head? Be a Beacon?
Re:What nuclear secrets do we have? (Score:3)
Re:Accountability (Score:3)
Or the opportunities in materials processing in Kansas? I expressed the same confusion to a co-worker because of a similar background, and he pointed out that those opportunities are part of the reason for the differences.
In the military, you are dealing with an enlisted workforce that can't leave (except for a window of opportunity every 3-6 years). The military has broad flexibility in the variety and degree of punishment, ranging from scut details to Leavenworth, and there is little difficulty in assigning that punishment, expecially at the lower end of the range.
On the other hand, government labs have to attract and retain researchers who are willing to work for lower salaries than their commercial counterparts. These researchers are more likely to look into work rules beforehand, can leave at any time, are subject to a limited range of punishments ranging from unemployment to prison, and have a high barrier toward applying these punishments. In such an environment, it is probably impossible to establish or to enforce security policies to military levels (which are not themselves perfect).
los alamos eh... (Score:4)
"DEAR GOD!! THE AMERICANS HAVE THE BOMB!!!!"
FluX
After 16 years, MTV has finally completed its deevolution into the shiny things network
Re:los alamos eh... (Score:3)
The information is public knowledge, and yet still classified.
Makes me wonder just how paranoid they are when they say 'classified'. For all I know, they've deemed the Los Alamos cafeteria schedule classified because it might be used to help poison some foolhardy scientist in ten years. Or perhaps they've classified their work schedule, because they don't want the GAO to know they work twenty hour weeks and bill for forty..
Re:los alamos eh... (Score:3)
Nope. The Los Alamos cafeteria schedule is in fact available on the web for the entire world to see at [lanl.gov]
http://www.lanl.gov/labview/services/CafeteriaM
Difference in security. (Score:4)
Re:los alamos eh... (Score:3)
Accountability (Score:3)