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Comment Re:Who is liable in an accident? (Score 1) 66

So who is liable in an accident? The manufacturer?

Yes, the manufacturer of the self-driving system. People have been asking this silly question for a decade now, even though there is no other answer. Google, at least, has stated publicly on many occasions that they are liable for the actions of their self-driving vehicles.

Comment Re:Good luck with that (Score 1) 66

They admitted exactly what I said. Which is that they periodically remote control the cars.

No, they did not. In fact they said exactly the opposite, that the cars are never remotely-piloted. They said that the cars occasionally request guidance, which means something like "Should I go this way or that way?", then the car acts on the answer.

Comment Re: Good for him (Score 1) 106

In fact China has brought in a lot of fairly strict environmental policies in the last few decades, which often have quite dramatic effects on local industry. For example, no factories within half a kilometre of most rivers, and no discharging untreated waste into them.

Then there is the massive and frankly staggering rate at which they have adopted renewables. Hit their Paris targets 5 years early, and those were considered too ambitious to be realistic at the time.

"But China" was never a good argument, but these days it's laughable.

Comment Re:Interesting (Score 1) 32

Mamdani hasn't been in long but has already

- Froze rent for 2 million New Yorkers
- Cut subway fares in half for low-income riders
- Fully funded NYC parks
- Added $680M for public schools
- Launched free child care for 2-year-olds

All things that we were assured were impossible, would crash the economy, would bankrupt the state etc. Oh, and he balanced the budget.

Politicians absolutely can help the people they are supposed to work for. Socialism absolutely does work. It's just that it works for you, not billionaires, so they are very keen to convince that they you can't possible have it and it's all just a fantasy.

Comment Re:Good luck with that (Score 1) 66

They drive themselves most of the time, and on the odd occasion when they are unsure or the passenger calls for assistance, a human can intervene. They don't drive the car directly, they just tell it if it can proceed, which route to take, that kind of thing.

It helps deal with the corner cases that are hard to engineer general solutions for.

The main difference between that and driver aid systems is that the car doesn't need immediate intervention to be safe. It will stop and call for help. Driver aids need the driver to be paying constant attention, which is why the Tesla ones result in so many injuries and fatalities.

Comment Re:phrasing, subby. (Score 1, Troll) 15

It's mostly better. While the barge has to be a bit more complex because it has to have the lattice of ropes (it's not a net), it means that the booster doesn't have to have landing struts. That's a significant weight saving, which means less propellant needed too.

It likely also means that the system is less dependent on good weather, and better able to recover from small issues that would tip self supporting boosters over. IIRC the Blue Origin system actually welds itself to the deck when it lands to help with that, which obviously makes the legs disposable.

The only real downside is that it does require that barge to land, so to land on the moon you would need to first land a landing station. That won't be an issue for the first manned trips, and longer term it may have advantages because the vehicle's engine can be shut off at higher altitude and kick up less regolith.

Exciting times and another technique added to the list of options. We will see which becomes the preferred one, but competition in this area is going to be good for getting costs down.

Comment Re:"Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory" (Score 1) 67

From an anarcho-capitalist and Austrian perspective, the attack of these subjects is severe. The core criticism is that welfare economics often dresses political value judgments in mathematics and presents the result as scientific optimization.
The Austrian objection starts earlier than the libertarian one.
There is no measurable quantity called âoesocial welfare.â
You value a steak dinner. I value the money more. We trade. Both reveal, through action, that each prefers the new situation.
Economics observes the voluntary exchange.
Now a welfare economist writes something like:
Social welfare = Aliceâ(TM)s utility + Bobâ(TM)s utility + Charlieâ(TM)s utility.
The Austrian response is: what units are you adding?
Utility is ordinal. You prefer A to B. This does not mean your satisfaction is 17.3 units and mine is 12.8 units.
You cannot scientifically establish that taking $1,000 from one person causes less lost utility than giving the money to another person creates.
You can support redistribution as a moral or political position. But calling the resulting calculation a social welfare function does not transform the moral judgment into an objective measurement.
âoeSociety choosesâ is dangerous language.
Individuals choose. Individuals act. Individuals own things. Individuals bear costs.
âoeSociety decided to spend $10 billionâ usually means a political process selected an expenditure and taxpayers were compelled to finance it.
From an anarcho-capitalist perspective, aggregating millions of people into a fictional decision-maker hides the essential question:
Who decided?
Who pays?
Who benefits?
Who refused?
What happens to the person who says no?
Social choice theory deserves some credit here. Its own results expose serious problems with turning individual preferences into a coherent âoewill of the people.â
The Condorcet paradox shows that majority preferences can cycle. Arrowâ(TM)s theorem shows that no general ranking system satisfies several attractive conditions simultaneously.
The anarcho-capitalist reaction is almost sarcastic: you spent decades proving mathematically that there is no coherent social preference ordering, then continued discussing how experts should optimize social welfare.
Pareto efficiency is much narrower than political rhetoric suggests.
Pareto efficiency has a legitimate analytical meaning. The trouble starts when economists move from voluntary exchange to hypothetical compensation.
Suppose a regulation gives Group A benefits economists estimate at $100 million and imposes costs of $60 million on Group B.
Some welfare analysis says the policy produces a $40 million net social gain.
The libertarian response is simple: Group B lost $60 million. Did anyone ask them?
If A gains $100 and B loses $60, saying âoesociety gained $40â treats separate people as entries in one accounting ledger.
An anarcho-capitalist rejects the premise. A benefit to one person does not cancel an imposed loss on another person merely because an economist performs subtraction.
The knowledge problem destroys the fantasy of optimization.
This is the Austrian argument associated especially with Friedrich Hayek.
Economic knowledge is dispersed. Prices contain information produced by millions of independent decisions. Preferences change. Local circumstances change. Resources have competing uses.
A central analyst does not possess the information needed to calculate the âoeoptimalâ allocation.
A market does not require one person to know everything. Prices coordinate plans without a central mind directing the entire system.
Welfare economics often asks, âoeWhat allocation maximizes welfare?â
The Austrian response is, âoeYou do not know the relevant preferences, opportunity costs, entrepreneurial discoveries, future alternatives, or counterfactual prices required to answer your own question.â
The calculation problem is worse without genuine market prices.
This is the argument strongly associated with Ludwig von Mises.
A bureaucrat deciding whether resources should produce railways, hospitals, housing, batteries, or server farms needs meaningful prices for capital goods.
Those prices emerge from exchange, private ownership, profit, and loss.
Without genuine market pricing, planners are not optimizing. They are allocating according to administrative rules, political pressure, historical budgets, lobbying, and guesswork.
A spreadsheet does not solve the economic calculation problem. More computing power does not solve a missing-price problem.
âoeMarket failureâ analysis often compares reality with an imaginary perfect market.
This is one of the strongest libertarian criticisms.
The usual pattern is:
Real markets have imperfect information, transaction costs, externalities, monopolistic tendencies, and unequal outcomes.
Therefore, government intervention might improve the result.
The missing step is institutional comparison.
Government officials also have imperfect information. Regulation has compliance costs. Voters are rationally ignorant. Agencies seek larger budgets. Politicians respond to concentrated interest groups. Regulations create unintended consequences.
The relevant comparison is not:
imperfect market versus perfect government.
The relevant comparison is:
imperfect market process versus imperfect political process.
Once you make that comparison, many clean textbook conclusions become much weaker.
Social choice theory accidentally supplies ammunition to libertarians.
This field is less inherently collectivist than welfare economics.
Social choice theory demonstrates that collective decision mechanisms have deep structural problems.
Majority rule can cycle.
Agenda setters can influence outcomes.
Strategic voting changes results.
Different voting systems produce different winners from the same underlying preferences.
There is no neutral mechanism for converting individual rankings into a single collective preference under all desirable conditions.
A libertarian conclusion follows naturally: if collective choice is structurally problematic, reduce the number of decisions imposed collectively. Leave more decisions with individuals, families, firms, voluntary associations, insurers, cooperatives, charities, and contractual communities.
Social choice theory often asks, âoeHow should everyone collectively choose one option?â
The anarcho-capitalist asks, âoeWhy must everyone choose the same option?â
That question cuts much deeper.
The deepest conflict concerns consent.
Mainstream welfare economics often focuses on outcomes.
Anarcho-capitalism focuses heavily on means.
Suppose forced redistribution produces a statistical improvement under some selected welfare function. The anarcho-capitalist still asks whether coercion became legitimate because an economist assigned weights to different people's utility.
From this perspective, the central problem with much welfare economics is not bad arithmetic. The problem is a category error.
Economics studies choices, scarcity, exchange, prices, production, and consequences.
The moment an economist says, âoeThis distribution is socially better,â a moral judgment has entered the analysis. The economist should identify the ethical assumptions instead of presenting them as a technical output.
The harsh Austrian verdict would be this:
Welfare economics starts with subjective individual preferences, admits they cannot be directly measured or meaningfully added across people, constructs a mathematical social welfare function anyway, inserts political judgments into its parameters, and then announces an âoeoptimalâ social outcome.
Social choice theory is more interesting because much of its best work demonstrates why the phrase âoesociety prefers Xâ is often logically unstable.
The anarcho-capitalist alternative is less ambitious and more disciplined: voluntary exchange, private property, freedom of association, decentralized decision-making, and liability for harms. Instead of trying to maximize an imaginary aggregate welfare number, allow people to pursue different goals and coordinate through consent.
The strongest criticism is not âoeall welfare economists are socialists.â Many are not. The stronger accusation is that the framework gives technocratic politics a scientific-looking vocabulary. Words such as optimization, social welfare, efficiency, and compensation criteria often conceal the real political questions: whose property is taken, who decides, who pays, and whether refusal is permitted.

Comment Re:Interesting (Score 2, Interesting) 32

So it turns out politicians can pass legislation that helps people.

Mamdani has been doing a lot of it.

Of course, it was too hard for the "other" politicians because they were being paid off. Mamdani ran on a platform that those other politicians were describing as something that would destroy the state.

Comment Re:Being too wealthy really is sociopathic (Score 1) 165

This level of aversion to having to "slum it with the masses" where every last bastion where you might come across a person with a 5 figure income

Dude, you're being ridiculous.

That's clearly not the intention here if the end result of passing through the luxury terminal is boarding the same airplane as those masses, and it is. It's obviously just to make the airport part of the travel experience nicer, in ways that would be too expensive to apply to the regular terminal. It's the same thing as airport lounges (I'm a Delta Sky Club member myself, a privilege I pay money for so I have the option of a nicer place to wait, the availability of hot showers on long trips, food, drinks, etc.) just scaled up to cover the whole airport process... right up to boarding time when the people get shuttled to board with everyone else.

Comment Re:Being too wealthy really is sociopathic (Score 1) 165

Urban cores subsidize suburbs

This is simply false. Most of the US wealth is generated in suburbs. Or perhaps you think that companies are people?

Urban cores steal from suburbia by taxing company offices that are located in urban cores. But if you look at PERSONAL tax returns, suburbia is clearly funding the lifestyle of urban cores. And as usual, welfare queens always think that they're actually the hardest-working and deserve all they get.

Oh, just "dis-aggregate" (whatever that means) the foundation of human civilization.

Yeah, let's instead force people into 15-minute neighborhoods. With barbed wire and fences, so they won't dare to go out.

Why they may ask?

Cheaper housing, better jobs, more space for kids, better entrepreneurship, better general outcomes. There's simply nothing that urban cores can offer in these areas.

Comment Re: We have been doing this all along... (Score 1) 81

Indeed, but I was answering the question: "It seems like there is an obvious business opportunity for a domestic tractor manufacturer here. Anyone care to explain why nobody has moved into this market?"
European tractors would not be a domestic manufacturer. A domestic company moving into the market would be a "new manufacturer" and would have to invest quite a bit into development - design, manufacturing, etc...
It's easier for other companies, whether Chinese, Japanese, or European to move in instead with their own superior offerings.

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