Can someone explain to me why a reactor can overheat and meltdown like in Japan ... but not have the energy to spin the turbines to power cooling?
Yes. The first factor is the residual thermal heat in the reactor, it is 150 tons of uranium, so it's a large thermal mass before having properties that cause the heat in the first place, i.e. neutrons bouncing around.
Obviously the heat is removed with the water cooling, however the water also serves to *moderate* the reaction by slowing the neutrons. There has to be enough water to cover the fuel rods otherwise more heat is generated. There probably was enough energy to spin the turbines and may have been a way to control the reactor assuming it was operational.
I don't know if there is facilities to do that however, after the earthquake and SCRAM the reactors condition was unknown.
How can it get so hot that it boils the water way even under ridiculous pressures ... but that heat can't be used to power turbines?
Well the pressure in a Mk I reactor only has to get to 70psi to expose the basis design issues and typically operates at lower pressures than that.. As the water level was not known in the reactor the operators didn't know that the water level was low. Consequently there was nothing to moderate the reaction and instead of cooling, it was getting hotter.
Am I to believe that reactors actually generate more power when shutdown than when powered up?
Yes, when they malfunction, as was the case in Fukushima.
I just can't fathom why a plant can SCRAM and then overheat ... but be unable to cool itself.
Because there wasn't enough water to moderate the reaction, let alone cool it. Don't forget the natural state is for it to produce heat.
Someones design is WAY fucked up me thinks. Its generating too much steam ... USE IT ...
By that stage each reactor was fully exposed to the basis design issue and was hot enough (thermal and radioactive) to start producing hydrogen from the water. This is the beginning of a plutonium fire, so at that stage, assuming you still had containment a lot of water is required to bring things under control. If TEPCO had better contingency planning, followed the manufacturers instructions for operating the plant, and the backup generators were available this whole situation could have been avoided.