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Comment The timeline is of note. (Score 1) 39

It seems worth noting that one of the items in Wyden's rather pointed inquiry is the fact that the feasibility of doing this is known to have been demonstrated for the DoD by outside people familiar with it at least as early as 2016; so while this is the first confirmed case of adversarial use it's the outcome of at least a decade of just ignoring the problem; and a significantly longer period of failing to reasonably anticipate the problem. It's not like there's No Such Agency you could ask about "how could you spy on someone with the internet even?" if you wanted to know how well or poorly readily available information matched a nation state signals intelligence apparatus.

Purely as a matter of cellphones being expensive and somewhat tepidly capable in the before times I assume that there was a period within living memory when merely telling people not to Gordon Gekko on their DynaTAC where the russians can hear you was good enough; but that would have clearly and rapidly been getting less true for at least a quarter century.

Comment Definitely a bad look... (Score 4, Interesting) 36

The whole 'responsible disclosure' preaching and the not-terribly-subtle threats seem particularly bad given that there's an entire industry of actively more dangerous people who are not only treated as legal but actively courted by state agents and cops(and often even less savory customers, though they tend to be cagey about those); the ones who actively seek to keep vulnerabilities quiet so that they can continue to sell exploit tools and services based on them. Throwing zero days on github isn't ideal vs. getting them fixed; but it gets them fixed faster than if Cellebrite wants to hang on to a bitlocker bypass or Trenchant, and L3Harris Technologies Company, wants to keep selling 'network investigative techniques' that can bypass default windows defender configurations or whatever the situation is.

From the outside it's hard to know whether MS actually mistreated the researcher badly enough to justify their displeasure(the consensus appears to be that MSRC was never the best to deal with and has actively gone downhill; but this person's position seems significantly angrier than average) or whether they are perhaps wound a little tight; but implying that their legal status is the same as people actively running attacks against user systems is blatantly false and totally ignores the class of researchers who do actively run attacks while being treated as respectable.

It's a particularly bad look when at least Facebook got into a public legal fight with the NSO group over their nerd-merc work against their users; not like that actually solved the problem of attacks on cellphones; but it was an all-too-rare case of industry pushing back against the 'respectable' arms dealers; and not one that MS has an analog to.

Comment Isn't that the point? (Score 1) 240

Isn't much of the point here the cultural shove? Sure, there's the line-go-up stuff; but that doesn't explain the companies gutting quite profitable software development operations to shovel money at Nvidia for things that have no demonstrated ROI; if it were nothing personal, just business, the level of enthusiasm for taking on poorly characterized risk would not be as fervent as it is. It's absolutely about resentment of the human resources that has been running at least as long as the demonstration that it would actually take some shoving to get them all to come back to the office, likely significantly longer.

Comment Re: Dance for me. (Score 4, Insightful) 154

They already pretty much are. You have to do at least a little performative fretting about the risks, which spoils the enjoyment of pure cheering at the best crunching sounds; but there's no way we'd justify the level of recreational head trauma something like football produces if we didn't fundamentally regard the players as relevant only the the way racehorses are.

Submission + - Elon Musk just spent $185 million on a mysterious AI data center deal in Memphis (nerds.xyz)

BrianFagioli writes: Elon Muskâ(TM)s AI ambitions appear to be getting even bigger after a mysterious SpaceX subsidiary reportedly bought the Colossus I xAI data center property in Memphis for $185 million. The 217-acre facility, already tied to xAI operations, represents another sign that the AI arms race is increasingly becoming a battle over physical infrastructure rather than just software models. GPUs, power delivery, cooling, networking, and datacenter ownership are quickly becoming strategic assets as companies race to scale AI systems.

Oddly, the press release never identifies which SpaceX subsidiary actually purchased the property. It also refers to âoeX-AIâ as a subsidiary of SpaceX, which is not how xAI has traditionally been described publicly. Whether that wording reflects legal restructuring, corporate overlap, or simply sloppy PR language is unclear, but it adds to the growing sense that Muskâ(TM)s companies are becoming more interconnected behind the scenes.

Comment Re:Why: Privatization == free money? (Score 4, Insightful) 42

There are obviously cases where complete vertical integration makes no sense; literally all of them if you interpret 'complete' at full strictness; but when someone actually says "privatization" they basically always mean contracting out something large enough to be or have been an internal program. Sort of the way you don't say "outsourcing" unless it either was or plausibly could be an internal function. Ordering copy paper from staples or having a meeting catered generally doesn't count.

That doesn't mean to say that it's always a bad idea; but when someone says 'privatization' that's a "we'll have SAIC do it" proposal not a "employees and the DoE use laptops they got under a GSA schedule contract rather than from the First People's Computational Manufactury" proposal.

Submission + - 'Underminr' CDN Vulnerability Hides Malicious Traffic Behind Trusted Domains (securityweek.com)

wiredmikey writes: Threat actors are exploiting a vulnerability dubbed "Underminr"i n shared content delivery network (CDN) infrastructure to hide connections to malicious domains. Researchers say the vulnerability could impact roughly 88 million domains and can bypass DNS filtering and protective DNS controls, potentially enabling stealthy command-and-control communications and other evasive attacks.

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