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LiveJournal Founder Launches OpenID System
Posted by
Zonk
on Tue Jul 05, 2005 03:49 PM
from the who-are-you? dept.
from the who-are-you? dept.
geekdreams writes "Brad Fitzpatrick, the founder of LiveJournal, has launched OpenID, an 'actually distributed identity system' for websites that accept user comments. The system utilizes decentralized servers to authenticate users, and aims to replace centralized ID systems such as Microsoft's Passport and SixApart's TypeKey. The first implementation of OpenID can be seen on LiveJournal comments pages." Previously mentioned on Slashdot, now out of development.
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IT: The Case for OpenID 229 comments
An anonymous reader writes "VeriSign and NetMesh are making the case for OpenID, the grass-roots, decentralized digital identity system already supported by LiveJournal, Six Apart, Technorati, VeriSign and many startups, reportedly growing 5% every single week. They say OpenID 'is fundamentally different from other identity technologies' because it is a 'fully decentralized system' and has a 'much lighter cost structure' than any alternative, like Microsoft Passport, CardSpace or Liberty Alliance. Time to remove username and password from your site and add OpenID libraries instead, so visitors can authenticate with their blog URL?" From the article: "If tomorrow, for example, you decide you don't like the Diffie-Hellman cryptographic key exchange at the root of OpenID authentication, you can develop your own way of authenticating, and deploy it within the OpenID framework. If you have an idea for a new identity-related service that nobody else ever thought of, you can deploy it into the OpenID framework as soon as your code is ready. This radical decentralization on all levels of the stack, both technically and organizationally, is a very strong catalyst for attracting innovators and their innovations. This makes OpenID a superior choice for identity-related innovation."
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LiveJournal Founder Launches OpenID System
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A dupe with a note saying it's a dupe (Score:2, Insightful)
(http://www.sdonag.plus.com/ | Last Journal: Wednesday June 07 2006, @04:05AM)
We just need to kill passwords (Score:2, Interesting)
Can hardly wait... (Score:3, Insightful)
Also isnt there an issue if somone discovers your password, they can "pretend" to be you on any site including sites with sensitive information such as paypal and the like...
Re:Can hardly wait... (Score:5, Insightful)
(http://www.wuputah.com/)
Anyone can run an identity server.. so for instance each ISP could have one, or you could choose to use Google's, or Yahoo's, or Livejournal's.. or even mine, if I choose to run one for my website. In an ideal world, AOL could run one and integrate it with their AIM logins. Microsoft could run one and then Passports would work too.
Having a decentralized system allows you to avoid problems like this - it's kind of like jabber in my mind. I don't know *too* much about OpenID yet but this is the general idea.
A good Idea... (Score:1, Insightful)
(Last Journal: Thursday February 23 2006, @07:41AM)
Just my 2 cents...
Self Obsessed ID system? (Score:4, Funny)
The point? (Score:2)
Sites that let you enter your name/URL/email/etc and show it without verifying you're you are lame.
On the other:
Somebody could run their own identity server that says they're http://spammer.example.com/000001/ [example.com] all the way to http://spammer.example.com/999999/ [example.com] and that's not a goal of this system to prevent.
If anyone can run their own identity server, then why use this rather than a (probably more user-friendly) Captcha [wikipedia.org] system?
Re:The point? (Score:5, Informative)
(http://slashdot.org/ | Last Journal: Monday November 03 2003, @03:59PM)
So it's a convenience for users, not to prevent spammers. This does have spam implications: you can blacklist/whitelist ID servers and you don't have to give your email to every site you visit, but it's not really about preventing spam. It's about simplifying the mass of passwords and accounts you have.
DOA (Score:1)
(http://ninenine.com/)
What this is actually good for (Score:5, Insightful)
(http://www.blindmindseye.com/)
Registration is mostly good for keeping away trolls who can't even take the time to learn their native dialect of English well enough to write a coherent and grammatically correct post. Sometimes it's horrifying to read the structure of such posts because you realize how far our schools have fallen. I've gotten ones that if I didn't have a college-level grasp of English, I'd have no idea what was being said.
As long as security is the first priority, this is a good thing. What I wonder though, is how secure this could really be without centralization. The appeal of SixApart's service is that SixApart is guarding it aggressively from being cracked... so who runs this service? I'm not sure how well you could trust a P2P system like this since you have no definitive authority to say "this user is who he/she says they are."
All that jazz (Score:3, Funny)
(Last Journal: Wednesday July 26 2006, @04:50AM)
Sometimes i wonder
Why we don't have it shut
Closed ID seems smarter
Burma shave
Seriously all this jazz about the OpenID systems left right and centre from so many sources , yet non of them work , perhaps a new vector is required
It looks vulnerable to spoofing (Score:2, Insightful)
This is a good step (Score:2, Interesting)
Easy Identification Across Web Sites (Score:2, Insightful)
public PGP key repository (Score:2)
(http://lawpoop.blogspot.com/ | Last Journal: Friday May 28 2004, @06:51PM)
NoCatAuth (Score:2)
Interesting (Score:2)
(http://www.alexkrupp.com/)
Universal Authentication? (Score:1)
Self-Identification (Score:5, Insightful)
(http://www.downes.ca/)
I was very pleased to see the LiveJournal system because it acknowledges what no system has done before: that identity belongs in the hands of the users.
This has two major aspects:
First, as argued over and over on the LiveJournal site, this is not an authentication system, it is an identification system. You are not being required to prove you are who you say you are, you are instead being given a mechanism to declare who you are.
It is, in purpose and intent, as secure - and no more secure - than filling out a web form. But the idea here is that you fill out the form just once, and then using a system of call-backs (to ensure your personal information isn't spoofed) you can use that information anywhere on the web.
Let me repeat that, in case you didn't get it: anywhere on the web.
The idea is, if you want, you can have the *same* identity on each of dozens of websites. Which means, say, if your email address changes, you change it once, and this information is now available (if you want it to be) to all of your accounts. Ditto your home page.
I will leave the many many applications - such as web-wide peprsonalized display, in-page messaging, multi-site social networking, and more - as an exercise to the reader.
Second, what it means is that the system is distributed. This means that there isn't some centralized grand poobah of identity (the way Passport tried to be, the way Sxip is trying to be). It means you can choose any system you want to host your identity or you can build your own.
Let me repeat that: you can build your own.
Don't like their security. Make yours tighter. Too much lag on LJ. Host it yourself. Want to send different emails to different types of site. Code it.
One of the mistakes made in previous system was in the use of a one-size fits all model, which meant that the level of security had to be at the highest possible - which is orders of magnitude more than someone needs merely to write blog posts and comments. Building a distributed system allows each person to decide how much - or how - security is appropriate.
Having made these two points, I would like to mention briefly where my system goes beyond LJ's. In their system, you are still typing your home URL at each site you visit. In mine, you don't ever have to type your home URL - it is stashed in the browser agent environment variable, where it can be picked up by any site that needs it. Oh I know, you probably shouldn't do that - but I've been testing this for months with no ill effects. YMMV, and if you have a better idea, I'm all ears.
Despite the naysayers here on Slash, this system - or something very like it - will become the norm on the internet very soon.
Why?
- Because it will be very simple to install for websites, especially after things like Drupal and Wordpress modules are built.
- Because it will be very simple for the user, because they just need to type one thing in (or extensions will be built for my type of system).
- Because it will work.
- because it will be no less safe, and probably more safe, than filling forms willy-nilly everywhere you go.
xdi.org and I-Names?? (Score:2)
(http://www.mega-tokyo.com/)
Sold! (Score:1)
(Last Journal: Friday June 20 2003, @02:15PM)
Taking it a step further (Score:3, Interesting)
(http://hisham.livejournal.com/ | Last Journal: Wednesday March 29 2006, @03:15PM)
What if we took this idea a step further and added a form of authentication, namely, signing of messages?
Here's what I have in mind, please point out any flaws in my logic:
- I log into livejournal.com using my id, "hisham".
- I post a message at foo.com using my OpenID, hisham@livejournal.com.
- foo.com sets a cookie in my browser, and issues a request to livejournal.com, with the cookie and the message.
- livejournal.com receives the request, verifies the cookie (confirming that the request from foo.com was posted by a browser who's actually currently logged as hisham in livejournal).
- livejournal.com then signs the message and sends the signature back to foo.com.
- foo.com posts the message saying that hisham@livejournal.com posted it, with the signature in the end (or most likely, accessible through a link).
- If anybody wants to verify if the message is legit, they can copy-paste the message and the signature and check it in a verification form in livejournal.com.
The system is still fully decentralized (anyone can host their own "OpenAuth" servers) and you only need to trust one of the sites (the signer), not both as in OpenID (though "trust" in the sense of OpenID means just identification, not authentication -- and I'm fine with it since that's its purpose).Off the top of my head, the only two potential issues I see are:
- the signer server would see everything you posted anywhere -- but anyway, Google see all my emails... if this is a concern, host your own server;
- the load on the servers -- would this be a big problem? most sites could use lighter, less CPU-intensive cryptography... again, if this is a concern, host your own server with 1024-bit crypto.
What do you people think? Could something like this work??Problems with OpenId (Score:2, Interesting)
(http://atrus.org/)
Problems with OpenIDI put off reading the OpenID [openid.net] spec [openid.net] because I though it was probably flawed. Now I just feel applying my head to my desk.
OpenID is led by with this philosophy:The above is taken from a discussion [danga.com] of vulnerabilities. The problem with this lowest common denominator approach is that it's horribly broken. OpenID is currently no better than just giving the URL of your blog.
The number one problem is the complete lack of integrity checking. Everything in OpenID seems to be perfectly happy to let their requests be modified in transit. I think the problem with this are pretty damn obvious: nothing can be trusted. Fortunately, fixing this is pretty simple: use TLS [ietf.org]. In today's shared hosting environment, you probably want to require support for server name indication [ietf.org].
Another brilliant idea: transmit the key that you'll use for signing later in plaintext.I believe "limited in some way" means "completely insecure." "Dumb mode" is not safe because there's no key associated with the server, so there's no way to ensure you're talking to the same one or that someone isn't tampering.
I also don't see much point in using a symmetric key for speed and security when you're just encrypting a short string. It's so tiny that both improvements are similarly small.
Perhaps the biggest problem with OpenID is it's reliance on sending a user to another page to login. It's just too easy to spoof a page and fool most people. Even better, you can open a window using Javascript and hide the location bar. Even if you normally use TLS, most people probably won't notice if it's missing or the certificate is different. Also, most sites (including LiveJournal) include a completely insecure assurance that you're secure. For example, LiveJournal [livejournal.com] says "LiveJournal Secure Site "
A simpler and more secure alternativeThe only way to fix this is (gasp) get users to carry their own keys. If you stored your key in a bookmarklet or extension, you could sign something with it. This is completely feasible because Javascript cryptography implementation [zonnet.nl] is done. You could submit your public key with the signed comment. If you wanted to associate yourself with a URL, all you need to do is link to a page with the public key. If the same public key can be used for the signature.. That's right, no special identity server is needed. The public key could be submitted directly or it can be linked to. It might be a pain to write out the entire URL to the key, so perhaps autodiscovery-from-HTML should be supported:
<link rel="openpgp.key" href="http://www.livejournal.com/pubkey.bml?user=a trustheotaku"
Note that no TLS is needed. The signature is secure in and of itself. If you want to support all the fanciness (e.g. revocation) of OpenPGP [openpgp.org] (spec [ietf.org]), then you just need the
Hmmmm (Score:2)
(http://danky.com/)
How does this prevent you from saying you're me? (Score:1)
(http://www.poromenos.org/)
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:5, Funny)
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:5, Informative)
(http://www.abstractwankery.com/)
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:2, Insightful)
Not really.. if you aren't remembering passwords, you're pretty much out of luck when you go to another terminal, or forget to backup your firefox directory and lose your data.
Maybe this type of system isn't for you, but I can definitely see some use for it.
Also, just because something is complicated doesn't mean it'll eventually get exploited. Things can be complex, yet well thought out and secure.
Re:Obligatory (Score:2)
*sigh* oh slashdot...
Not that bad, either (Score:5, Insightful)
(http://slashdot.org/ | Last Journal: Monday November 03 2003, @03:59PM)
I'd have thought the motivation was to limit the number of separate accounts you need. Having a billion accounts running around is a massive security nightmare. Either you're using the same password everywhere (and telling every web site owner your password) or you're wandering around with a notebook of thousands of passwords.
Firefox won't remember your password if the computer is a public terminal, or if you use multiple computers (e.g. at home and at work.)
No, this isn't the ultimate solution (which involves encryption, a portable very strong crypto key time-based challenge-response, and perhaps biometrics), but it could be a good half-measure.
Re:Not that bad, either (Score:5, Insightful)
This is a means of identification. You log in to a site. The site passes off a redirect url, of sorts, to the OpenID server (the part after the @), and asks THEM to verify who you are. The OpenID server does this, and either goes to the URL it was directed to, and now you're 'identified' to the original site, or says no
So, what if they spoofed the OpenID server, made it always say yes? Then now you have anyone @that_openid_server can ident as anyone else. This doesn't compromise me@some_other_server. I'll probably end up running my own OpenID server, and having my account on it. Or maybe get my friend to, and we'll all share. Small and localized, one password to remember, and works anywhere (home, work, laptop, desktop, friend's house..) and the authentication goes away when I close the browser window.
What, exactly, is wrong with this
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:1, Funny)
It would be easier to identify someone (and harder to spoof someone) if their ID information carried across multiple sites.
Re:Rivalry (Score:3, Informative)
(Last Journal: Saturday January 13 2007, @02:19AM)
and his comments about spam and trust lead one to believe that these are area's SixApart's service could fill.
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:4, Insightful)
3 Tools like Firefox's "remember password" make these kinds of shared identity systems obosolete, don't they? Who cares how many passwords you have to remember? You don't have to remember ANY of them anymore, really.
One of the things I hate about internet is precisely this. Face it, how do you feel when some links in slashdot to a "register for free!" kind of link? I also hate when I go to a blog or a online forum and I'm forced to register, wait for email, login, etc. Most of the time I give up - this thing would fix those problems.
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:4, Interesting)
(Last Journal: Wednesday November 14, @08:42PM)
One of the things I hate about internet is precisely this. Face it, how do you feel when some links in slashdot to a "register for free!" kind of link? I also hate when I go to a blog or a online forum and I'm forced to register, wait for email, login, etc. Most of the time I give up - this thing would fix those problems.
On the surface you might think that this thing would fix those problems but I highly doubt that it will change anything.
Think about it: If the New York Times wouldn't adopt Microsoft's Passport solution do you really think that they are going to adopt this solution by a (in their eyes) virtual nobody? If something with the backing of the largest software company in the World couldn't take off then I don't hold out much hope for this except perhaps for some blogs here and there -- but that hardly solves the NYT problem.
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:4, Interesting)
No one liked Passport so that's why it didn't get used. This is a different idea which has a slim, but possible, chance of success.. even on large sites.
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:1)
(http://slashdot.org/)
Being modded down?
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:3, Insightful)
(http://dstupid.com/geeklog/public_html/index.php)
I'm not saying that we need more services like the one in the article, but it would be nice to have some sort of simple way to fix this.
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:3, Insightful)
(http://www.linuxhelp.ca/)
Re:Insecure by design (Score:1, Insightful)
There are many fun topologies out there like Decentralized Ring (ala Gnutella2; don't knock the design just because the inventor was controversial) which work around issues in simple systems such as Distributed or Centralized. Ultimately your application will decide what the best topology to use is. Authentication is debatable but i've always found it easier to deal with differing systems for different levels of trust in the authentication (for example, to get into your bank 3 levels of authentication would be more ideal than the username and password you use for your Blog, and neither system -needs- to have the same authentication system as the other).
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:2, Insightful)
5 Seconds? Where did you get that benchmark?
I'm a CMS designer,
Ah, that explains it.
If I'm on a computer I trust, I might allow it to save my password. If I run accross a forum that requires a login, I'm more than likely not going to take the time to create a login, just so I can participate. Why? because I've never seen one that only takes 5 seconds. Most send emails, which add considerably more time and pain (I gave up using POP email when I changed my email for the 10th time (@home failed, to be exact).
Not that his solution is perfect and that all of you points are not valid. Just that its not such a bad plan at its core.
Re:useless (Score:2)
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:5, Informative)
(http://www.trifault.net/)
Secondly, addressing your remember passwords comment, it's a complete waste of resources for the system for these users, who just may want to leave a comment, to force them to sign up for an account. Why not just let them provide a reference URL which represents them, and let that server verify that the provided URL is the user's?
Many of your points were simply "This is complex", or "This requires relying on more systems", and conclude that it's bad. Firstly, I think 'rely' is the wrong word for this. You're using these other systems, yes, but if these other systems go down, it doesn't stop you from doing anything. It's similar, though not a perfect analogy, to saying that having more IRC servers in a given network is bad because you're relying on more servers.
Also, imagine the advantages this gives when designing around this system. Forums which are really only for one topic, such as an official forum for a specific piece of software, don't even need to store any user or password information (and therefore don't have any sensitive data). The forum can simply store the OpenID URL for the admins and allow anyone who can verify with that URL do all of the admin work.
It's the first step to providing a true roaming profile, and single sign-on for the web, and it's done in an open manner. I think it's a step in the right direction.
Re:Insecure by design (Score:3, Informative)
(Last Journal: Saturday January 13 2007, @02:19AM)
Such a system would be the foundation of a new set of services as well. For example, if all the citizens of the world would wear a GPS transmitting necklace or under-the-skin implant no one would ever be wrongly accused of a crime or be accidentally lost in the wilderness. With bio-scanning technology the government could ensure that you're vital signs were normal and if they became erratic they could send aid.
Only with a wonderful benevolent government like the United Nations can we ever begin to see the wonders of these technologies and rid ourselves of all the risks of the dangerous ideas of freedom and privacy.
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:1)
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:5, Insightful)
(http://www.andrews.edu/~freeman/ | Last Journal: Tuesday November 13 2001, @08:53AM)
11. Profit!!! (Score:2)
(http://www.wifimaps.com/ | Last Journal: Saturday June 19 2004, @09:58PM)
(Sorry, had to!)
Re:Insecure by design (Score:1)
(http://www.christophermahan.com/)
No thanks. I barely trust my government, and I vote for the suckers.
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:1)
There are many uses... who really wantes to have to register to 50 sites, just because you wish to post a comment or two, or ask a question at a site?
2 Tools like Firefox's "remember password" make these kinds of shared identity systems obosolete, don't they? Who cares how many passwords you have to remember? You don't have to remember ANY of them anymore, really.
If you are really concious about security, you NEVER use these "I will remember your password..." becuase if someone gets physical access to your system, you are screwed.
3 Caution should be applied when linking with systems using any kind of third party medium. KISS.
How is linking a URL security-prone? You are NOT showing your password to anyone, at anytime.
4 This could be ripe for phishing.
Phishing what? Your ID?
5 This system provides a false sense of security. You will never know exactly who you are dealing with over the internet. Behavioural tests should be part of this system and they are lacking. Also, nobody is going to use a secure pipe at both ends to handle this kind of data, are they? Uh...
Once again, they DO NOT REQUIRE PASSWORDS So why use a secure pipe FOR A URL?
Personally, I belive that this is a great service, and will be welcomed by myself. The genius of the idea, and let me note one last time, the non-need of a password is a key feature of this idea.
Re:useless (Score:2)
(http://mrd-srv.ath.cx/)
Christ on a cracker, I know this is Slashdot, but could you at the very least read the summary?
Re:Not really that good, IMHO. (Score:2)
(http://trypticon.org/)
2. It takes a little longer than just five seconds to register for a new service. First you have to spend at least five seconds filling out a form and squinting to read the CAPTCHA. Then you have to wait a few minutes for the email to finally arrive and then confirm it. Of course, I'm only talking about the majority of services here. Clearly there are one or two (total) services in the world which actually take five seconds to sign up for.
Furthermore, that's not the only reason they did it. Suppose John Smith registers on 5,000 web sites. What says that JohnSmith at Slashdot is the same john_smith at LiveJournal? OpenID solves that part of the problem.
3. Last I checked, Firefox's "remember password" feature didn't help my home browser remember passwords entered at work. Furthermore, this feature doesn't magically register new accounts either.
4. I agree, and not having to register on 5,000 web sites is minimalism for most people.
6. If you'd bothered to read their documentation, they actually admit that rogue sites can do whatever they want, including simply not handling the OpenID information at all. What OpenID does is makes sure that sites which _do_ play by the rules have a consistent view of identity.
7. I'm sure most users would love to have to manage a cron job just to do something that web sites can do for them.
9. Let's see how.
Re:We don't need single sign-on!!!!!! (Score:1)
Says the person who couldn't even be bothered to sign up to Slashdot...