Appeals Court Rejects Copyright Extension Challenge
Posted by
michael
on Fri Feb 16, 2001 02:34 PM
from the expected,-but-sad dept.
from the expected,-but-sad dept.
Today the U.S. Court of Appeals handed down a decision in the Eldred vs. Reno case, which challenged the most recent extension of copyright terms on the grounds that it violated the Constitution in several areas - that it violated the First Amendment by overbroadly restricting speech; that it gave protection to non-original works (since it retroactively applied to old, already-published works); and that the constant extensions of copyright terms were not a "limited Time" as required by the Constitution. The Court rejected all of these arguments. However, one of the three judges in the case wrote an interesting dissent, which at least holds out the hope that in some future case, skilled litigators may be able to convince the judiciary that permanent copyright is an unwarranted extension of Congress' powers.
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Appeals Court Rejects Copyright Extension Challenge
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In case it gets /.'ed (Score:5)
Under the copyright regime existing before the Sonny Bono Act, works created by individuals, say J. D. Salinger or Elvis Presley, enjoyed protection for the life of their creators plus an additional 50 years. Works created by so-called "corporate authors," such as Disney and the New York Times, received protection for 75 years from the date of their creation. The Sonny Bono Act adds 20 years to both terms of protection, giving individual authors protection for life plus 70 years and corporate authors protection for 95 years. Thus, a symphony created by a 5 year-old modern Mozart who lives to be 85 will not be available in the public domain for the first 150 years of its existence. Eric Eldred and we at the Berkman Center think the Sonny Bono Act robs the American public of the rich and diverse public domain guaranteed by the Constitution.
"Me Ted"
I agree with the ruling, but not the law... (Score:3)
Well, duh, we all know that. And so do the judges. The problem is, copyright hasn't been extended to be permanent yet!
Even if, for all intents and purposes, it is far too long, it's still not permanent! And this is the problem. I personally agree that the current span of copyright is far too long. However, my opinions mean nothing legally. Face it, if they decided that copyright lasted a billion million years or whatever, it's still "limited."
When I first read of this case, my reaction was "tell me when they lose" because none of their arguments really hold water in my not-so-legally-binding opinion. This cannot be fought in court. This battle must be fought with the legislature. Write your congress-critter. Write editorials to your paper. Get people informed!
Trying to get this law overturned in the courts is the wrong way to go about it. Don't bug the judges about this - bug Congress. They write the laws. Fixing what the problems in copyright has to go through Congress. They extended copyright, they have the power to reduce it. Make it an issue. But don't fight this in the courts - it's well within Congress's right to make these kind of laws. It's a delegated power. So take the issue where it belongs - to the law makers.
Thumbnail summary of the dissent (Score:5)
Intellectual property is a construct; in nature, the public domain rules all and any idea which becomes understood by the public becomes the property of all. The purpose of patent and copyright protection is to promote the publication of these ideas by allowing temporary monopoly use. Progress in the useful arts includes returning things to the public domain so that others can build upon them. One thing's for certain: letting one company have a monopoly on a mouse 70 years after "Steamboat Willie" was aired has no relationship to progress.
--
Knowledge is power
Power corrupts
Study hard
The case, distilled: (Score:5)
This is false, because the categorical response to speech has always been to have more speech, which copyright prevents. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court made copyrights categorically immune from First Amendment attacks in United Video, Inc. v. FCC. That's the precedent, and the DC panel has refused to undermine it.
Similarly, the "limited times" response by the Court is absurd:
The Court's response to this argument? A meager reference to precedent in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., controlling because of the Feist's court's failure even to account for the clause.
The principle of stare decisis is an important one in angloamerican law, but it's hardly an absolute rule. If precedents fail to allow for the manifestly correct verdict, then they should be overturned. It's that simple.
I take small consolation in the fact that this is merely a three-judge panel of the DC Court of Appeals and not the complete bench.
I hope they try again... (Score:3)
Next time with better arguments. Reading the court's ruling leads me to believe that the plaintiffs did a poor job of forming and presenting their arguments. They should have focused more on a couple of points that might have at least had a chance of making the court take a side and express an opinion on a real issue.
For example, I'd like to know how Congress thinks extending the copyright of an existing work encourages the creation of that work. I'd also like to know Congress' reasoning in determining that the extra 20 years would, in fact, "promote the progress of science and useful arts more than the previous term did." I think the government should have to explain itself, and this case did not ask the right questions to get useful answers from the government. If they try again in the future, I'd like to see them pursue these explanations.
limited... (Score:3)
Re:Thumbnail summary of the dissent (Score:5)
My idea for a decent copyright term (Score:3)
This way the people that should benefit from the royalties are the proper people.
For a corp (ie Disney): a use-it-or-lose-it 15-20 years after last use method. Okay...when was the last Mickey Mouse movie? 15 years after that, the mouse becomes public domain. My idea here is that if it is not a valuable enough property for them to use, then let the public have it.
While this would not help too much for something like Mickey, flash-in-the-pan things could benefit - like Roger Rabbit. When was the last thing that featured him (with new content)? IMDB says 1996 - with the Best Of, which I'll guess had some new content. So, in another 10 years he becomes the public's bunny.
However, the problem with this is that every 15 years or some, some obscure or older character will suddenly make a cameo appearance in a new title.
Perhaps the term should be longer though. In 1986, Aliens came out. That is still a very sellable title. Perhaps it should be 15 years from the last release date? At least that'd make it easier to get things on new formats as studios hurry to rush things out so they don't lose them.
The SC is going to have to sort this out. (Score:3)
IIRC, the government doesn't have to, since the plaintiffs did not make a consistent case that promoting the useful arts had anything to do with a limitation of congressional power. This is unfortunate, because excepting the argument about limited terms, the other two arguments they placed forward were obviously ridiculous. Here's what the ruling says about their attempts to argue the limited term contention:
Here the plaintiffs run squarely up against our holding in Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (1981), in which we rejected the argument "that the introductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on congressional power." The plaintiffs, however, disclaim any purpose to question the holding of Schnapper; indeed, they expressly acknowledge "that the preamble of the Copyright Clause is not a substantive limit on Congress' legislative power."
So everyone agrees that the preamble is not a limiting factor on Congress's power because the courts have previously ruled this to be so. I guess being lawyers, they must argue this way. However, to actually believe that the preamble doesn NOT limit congress's power is to believe the clause as written is sheer nonsense.
Literally speaking, 10^50 years is a "limited time", even though it exeeds the probable lifespan of the entire human race. The majority does admit that it is possible to challenge copyright extensions based on rationality, but not rationality to pursue the purpose of the copyright clause. If this is true, then the founders were blowing smoke out there ass when they used the word "limited", since any period can be used if it can be argued to serve any purpose, however limited and ultimately detrimental to public discourse.
Judge Sentelle's dissent is a masterful piece of legalistic quibbling that attempts to show that something that walks like a duck and quacks like a duck is not necessarily a duck. He argues that the preamble is not a preamble per se, but an explicit grant of power to Congress to "promote the useful arts." Congress if further granted the means to pursue this "By securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." Thus Congress has no explicitly enumerated power to secure exclusive rights for an author, except as a means to promoting the useful arts.
This is actually a pretty good argument, except that it does not differ in any meaningful way from saying that the preamble is a limitation on the power of Congress to grant copyrights. If you accept that the preamble does not "limit" Congress power to secure monopolies for authors, you cannot also hold that Congress' powers are expressly enumerated in the constitution.
It looks to an outsider like a bloody mess, and it will probably take the Supreme Court to sort it out.
Synopsis of the ruling (Score:5)
The plaintiffs are corporations, associations, and individuals who rely for their vocations or avocations upon works in the public domain: a non-profit association that distributes over the internet free electronic versions of books in the public domain; a company that reprints rare, out-of-print books that have entered the public domain; a vendor of sheet music and a choir director, who respectively sell and purchase music that is relatively inexpensive because it is in the public domain; and a company that preserves and restores old films and insofar as such works are not in the public domain, needs permission from their copyright holders -- who are often hard to find -- in order to exploit them.
The CTEA is but the latest in a series of congressional extensions of the copyright term, each of which has been made applicable both prospectively and retrospectively. In 1790 copytight term was established at 42 years. In 1909 it was extended to 56. Between 1962 and 1974 the Congress passed a series of laws that incrementally extended subsisting copyrights. In 1976 the term was drastically increased to the life of the author plus 50 years. The CTEA amends this scheme by adding 20 years to the term of every copyright.
The preamble "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" does seem to establish a guideline for how to limit copyright. But the Schnapper ruling of 1981 rejected the argument "that the introductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on congressional power." The plaintiffs did not dispute Schnapper. Therefore the court can't consider the argument that the preamble limits Congress's powers.
Even if the court could, it would still rule the same way. The CTEA is in line with the European Union, and that's "a powerful indication" that the CTEA is necessary and proper, since we love ABBA. So what if the EU is not bound by the Copyright Clause of our Constitution? The court believes that extending copyrights actually preserves works because it gives copyright owners a motivation to preserve them, and thus "promotes Progress."
In sum, we hold that the CTEA is a proper exercise of the Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The plaintiffs' first amendment objection fails because they have no recognizable first amendment interest in the copyrighted works of others. Their objection that extending the term of a subsisting copyright violates the requirement of originality is stupid because something doesn't lose originality by being out of copyright. Duh.
Whatever wisdom or folly the plaintiffs may see in the particular "limited Times" for which the Congress has set the duration of copyrights, that decision is subject to judicial review only for rationality. This court is deferential to the judgment of the Congress, and the courts shouldn't stick their noses into it. This is no less true when the Congress modifies the term of an existing copyright than when it sets the term initially, and the plaintiffs -- as opposed to one of the amici -- do not dispute that the CTEA satisfies the preamble. Maybe if the plaintiffs actually argued this point -- which we think Schnapper indicates they'd lose -- before a full court, they'd have a case. Till then, fuck off.
Dissent by Judge Sentelle
I just want to say that I probably would have ruled against the plaintiffs too, but my fellow judges are nitwits, so I'm not going to agree with their reasoning.
Even though the plaintiffs didn't dispute Schnapper, an amicus brief did. When the other judges say they can't consider that argument, they're being asses. In fact, it's what amici are for. (As long as it's not introducing new issues, and merely arguing the same issues in a new way, it's fine.)
Also, I'm a strict constructionist (wassup, Dubya), and I don't think Congress can just go around passing laws as it damn well pleases. And these copyright extensions are effectively extending copyright indefinitely. The government has offered no tenable theory as to how retrospective extension can promote the useful arts.
I don't even think Schnapper is applicable in this case, because Schnapper dealt with limited questions related to the application of the copyright laws to works commissioned by the U.S. government. And what the fuck does the European Union have to do with our copyright law? Goddammit.
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Re:Cheer up dudes! (Score:3)
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Bad reasoning. (Score:4)
How does this relate directly to copyright law? People--big corporations and wealthy IP brokers--are *stealing* our property--our IP. Once copyright expires, the work becomes public domain--meaning it belongs to all of us, to the society and culture which inspired and nurtured it in the first place. So, people who extend copyright beyond constitutionally intended terms are *stealing* from our entire culture, from all of us. As a specific example, about six years ago the RIAA started demanding royalties from the Boy Scouts of America for singing popular campfire songs. These are songs which have been sung around the campfire for decades, some which my grandfather probably sung when he was a boy, which would have obviously been public domain and freely used if copyright had not been stretched and beaten into submission by organizations like the RIAA--and here, they were trying to extract royalty payments from the Boy Scouts! How much more evil and greedy can you get? Denying kids the opportunity to sing songs which had become part of our cultural heritage, unless they pay up. That is fucking disgusting, and attitudes like yours allow it to happen. You're well-meaning, but you lack understanding of the scope of this IP mess. Do you want everything ever written, sung, painted, or filmed to be copyrighted and forbidden to use and forbidden to become part of the public culture, until it's so old that it's too late for anyone to bother? Because, that's what we're in the process of doing. People are afraid to create things that are too closely inspired by works which may have been created fifty years ago, for fear of being sued for copyright infringement. Studios won't touch many things, and keep releasing tired retreads of movies they made forty years ago--and why not, it's still their IP, why innovate when you can just reach into the vault and mindlessly vomit something back up? The Boy Scouts and other ouh groups have to keep kids from singing copyrighted songs around the fire, or worry about paying royalties. That's sick. Our whole goddamned society is fucked up because of corporate greed like that.
From the plaintiffs in Eldred v. Reno (Score:4)
The plaintiffs in Eldred v. Reno thank all those who participated in the debate about the constitutionality of copyright extension. We especially wish to thank our many supporters and those who gave the case direct aid (we haven't needed money, just brains). The Berkman Center for Law and Internet at Harvard Law School, Lawrence Lessig (now at Stanford), Charles Nesson, Jonathan Zittrain, and the law firm of Jones, Day, did an outstanding job of representing us pro bono against Bono.
We have not decided about an appeal. We will be discussing that this weekend, and we look forward to your ideas. You may direct them, on either side, in the OpenLaw forum, at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvreno/ [harvard.edu].
Although we lost this particular case this time, the battle of strong "intellectual property rights" advocates against the freedom of the rest of us goes on. Cases such as the DeCSS cases and others demand our participation in deciding issues about how law and technology can get along. The issues have extended from copyrighting books now to copyrighting the human genome. Patents on AIDS drugs may meant life or death for many people in Africa who could never afford a computer.
It is important that we not get discouraged, but that we continue the good fight--we are right, we will eventually prevail, and your children will appreciate what you can do right now in this long struggle for freedom online. Thanks for taking part in this debate and discussion.
Odd Reasoning (Score:3)
The basis of this claim is the supreme court's precedent Harper & Row vs Nation Enter.that explains how the regime of copyright itself respects and adequately safeguards the freedom of speech protected by the first amendment.
The court explains this inherent protection as residing in the distinction between non-copyrightable ideas and copyrightable concrete expression.
The court reasoning is self-contradictory. According to this line of reasoning
The first point makes an impossibly hard distinction between concrete words and ideas. Can I express the idea of Donald Duck without using the concrete expression "Donald Duck"? Try at home! Can I express the emotional force of using obscenities in a clean language?
The second point is both circular and self-contradictory. The court admits, pace itself, that there is some tension between the Constitution's copyright clause and the first ammendment.
It should follow that copyright is a restriction of speech ( otherwise, where the tension?). And therefore any statement that a copyright regime adequately safeguards free speech must come not from the principle of copyright (which is in tension with the free ammendment), but from the balance obtained in a particular application of copyright. In other words, the totality of copyright, the free use of ideas, the "fair use" doctrine, the time limits, etc., constitute a balance. Any act that changes that balance cannot possibly be sanctionned based on the constitutionality of the previously existing balance. Yet the court draw the opposite conclusion: the (untenable) distinction between ideas and expression has always been held to give adequate protection to free expression. Thus the court basicly says that an issue of fact, whether free expression is preserved by a particular act of congress, can be decided in principle without attending to the facts and to the particular act in question.
If we were to apply it to other laws, no law would ever fail. Since every law that affects constitutional balance ( security vs. privacy , free speech vs. harm , etc.) is passed on the background of a balance that has already been sanctionned as constitutional.
It almost seems pointless to argue. As Bush vs. Gore made plain, legal arguments are used as FUD to cover deep political symphaties. I bet that any research will discover that the majority has a record of protecting commercial interests and the dissenter has a record of protecting civil rights.