I'd be a bit surprised if they'd bother in this case: they are already hemmed in by the existing supply of cameras whose hardware cannot be changed and by the demands of professional photographers for usability with things like external preview displays in the field; and, realistically, driver signing requirements in modern OSes mean that they can do something utterly trivial and, so long as it requires a driver, everyone but the nerds will need someone to sign it for them; and this would involve actual engineering effort; but it's hard to be entirely sanguine about driver re-implementation against an adversarial vendor.
The trouble is that the hardware vendor controls the hardware; and that a peripheral is physically plugged into your computer but may be logically plugged in somewhere else, or in more than one place. Sometimes fairly loosely(unverified firmware built for a relatively well known architecture that can be reflashed either by a deliberately provided update interface or some fairly accessible bug that doesn't mean cracking the case); sometimes inconveniently(weak or nonexistent firmware signing; but you need to crack the case for a debug header or to clip onto a flash chip); sometimes more or less unshakably(some contemporary smartphones and consoles where everything is signed to hell and back and no exploits short of ion beam reworking a sub 10nm IC are know). As for the physical/logical distinction; it's relatively simple for the driver to provide some mixture of 'local' features(like a UVC camera or a mass storage class device) and a logically remote one that just uses your computer to set up a tunnel between something running on the hardware and something running on a remote host.
Microcontrollers with some cryptographic capabilities continue to get cheaper; and even ones that will do full mutual TLS with their own unique factory key and all are downright cheap now; so the price of entry to a device that doesn't have its own NIC; but, if provided with an untrusted tunnel over USB, is fully capable of strongly authenticating a remote host(nope, DNS spoofing won't help) and strongly authenticating itself to a remote host is pretty low indeed. If (as with digital cameras, which tend to be built around a fairly punchy DSP/ISP ASIC that's essential to pulling data off the sensor, plus a weedy little general purpose core that does UI and housekeeping) you've got a vital, heavily integrated, component to put the cryptographic chip into you can also frustrate attempts to physically remove it or swap it out: you can pry the DIGIC X off the board of a Canon camera easily enough; but what remains is basically a nice sensor and a lens mount: you aren't just swapping out a commodity PMIC or the like.
Put these two aspects together and you have a recipe for hardware that will substantially resist driver re-implementation: you can still connect high bandwidth or latency critical things directly to fairly basic local drivers(the actual UVC video stream; mass storage access to the memory card, etc); but if you want to lock something down (like the actual image processing parameters being applied to the UVC stream) you can require that to be a cryptographically secure request by the onboard cryptographic element to the vendor's host and then a response, unique to the requesting device, whose vendor signature the device will verify before applying the settings.
Adds some latency and an always-online requirement(something you can increasingly get away with); and if you lose interest in the product or go out of business the customer is screwed; but that's a them problem not a you problem. Plus, unlike attempts to keep things closed on the client side, you don't even need to hassle with any bullshit obfuscation: as long as the keys stay secret you can use totally normal, off-the-shelf, approaches to cryptographic authentication; and the format of your configuration requests and configuration files can be as sane and readable as you like; because it doesn't matter if other people can generate their own configuration files when you are the only one who can generate signed configuration files.
Please note, I'm absolutely not in favor of any of this. All super-mega dystopian anti-customer stuff for which I'd hope anyone bold enough to try it would be punished severely: just to note that it would work, so long as the aspects of behavior you wish to control aren't too latency sensitive or incompatible with online requirements; and your hardware includes some core component critical enough to keep it from being swapped out. Fancy digital camera? If you are going to rip out the image processor you might as well just buy the appropriate image sensor from digikey and start from there. Console? Basically nothing but breakout board and power delivery for a SoC that does everything. Laser printer? Rasterizing postscript is not a challenge; not sure exactly how exotic the laser driver reading out of raster memory is. Pen plotter or filament deposition 3d printer? Don't bother; you'll just get brain-swapped.