I believe you misspelled "slower than molasses in February".

If they break into a car and the police look at the footage on the dashcam and see that they've kept their license plate out of view, but they are able to cross-correlate it with other cameras and figure out the plate number, then figure out where they drove that car, where it ended up parked, who got out, where they went, etc., then it can make arrests possible where it was not possible previously, making it *massively* more likely to be able to solve the crime.

The problem becomes when it turns into "show us all the plates that were near that spot within a few minutes of that time", and thus a fishing expedition.

You're interpreting it in the context of typing "sudo" on the command-line granting a one-time permission. And the original statement from Apple (after correcting the "every -> very" error in the summary) makes it clear that this is *not* what is being proposed, so if that was the original poster's intent, then it was incorrect.

The way I interpreted the original sentence — "They're going to make it like sudo where when you give permission to a program to write protected files once it has it forever after" — is that they're going to make it like the sudoers file, where you edit it to grant permission to a program to do something, and it permanently has the right to do that... which is exactly what happens when you grant full disk permission, just with a dialog box instead of editing a file.

That said, I'm not sure if that's how the original statement was intended to be interpreted. It was a bit confusing. :-)

Nope. And this is why I object to the phrase "censorship is bad". *Unreasonable* censorship is bad. But not all restraint on speech is bad.

No, you're confusing the definition of censorship with what restraints on free speech are constitutional. You're defining the term based on legality in a specific jurisdiction. If you applied the same standard with a different jurisdiction — say what can legally be spoken in Iran — you would get a very different definition. This is why you cannot define censorship based on a specific legal standard. It must be defined in the abstract.

The general definition is that censorship is the suppression of expression by an authority. That expression could be a constitutionally protected idea, or it could be an advertisement for Taco Bell. It's still expression, and blocking it is still censorship.

And again, you're using the U.S. definition of free speech to define censorship. These things are not synonymous. Nobody is talking about whether someone should have to listen to you. The fact that someone shut you up is still censorship. It may be *constitutionally allowable* censorship. It may even be *entirely* *reasonable* censorship. But it is still censorship.

Not all censorship is bad. Restraints on speech based on time, place, and manner restrictions can be entirely reasonable. They are still, at least in a purely abstract way, a form of censorship. Restraints on speech where your speech costs someone else money can also be entirely reasonable (e.g. spam, robodialers, etc.). But those decisions still represent censorship in the abstract. We simply choose to say that those types of restraints on speech are reasonable and necessary for a functioning society.

It's all about balancing rights — your right to swing your fist ends when it meets my nose, and all that. Censorship is generally justifiable when exercising your right to speech has the effect of violating someone else's rights. For example, if you call for violence and that violence happens, you can get thrown in jail, and your rights to free speech can be massively curtailed. This is, however, still censorship in a purely abstract sense.

Oh, also, each agent runner should have:

• read-write access to a per-agent temporary directory
• read-write access to a cross-agent-shared temporary directory
• read-only access to other agents' private temporary directories

But this is the trivial part.

That's how it already works. But you can request the permission from the user with a pop-up. Presumably a "very explicit action" means going into the Settings app and turning it on by hand.

But that's going to do exactly nothing. The app will tell them that they have to do this, and the users, having no idea how dangerous it is to give an AI unrestricted access to their device, will do it anyway, and we'll be right back to where we are now. And the next step will be "See, we can't allow full disk access." And then macOS will cease to be usable.

The only reasonable choice is to flag Meta's software as malware for extending their full disk access to agents. Force them to implement a proper sandbox. Apple already gives them all the tools they need to do it right.

• The main host app asks for full disk access, but functions without it, triggering an open file dialog to work around missing access when necessary. Most users will end up granting full disk access out of frustration, but that's okay because the agents themselves don't have that access. If possible, make it start out with a read-only full-disk entitlement, because otherwise, using it will be much harder.
• Each agent runs in a separate agent runner process with a stricter sandbox.
• The agent sandbox has an entitlement that grants read-only access to the entire disk (or, if the main host app's sandbox doesn't allow that, to every resource that the main host app has access to), and bans the use of the socket() system call.
• AI agents can request read-write access to specific files or directories by asking the host app. The agent is encouraged to ask for access to an entire directory at once if it needs to write to multiple files in that directory.
• The host app can pass in a security-scoped bookmark/URL to grant permission, but asks the user first unless the URL is part of an explicit list of allowlisted URLs that the user provided before beginning the task. Doing this expands the sandbox to allow writing to that file or to files in that directory. The SSB can be created programmatically or, if the main app also doesn't have access, through showing an Open File dialog.
• One tool provides network access to specific hosts with no POST, all GET parameters filtered, and a low limit on URL length to mitigate exfiltration risk. This tool has an entitlement that allow socket access inside an environment where opening sockets is otherwise banned, and thus can be run directly by AI agents.
• One tool provides broader network access with full upload capabilities. This tool lives outside the sandbox so that the AI agents cannot run it themselves — only ask the main host app to run it for them. Then:
  • The main host app requires the user to give permission to access a single hostname for either a single request (allow once) or a single task (always allow for this task).
  • If the user clicks the "Always allow sending data to example.com" button, the user is asked "Trust example.com for similar request parameters only" or "Trust fully".
  • If the user choose to trust similar request parameters only, then any additional GET parameters must be explicitly allowed each time.
• The main host app passes each AI agent runner a new open socket connected to the AI service's server.
• The AI service's server is configured to provide minimal or no network access from the server side.

This is how you protect privacy in an agentic environment.

I hereby retract everything I just said. The entire post was based on a misunderstanding caused by Slashdot's editors adding a single extra letter.

• Original: "very explicit user action."
• Slashdot: "every explicit user action."

What a difference an 'e' makes. I was imagining every single file access causing a UAC dialog.

Yikes.

Well, no, I don't retract the last paragraph. They should still kick Meta's garbage agent off the platform until Meta can get security right.

The word was *every*. *Every* explicit user action.

Oh, bloody hell. I just got rage-baited by incompetent Slashdot editors.

Good night. I'm done for the day.

If this happens, this thirty-year Mac user will be leaving the platform. Full stop. So will just about everyone else within months to single-digit years.

This approach didn't work with Gatekeeper in Mac OS 7. It didn't work for Windows XP. It won't work for modern Mac OS, either. Here's why: CONSTANT PROMPTING MAKES SECURITY WORSE.

Prompting users over and over again to allow or deny actions makes security WORSE. Period. It means that users are constantly being nagged, and constantly having to decide whether an action is harmful or not. This rapidly (over the course of just minutes) turns into query burnout, and the user just clicks "Allow" for everything. And not only does it fail to meet its objective, but it also causes them to the same for every other dialog, including all of the other things Apple put in place to improve privacy and security. And now people are granting every app whatever access it asks for automatically without question, and every advantage that Apple has security-wise and privacy-wise evaporates instantaneously.

Continuous prompting NEVER makes security better. It ONLY makes security worse.

AND this would have a hopelessly deleterious effect on EVERYTHING that high-end users do, from running commands in Terminal (which would become completely unusable) to third-party backups, etc.

And that latter one would also be a major antitrust problem for Apple, which is to say that if they do this, they WILL get sued, and they WILL lose, because it is so clearly open-and-shut that this is not the correct solution for the problem, but that Apple stands to greatly benefit while their competitors are irreparably harmed.

What's described here would completely break the platform at a level that makes it a toy, no more useful than iOS, and completely unreasonable to use for any serious professional work, whether as a software engineer or a graphic designer. And it is pathetically absurd that they think this is a good idea. It makes me assume that none of the Apple security engineers I know are still around, because all of them would have flat out called you a moron for even suggesting something like this. They actually understood security at a more-than-superficial level. Someone proposing this "solution" clearly does not.

You can't fix sh**ty apps by making the platform objectively worse or making things that people legitimately need to do as painful as possible. The only way to fix sh**ty apps is by banning them from the App Store and flagging direct downloads as malware repeatedly until such time as they get their security model right. There are correct ways to sandbox things like agentic frameworks. This is about as far from the right way as you can get, as it does nothing to improve the security of the agentic setup, while catastrophically breaking overall platform usability and turning users into mindless "Allow" clickers.

Find another way. Kick Meta's horrific agentic tool off the platform until they can get security right.

Censorship means suppression of speech or expression by a governing authority. It can be prior restraint (blocking publication) or censorship after the fact (take-downs, bans, etc.).

In the strictest sense, you could maybe argue that soft moderation in the Slashdot style where people who want to see what has been moderated down doesn't qualify as censorship because there's a way around it, but the net impact is still that most of the potential audience doesn't see it, so that argument is on somewhat shaky ground.

At best, you can argue that moderation is not prior restraint censorship, but while prior restraint makes censorship way more likely to be a first amendment issue if the government is involved, it's not a requirement for something being censorship.

What do AI companies have to do with anything? The prompts would be generated by the company running the site, not the AI company. The quality of performance depends on the quality of the prompt and what data it has access to far more than on the model training.

You slow the initial spread of posts for long enough to throw AI at the problem and analyze the factual accuracy of every post, or at least every post that any user flags as misinformation or factually incorrect.

For posts that are obvious satire (e.g. from known satire sites, etc.), flag them with a clear "This post is satire" warning at the beginning of the post.

For posts that are just flat-out lies, mass cancel the post automatically:

1. Prevent it from appearing in anyone else's feed or spreading.
2. Fan out the ban scan to recognize similar posts from people who saw the original post, recursively cancel those.
3. Backtrack to see if any posts that the original poster might have seen posted similar information from which the false post was derived, and recursively cancel those, including fan-out and backtracking from there, etc. until you have a complete graph of every post that appears to be derived from the lie.
4. Bulk distribute a post to everyone who saw the original post, explaining what was untruthful and why the bot believes that it was untruthful, providing factual citations to refute the original post. You do this in bulk to everyone who saw the original post all at once, not through organic spread, making it faster to refute a lie than to spread it originally.

In your fact checking ban post, you make it possible for anyone who believes that the cancellation was unjustified to submit external citations as evidence of its accuracy. After 72 hours, all citations submitted by anyone who saw the fact checking ban post are deduplicated, consolidated, and sent to a hundred human reviewers. These reviewers vote to either: A. reinstate the original post, B. reinstate the original post with clarification at the beginning (this post is mostly correct except XXX, this post is satire and is not intended to be taken as truth, this post is an opinion piece that disagrees with broadly held scientific consensus and the evidence presented herein should be treated with skepticism unless proven correct by larger/stronger/more robust studies, etc.), or C. uphold the ban.

If a post is reinstated, every post flagged as a consequence of the original flagging is also reinstated in a similar fashion, with clarification if applicable.

In other words, make it easy for users to report that something is a lie, make the resulting fact checking be aggressive at immediately halting the spread of things that are clearly untruthful, and make corrections spread faster than the lies did originally.

The last critical piece is the ability for an individual user to choose whether to see posts that have been flagged as being lies. If they choose to repost something that is already flagged, it will be seen only by other people who have chosen to opt out of hiding factually erroneous posts, so the spread will be mostly limited to those who have already bought into one or more conspiracy theories, but that's still moderation rather than outright banning of the content. And people would be free to write new posts that point out that a post on a subject has been banned and telling people why they think it should not be banned. Of course, in most cases, that will paint the person as a nutter, but at least you'll know. :-)

Unfortunately, at some point, in the U.S., certain political groups decided that things that are contrary to established facts are "opinions" that cannot be questioned, rather than lies, so demanding factual accuracy will be seen by many as political bias, which is why this will probably never happen.

Any time I get a political ad, I assume that their position is questionable enough to require spamming me with ads, and therefore that I should probably do the opposite of what they're advertising.

Moderation is censorship by definition. So no, there cannot be ways to moderate those things without censorship.

What you mean is that governments requiring companies to censor things is bad. And in general, I agree.

Corporate-driven censorship is also generally bad, where corporations censor things to protect their interests or boost their revenue without a legitimate public interest in mind.

The real problem is that social media does not give the public control over what they consume, and subjects us to increasingly low-quality garbage from increasingly distant voices in a desperate attempt to drive interaction in spite of a declining user base. And that effectively becomes corporate censorship, as the garbage drowns out the organic content from our friends that we actually went to the site to see. Yet it is by design. Sites like Facebook appear to completely ignore our "I don't want to see this" signals and continue to shovel this garbage. As a result, I go to Facebook an order of magnitude less often than I did ten years ago, but at the same time, I know that other people find the algorithmically driven shovelware to be compelling, and they're the ones being manipulated by this stuff.

With that said, I don't want government censorship. I want government to require social media to give control to users, to publicly disclose how their algorithms shape what users see, to allow independent audits to ensure that their algorithms are working for the public good rather than just for the corporate good, etc. We need more access to information, not less, but we also need to be able to filter what we see. Because if news media, etc. is not serving as a filter to show us the most important information and filter out unverified information and clear misinformation, then we need tools to help us moderate what we see, and maybe by sending those signals, also influence what our friends see and reduce the garbage a bit.