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Comment Re:People without a clue commenting on crypto (Score 1) 187

Thanks for proving my point about utterly clueless people here. You are one of them.

A high-entropy password hashed with SHA1 is perfectly secure. You could even hash it with MD5 and still be secure. A low-entropy hashed with SHA1 is not less secure than hashed with, say, SHA-512.

Comment Re:SHA1 in git (Score 1) 187

That is apparently an idea many, many people cannot understand, obvious though it is.

My guess is that these people can only think in association-classes: For them, SHA1 equals security and any successful attack on SHA1 (no matter what its nature is) hence must break security in all applications of SHA1 (even if not used for security there or the attack is irrelevant for the scenario it is used in).

Of course, such a simplistic model of thinking is utterly pathetic and disconnected from reality, but it seems to be what is going on in their minds. And then these morons believe that are actually qualified to tell experts what to do.

Comment Re:Not a huge issue for git... (Score 1) 187

Using SHA1 for fingerprints is not an issue at this time. All somebody could do is create two PGP keys with the same fingerprint. As keys do not really contain any critical information, unlike X.509 certificates, this matters little. So the reason SHA1 is "still" used there is that the people doing it actually understand what they are doing.

Comment Re:this is a deflection (Score 1) 187

That is bullshit. CRC is slow and has a collision-probability high enough to be a concern. CRC is not a good idea in repositories that can be very large. Incidentally, the claim that using a crypto-hash for a hash indicates that a "secure" has is needed is completely bogus. Crypto-hashes now have speeds and set-up times that make them well suitable as replacements for normal hashes in situations where you not mainly hash very short things. A lot of semi-competent people seem to have missed that little fact though.

Comment People without a clue commenting on crypto (Score 4, Insightful) 187

That really annoys me no end. There is some gradual improvement in a specific attack, expected by everybody that has a clue and not seen as anything dramatic by the same people. And immediately a horde of people with no understanding of crypto swoop in an declare the sky to be falling and all uses of this thing are now invalid. This is really just utterly pathetic.

Example: I have to constantly defend the use of SHA1 for password hashing. (Sure, something like pbkdf2 or Argon2 should come later if the password may be low-entropy and gets stored. That is not always the case.) The thing is that password hashing has the purpose of preventing the hash being turned into a password again. Collision attacks have no impact on that at all. For a collision attack you would need to know the password and then you could find a second one with the same hash (or rather with the two-sided, much easier, variant you can find two passwords that map to the same hash). Now, these nil-whits completely overlook that the situation when using hashes in signatures always is that you already have what gets signed, which is completely different to the password situation. Still they claim "SHA1 is broken!". No it is not. It is broken for some specific _different_ application.

Why so many non-experts think they can voice a qualified opinion about a very hard mathematical topic is beyond me.

What Linus says here is exactly right and it is a statement by an expert. All those criticizing him are basically people that can put on a band-aid telling a brain-surgeon how to do his work. They just do not get it at all.

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