No it is useless, at least if we are talking Bitcoin specifically.
One real sign that you are right about this is that the actual insiders chose to create a separate Trumpcoin, fully separate from Bitcoin when they wanted to use crypto for serious fraud. That is not a vote of confidence from people who actually have access to US government internal information.
It isn't useful for those because of how wild and how fast the swings can be. It had a 15% drop over 10hrs yesterday between 14:40 on Thursday and 00:15 Friday morning and it's still down 5% over the price yesterday.
For a currency transfer even that rate of variability is not a problem. You can simply divide your currency transfer into tiny segments and immediately (no more than minutes) convert to and from the cryptocurrency.
That doesn't make sense, though, with Bitcoin because transaction costs are so high. Crypto can only have a chance of success once Bitcoin burns.
Sure, but if consumers don't get them, we will have to pay over the odds.
majority of people don't need that much resolution. It's marketing shit.
Right, but we (the computer/software/developer/CAD/graphic design type people) care. 8k is completely lost in motion blur and almost useless for watching films on anything but a full home cinema. On the other hand, it's really useful if you want to have static text or compare detailed photo images. We want cheap 8k monitors because it's much more convenient to have three 8k monitors than six 4k monitors. We have failed to fool the TV manufacturers into delivering what we want. If we can work out a way of fooling people it's needed like we did with 4k then we should do so. Tell them about the importance of home TV? Make films specially designed to show moire fringes on 4k TVs? I'm not sure what the tactic is, but if anyone can work out how to do it, clearly this should be a priority.
I'd like to think this is a tongue in cheek comment, but I think it has a bit too much truth to count as a proper joke or sarcastic comment.
That's my point about the timing being after the embassy decision. A "sinophobe" would have done it just before the decision, hoping to force the rejection of the embassy. However bad Starmer's trip is now, it would have been infinitely worse in that situation. Makes it much more likely that this release was delayed by Sinophiles than the other way round. Also, from China's point of view it gives them an excuse to fail to deliver favors expected after the embassy decision.
Lots of weird things, however the weirdest is that this comes out just immediately after, not before, they approve a huge new Chinese embassy. Likely it's been held up as a secret deliberately to not interfere with the process?
You mean suspects, right? Since when did they lose their basic rights? Just no. We have plenty of 3 letter orgs with their own special exceptions to the laws. The police can respect our basic rights.
The entire point of the category of "suspect" is that the police have more power over a person where they can show "reasonable suspicion" than they have over someone who is not a suspect. Think of the standard "think of the children" scenario. A van was seen next to the place where a child was kidnapped. Do you want the same set of rules to apply to all vans as the one that is "under suspicion"?
If you try to say "nothing proven; no right to investigate", the simple fact is that this will make it almost impossible to recover kidnapped children. If you say "we need the right to investigate, but we can't make a difference for suspects" then you will end up with the right for the police to do investigation on everybody.
The reasonable compromise is that; when there is a clear reason for suspicion, the police can investigate further. When they do that, they need to record the fact and get authorization. The mechanism for that is a warrant.
Maybe you're ok with the law providing exceptions such as these to your rights. I am not, and I would not view that as clean legislation.
The US constitution protects against unreasonble siezure. That is already a clear exception for reasonable seizure which is the whole point. I am okay with that.
Imagine requiring that all cars had explosives on them so that, in the case they were used for a bank robbery the police could blow them up remotely.
Replace explosives with a safer way to disable said vehicles,
Here I agree with you that even this is a problem. When a war with China comes as seems likely and people need to evacuate or transport food, China will be able to use those mechanisms to disable many vehicles across the US. This will cause major problems. There should not be a requirement for people to purchase equipment that could be used against them by an oppressive government. For the same reason they should not be forced to include software that could be used by an oppressive government to monitor them.
You realize that the ISPs already have the capability to intercept everything that happens online.
Intercept is not the same as "read" or even "attribute". They can record traffic. If that traffic is properly encrypted at one end and decrypted at the other with keys that only the user has access to they they can't access the traffic. If the traffic is correctly put into a trustworthy Tor node which has sufficient traffic levels and then sent through the onion network they cannot work out who is communicating with who.
That means that the only information that you have to give away is the fact that you are communicating and a maximum limit on the amount.
It's not hacking, specifically, if it's already baked into the software, and the possibility that (you could call it) "eavesdropping" might happen is already in the TOS and EULA.
It's been this way for decades. There is no privacy, all encryption schemes are easily cracked by the Master Keys the governments already have (the government (regardless of country) would never let an encryption scheme go public without a way to watch what you send).
You mean... not telling you every single way that your "facebook messager" is vulnerable... if every company did that, they wouldn't have customers.
Why would Facebook (in this example) shoot themselves in the chest like that?
This is specifically what we are discussing. If you want to learn more then the term you need to search for on google is "lawful interception". the concept is that it is under the control of a judge and requires a warrant. A major problem occurs when the same mechanisms are given over to those that should not use them.
Microsoft has ways to remotely execute commands (if they really wanted) on your computer, and that avenue of potential attack won't be patched.
If you are using Microsoft software then that is already a much bigger problem than the fact that you have decided to trust Microsoft. Having a FOSS operating system does not guarantee privacy or security, but it is a basic entry requirement for the possibility of it.
That one family picture (where you snogged your cousin) is only safe from the online snooping if you take that microSD card and hide it in the wall safe... if it was an internet-enabled device, it's out there already.
At some point you have to write and read that SD card. When you do that it is just as vulnerable as the computer you do that on.
Another key difference is that #2 violates a bunch of other laws and personal property/privacy boundaries.
The whole point here is that, with a permitted court order and warrant it doesn't break any laws because the law will allow it. That's not a problem. Every day you go into shops which could break "trespass" laws if it were not for the fact that you have permission. Since you do have permission it doesn't. Law enforcement goes
I don't think anyone should be encouraging the use of hacking as a legitimate LEO method to use against our own citizens.
This is an interesting discussion. I don't see hacking as inherently more problematic than, for example, spying on suspects using the many methods that police already do use. However if hacking causes insecurity for other people that's more of a problem.
What I think should be illegal is keeping secret vulnerabilities which might compromise a noticeable proportion of systems in the country (note, I didn't say "large", I would consider 1% of systems "noticable"). The NSA and GCHQ have been doing this when, if they had been publishing vulnerabilities much earlier and more aggressively, it's possible the extra pressure on software companies would have made our systems much safer and more secure. That's a problem.
While I disagree with the use of the 3 party chat solution, and it is a direct violation of necessary privacy and security safeguards, it would function and could be legislated fairly cleanly.
I disagree about the clean legislation. This involves forcing non-technical normal citizens to put themselves at risk by carrying software with them at all times which is designed to work against them. Imagine requiring that all cars had explosives on them so that, in the case they were used for a bank robbery the police could blow them up remotely. That would cause immense problems to make sure that not only could they not be triggered accidentally, that the police couldn't kill random people by mistake, but also that other people couldn't take advantage of the system and the supply of explosives that it provides and use it against the society. Nobody would consider this sane.
Be very careful. There's lots of truth in what you say but there are a bunch of subtle misconstructions that you are repeating which are designed to weaken the privacy of the public. Let's talk very specifically about tor,.
* yes, some Tor nodes are run by the governments with the aim of spying and supporting their spys. It is not an accident that the US government / CIA was openly involved in early funding
* yes, obviously, the computers at both ends of the encrypted track know a key to decrypt traffic from eachother
However
* there are Tor nodes run by "us"; the people opposed to both NSA and Chinese spying
* the beige box does not have your key if you are connected correctly to such a node from your computer
What they do have is
* access to the keys that the networks use for decryption
* the ability to compromise your end terminal
So it is possible to transmit messages securely - approximately (this is back of envelope stuff I did just for this comment - validate with an actual expert)
* use a separate terminal at each end owned by the people to encrypt/decrypt traffic
* copy the message safely and independently on protected media (paper you burn is good) to and from the separate terminal
* use a tor node on each end under your control, which doesn't log and which does carry lots of other easy to explain traffic like piracy
* when transmitting your actual secret traffic, limit transmission to entry and exit nodes you know are trustworthy.
by persuading you that these things are impossible, various malign actors want to take them away from you.
Imagine thinking privacy doesn't matter and mission creep isn't guaranteed here.
Nobody said that. Privacy does matter which is why you need to encourage reasonable searches with warrants. If you ban them from using techniques like spy systems against actual criminals then they will use that to get permission to embed spying in all systems.
As far as mission creep goes, it's inevitable. However, what's also inevitable is that secret services and police perverts will get caught spying on people they shouldn't be and abusing that. Whenever that happens, you get to reverse the mission creep and push it harder in the other direction.
It's a balance, and whichever side pushes it too far in the direction they want it to go ends up losing. Which is why the bad spy people try not to use the powers we already gave them and to hide what they do with data they take illegally. Requirements for warrants keep them in reasonable check and mean that illegal monitoring can only practically and effectively be used for national security reasons.
there are two ways of doing that
1) require all software to support three party chats with an extra party added - forcing signal, for example, to either leave the country or compromise it's system
2) have a spyware / malware ("policeware") system that installs extra software on the end terminal, grab the chat before it's encrypted and send it off to the police
the difference is that 1) means that everyone is burdened by making the software that they use is insecure.
On the other hand, 2) only needs to apply to the criminals at the point that they have a warrant against them; it requires some form of direct attack against the users terminal. If the Police use it too much and too widely then someone is bound to spot it happening and it will be compromised and reported to the antivirus companies. In the end, method 2) actually improves security because every time there is a court case where evidence from the method is used, more people become aware that the end terminals (Android phones / iOS / etc.) can be hacked and avoid the ones that get easily compromised.
So, whilst they both achieve the stated aim of allowing the police to intercept encrypted traffic from criminals, 1) and 2) have very different, even opposite, effects on general security of the whole population.
Which reminds us why it's really important for people to own all the server software for critical things. At some point there's a decision which is a trade off. "Disable A or Disable B". If A is the thing which kills your business and B is the thing that kills something Google cares about (even if it's just two other small businesses) then Google will kill A and your business with it.
Microsoft used to be able to do similar things, but it was much much slower and they tried to give you lots of warning. Now they moved to the cloud, the same tradeoffs as Google are now true there too.
Not completely. There are specific things which is incompatible - any law which controls the software that you install on your device when you are innocent; any law which allows them to carry out mass surveillence and keeping data of people who are not under examination. From the article I can't see that these things are being done.
Things which give them permission to hack with a warrant are reasonable. Firstly, it's something that can be measured because the warrants are recorded. Secondly, it can be discovered and puts pressure on companies and developers to improve their software which is good.
The Russians and Chinese are operating IMSI catchers all over the West. We have a group of trouble makers who say things like "I don't mind if my data goes to the Chinese" and put us all at risk. People who support privacy have to teach everyone to lock to networks where the IMSIs are hidden.
Stinginess with privileges is kindness in disguise. -- Guide to VAX/VMS Security, Sep. 1984
