>"Mass debt is profitable to the ones pulling the strings of our government."
Actually, it is much more profitable for the colleges/universities that rake in tons of zero risk money and have zero accountability for their admitting and spending/charging behavior.
>"No but if the borrower can't get a good job there should be cause of action for Warranty Act claims against the college. Extremely few people go to college with the expectation of borrowing to be unemployable. "
THIS
The colleges/universities should be held at least partially financially responsible for loan-enrolling so many people who probably are not ready or suitable for college (or at least THAT college) and are destined to either pick a useless major, or drop out. The colleges currently have ZERO risk, and their behavior and spending/pricing exactly matches that reality.
I don't care how much of an idiot you are, you're simply too stupid to respond to further. I don't want things to be as they were in my childhood. Back then, things were a mess. BECAUSE government tried either to micromanage everything or manage nothing at all. The idea of a third way, where governing is about just that, placing control mechanisms in place but not do the management, is obviously far beyond your pea-brain.
The problem is that you can ALWAYS get around rules. It isn't possible to make perfect rules for anything above a minimal level of complexity - that's just a variant of the Turing-Church Halting Problem.
So you are forced to invert the dynamics. There's no real alternative. Instead of you creating a high level of complexity that the departments will work their arses off to avoid, you force the departments themselves to create the regimens that they're prepared to live with. But you have to do so cleverly. They will always create regimens that mean they do the least work necessary (because that's cheap on resources and they will ALWAYS consider this sort of extra work to be an imposition) and have the least amount of culpability.
So you need to meet three conditions:
1. The department can't evade the bits they're actually able to do
2. The department CAN pass on work they're not equipt to do, but ONLY if it's their responsibility to oversee the department they pass it onto
3. The department IS inescapably culpable for failure to either do the work OR ensure that others do it
You do NOT need the frameworks for each department, and should not attempt to draw those up. Those will be departmentally-specific and timeframe-specific. Far, far better have people who actually know the specific context do that work. No department likes to look like it's being forced to do anything, so making the actual detailed specifics internal, you're utilising their psychology. They're not being "forced", they're defining their additional responsibilities and duties. From a psychological angle, they're much more likely to be receptive to this perspective.
But because the departments are all internally writing their own management protocols, YOU DON'T HAVE TO. You only need to have a framework which obliges them to write up what they will request. This is MUCH lighter and, because it is much lighter, it is far less prone to have failure points where generic ideas don't work for a specific type of work.
If we want to look at this in software terms, only an idiot would write an overly-restrictive langauge that imposes a strict model of thought regardless of the type of work. If you want to provide a high level of confidence in correctness, you don't try to impose it through a myriad of complex hurdles and rigorously controlled APIs. You achieve it by incorporating contracts (function X is guaranteed to take in data meeting these requirements, and is guaranteed to deliver data meeting these other requirements). Contract programming is much, much lighter on the development process, doesn't impose on the programmer, and yet creates a very high level of assurance. Mostly because programmers aren't working to try and cheat with irritating APIs.
In Linux terms, you want a lightweight virtual layer handling filesystems in general, the filesystem policies should be handled by the filesystem not the main kernel. You want the main kernel to be doing as little of the work as possible. As soon as it is heavy and micromanaging everything, you're going to end up with something slow and unstable, that really can't do a whole lot.
You want to push the complexity to the edges, that's where complexity belongs. The bit that changes slowly, can't handle special cases, has least visibility into what is needed, and is really a very blunt instrument wants to be lightweight. One reason for having things like Common Law and Case Law is precisely because the legal system figured all this out centuries ago.
I disagree. It actually needs less regulation.
The siloing of knowledge and duties is why it was always somebody else's problem. So you simply take out all the regulations that obligate siloing and replace all of that kerfufle with a single rule: "If it's on your plate and nobody else has published that they've done the work so far, it's your responsibility, silos be damned, and failure leaves you liable".
That's it.
That's all we need. A removal of siloed thinking and a duty to complete all of the scheduled work regardless of whose toes it tramples.
That would have solved the problem. But, because departments never like to give up powers they obtain, a side-effect would be that departments would be proactive. They wouldn't walk down piers, looking for strange things. Rather, if they heard of strange things that are their department, if they don't want to be shamed, then they need to ask the company for more information. Because then it's on their plate and not that of a rival department.
The other benefit of using this approach is that it isn't about the special cases, it's about the general problem that underlies all of the special cases of this sort: nobody takes responsibility until it's already a disaster.
If a department is liable for pretending the problems aren't there, then the department wil CYA. If the only way to do so is to do all the outstanding work, regardless of title, then that work will get done. If the only way to get it done right IS to give it to the right department, and they're on the hook until that has happened, you're damned right it'll happen.
I've worked in the public sector, I've seen the paranoia and closed-mindedness first-hand. That's not going to go away. So you solve the issue by exploiting those traits, since you can't eliminate them.
Ah, I see what you mean, now. Yeah. I do my best to make lore make sense, but that's one I can't fix.
>"If they can borrow money against those "unrealized gains" - a major source of wealthy people's cashflow - then they can tax those "unrealized gains."
That is the cart pulling the horse.
The problem is borrowing against unrealized gains to avoid income tax, so fix THAT. Then they will get taxed on that action, or on selling holdings which does create realized earnings and that will be taxed.
>"Are you a temporarily embarrassed billionaire?"
If I were, would I be bothering to post on Slashdot as a pass-time? But, no, I wish I had such a problem.
>"Wonâ(TM)t someone think of the poor billionaires?"
So easy to "other" them and do whatever we want to them?
But this will just drive all the highly rich right out of the State and they will take all their spending, companies, employment, holdings, other taxes, etc with them. I am all for closing loopholes, like the creation of tax-free "income" by borrowing against unrealized assets. But taxing them like that is just wrong on many levels and sets a really bad precedence.
>"colloquially known as the billionaire tax, would levy a one-time 5% tax on any California resident worth more than $1bn."
If it goes through and eventually becomes law, who really believes this will be a ONE-TIME ever tax on the UNREALIZED wealth of individuals?
I suppose one could argue that you want the more dselicate computers behind the pilot, since then it has the greatest achievable shielding on all sides without having excessive distance from the flight controls and without becoming inaccessible if the pod that is loaded into the middle is not traversible. Similar reasoning is used in Formula 1 - delicate bits of the car (such as the fuel tank) are placed between the driver and the engine, to keep them as safe as possible without creating a burden. This would necessitate there being a step down to get to the pilot's chair. It's not a particularly good piece of "lore repair" but it's the best I can do.
"Nuclear war can ruin your whole compile." -- Karl Lehenbauer