I agree whole heartedly with all of your points - although confirmation bias derailments show the limits of experimental psychology - like in the Hatemi debacle. In case you haven’t seen it, I highly recommend reading https://www.thecut.com/2016/07... (The Cut article “Why It Took Social Science Years to Correct a Simple Error About ‘Psychoticism’”) as it not only demonstrates the problem but it demonstrates projection.
I am MUCH more of a dilettante than you in the philosophical, psychological, and economic areas - having an engineering and computer science background - but CT’s spread, as well as Mao’s, Lenin’s, and Stalin’s “pruning” of my family tree, has led me down rabbit holes. Don’t know that fellow Hegel, but have read some Popper, Hayek, and Sowell to steady my sanity, as well as small (icky) samples of several folks in the CT though-line (Delgado, AP Harris, Foucalt, etc, Frankfurt school, Lenin, Marx, back to Rousseau).
My chief understanding of Foucalt is surface level - mostly limited to:
- His squishy definition of truth - which is ALSO neither predictive nor prescriptive - as it essentially abandons empiricism as “just another viewpoint”
- His dislike of totalizing theories like CT and Marxism (CT, of course conveniently ignores this warning from Foucalt while adopting his “narrative is truth”).
- His open support for installing Khamenei, even traveling to Iran, a solid example of the bewildering “red green” alliance built on mutual opposition to enlightenment philosophy.
- His rather chaotic personal life, which, not coincidentally in my opinion, matches the chaotic personal lives of Marx and Rousseau. This suggests that the entire philosophical line is founded on motivated reasoning - as it “just happens” to conveniently justify such chaos.
I see no value in CT. What use is a lens that - that, as you put it, exempts itself? Plus that’s so flawed that it (a) has never provably detected a problem that enlightenment didn’t more thoroughly detect and analyze, often centuries earlier, (b) never provably solved a problem better than enlightenment, plus (c) is so rife with false positives that it finds problems with virtually the entire enlightenment contract. At best, one can say it’s useful as a “devil’s advocate”, but that’s being awfully charitable given the consistent disasters when it’s applied at scale.
What’s more, from my simplistic engineering viewpoint, it’s amazing how crudely simple and similar Marx and CT are at their self-sealing core with just these four invariant assumptions:
1 - Group disparity necessarily indicates trouble (a fallacy per Simpson’s paradox)
2 - Rousseau’s “no man is a sinner - it’s the system that’s the problem”
3 - Self-sealing framing trumps empirical framing (examples: dialectical materialism, cultural Marxism, postmodernism)
4 - The “needs” of the group outweigh an individual’s suffering (this is the identitarian answer to the trolley problem)
It’s also amazing how these assumptions pretty inevitably lead to the conclusion that virtually all of enlightenment theory is bunk - blind justice, property rights, free speech, decentralization, and even empirical reasoning - whilst also concluding that forceful centralized redistribution of wealth and justice according to identity is the only solution.
It’s also interesting that invariants 2 and 4 theoretically conflict - but invariant 3 provides an escape for this illogic.