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Comment What if they asked to narrow the search for them? (Score -1) 12

Even so, law enforcement would also have access to the cellular records of countless individuals, the vast majority of whom were merely passing by a location at the 'wrong' time

What if, instead of asking: "Give us the list of everybody using this tower during this period", police asked for something narrower, like: "Give us the list of everybody using this tower during this period, and this other tower at this other period" (which is, what police would've done themselves)? What would make the request palatable to the Court — and Slashdot?

Enough AND-clauses until the resulting list is shorter than a certain number? 500? 50? 5? What if it becomes so short, the phone company employee(s) themselves can identify the suspect(s)?

Comment Re: Bulshit solution looking for a problem (Score -1) 81

I can't place a Polymarket bet on there being a hurricane and then go out and cause a hurricane.

Admitting your weakness is the first step towards growing strong!

Seriously, though, I do acknowledge this as a (potentially) valid concern in my next paragraph. But there are lots of other cases, where the bettor either has insider knowledge prior to betting, or can affect the outcome afterwards — both legally and otherwise. Lawmakers betting on financial markets' moves in response to their own legislation is still legal, for example. Other methods exist for the rest of us.

Yet, this proposal is limited sorely to setting wildfires and for the most bullshit reasons of all: "all so the rich and powerful can profit". Hence my contempt...

Submission + - Artificial Intelligence used to design brand new viruses (bbc.com)

fjo3 writes: Artificial Intelligence has been used to design brand new viruses that are fully functional and can replicate in the laboratory, say US researchers.

It is the first time whole genomes have been successfully designed by AI.

The resulting 16 novel viruses were created to infect bacteria and pose no threat to people.

The breakthrough has been labelled a "very significant turning point" in science that could unlock a new era for treating disease. But experts have also warned AI-designed viruses raise "urgent" safety and security concerns.

Comment Bulshit solution looking for a problem (Score -1) 81

Offering bets on destructive wildfires threatens to minimize communities' suffering

Totally different from hurricanes, floods, and tsunamis, right?

There's also the heightened risk -- according to state and local fire officials -- that individuals could be tempted to commit arson in order to make sure their bets are successful

This is, actually, a valid concern. I don't think, freedoms — including the freedom to bet one's own money — should be curtailed by such concerns, but it is valid.

Funny, how the authors don't hate the would-be arsonists — nowhere close to their disdain for the "rich and powerful", who might (might not!) profit from the betting...

Comment Re:Governments don't have the right (Score 0) 132

The act of surveilling someone is a form of search (Carpenter v. United States (2018)

You are incorrect. What the Carpenter determined, was not about generally "surveilling", but the particular act of requesting historical cell-site location records from wireless carriers.

The Court's majority did rule, that the 4th Amendment protects reasonable expectation of privacy, and the collection of the particular records violated this. But not in general case. What's between your cellphone and the cell-tower can be expected — reasonably to stay private. (Though personally I disagree even with that — anyone carrying an active radio should not expect it to be unnoticed.) But a visible presence in public — detectable by unaided human senses — definitely not. Police have tailed suspects for as long as law enforcement existed — and Bill of Rights' authors certainly knew about the practice existence — and there is nothing wrong about it.

Further, they didn't extend the "third-party doctrine" to the particular case of cell-site records, but they didn't repudiate it completely either.

While the average citizen is allowed to record anything they see in public [...] When the government does it, it is considered a breach of an individuals 4th amendment rights

Nope, it does not — not per Carpenter. Maybe, that's how things should be — though I'm not certain even of that. But it is not, how they are. And the list of earlier court-decisions (which I already posted twice) — the Knotts in particular — shows it.

Further, I was not talking about "the average citizen" — I was talking about a police officer. If one can watch you — without a warrant — he can also record you.

Submission + - An Ancient Poop Explosion Could Have Helped Complex Life Evolve (sciencealert.com)

alternative_right writes: If the earliest animals hadn't been such prolific poopers, life might not have diversified into all the weird and wonderful forms we see today.

That's the conclusion reached by a new review study published in Trends in Ecology & Evolution.

The team of scientists in Australia and Germany found that the Cambrian explosion â" a period around 540 million years ago when the ancestors of most animal groups arose â" could have been partly set in motion by an explosion of feces, left by those that came before.

Comment Re:Governments don't have the right (Score 0) 132

I suppose if one were to ignore 250 years of constitutional law

What "Constitutional Law"? Citation needed. Needed so badly, I'll do it for you:

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
Established the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. The Court held that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, laying the foundation for warrantless visual observation of people in public places.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)
Held that police may use a beeper (tracking device) to follow a vehicle on public roads without a warrant. A person traveling on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements from one place to another; visual surveillance (or technological aids that merely enhance it) is not a Fourth Amendment “search.”
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)
While ruling that prolonged GPS tracking of a vehicle constitutes a search requiring a warrant (because of the physical attachment of the device), the Court reaffirmed that short-term visual or technological monitoring of movements on public roads remains permissible without a warrant under the principles of Knotts.

Oh, wait...

Comment Re:Governments don't have the right (Score 0) 132

people shouldn't have a government that follows their every step by using AI and networked devices

Maybe, we should not, but there is not law prohibiting government to do this.

AI may be new, but the problem is not, and courts have repeatedly reaffirmed government's right to surveil us in public without any warrants (list courtesy of Grok). The second item — known as Knotts — is particularly telling...

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
Established the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. The Court held that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, laying the foundation for warrantless visual observation of people in public places.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)
Held that police may use a beeper (tracking device) to follow a vehicle on public roads without a warrant. A person traveling on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements from one place to another; visual surveillance (or technological aids that merely enhance it) is not a Fourth Amendment “search.”
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)
While ruling that prolonged GPS tracking of a vehicle constitutes a search requiring a warrant (because of the physical attachment of the device), the Court reaffirmed that short-term visual or technological monitoring of movements on public roads remains permissible without a warrant under the principles of Knotts.

Besides, how can the 4th Amendment include cameras, which didn't exist in the 18th century, if the 2nd doesn't protect "assault rifles"? :-)

Comment Re:Governments don't have the right (Score 1) 132

Usage of Flock cameras is almost certainly a violation of the 4th amendment.

It most definitely is not. The actual text of the Amendment, for your benefit:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.

The camera is not peering into your pockets, or windows. It is only looking at what's publicly visible...

Very simple, obvious, common-sense argument: whatever a human policeman can see and memorize, an electronic device can record too.

Comment Re:Governments don't have the right (Score -1) 132

Governments don't have the right to do mass general surveillance

Huh?! Why not? Let's focus on American (Federal) government in particular — what is prohibiting them from conducting "mass general surveillance"?

Not saying, it is good — or bad — just want you to substantiate your claim, that it is somehow illegal...

Submission + - A fundamental flaw leaves LLMs strikingly vulnerable to attack (technologyreview.com)

joshuark writes: It is impossible to make large language models fully secure against hacks because of a fundamental flaw in how they work, a team of researchers argue in a paper presented at the International Conference on Machine Learning, a top AI conference, this month. The claim has huge implications for the safety of this technology.

By taking advantage of this flaw, which concerns how LLMs identify who or what is giving them instructions, the researchers were able to make popular LLMs spit out information they had been trained not to provide, such as how to synthesize cocaine and how to sabotage a commercial aircraft’s navigation system.

“There’s a real probability that this is going to be a problem that’s fundamentally unsolvable,” says Charles Ye, an independent researcher and coauthor of the ICML paper.

Companies will typically hire teams of human testers to try to come up with novel attacks that break existing guardrails, a process known as red-teaming. Model makers also use LLM super-hackers (such as OpenAI’s GPT-Red) that find and exploit weaknesses in other models to automate parts of this process. The goal is then to take those attacks and train a new model to resist them and anything that looks like them.

The problem, says Jasmine Cui, another independent researcher and coauthor of the paper, is that the approach amounts to giving the models a list of things they shouldn’t do. But no list is exhaustive. “It’s like watching The Simpsons and they have Bart writing ‘I will not say something inappropriate to my teacher’ a hundred times,” she says. “And he still does things that are pretty crass anyway.”

The ICML paper describes attacks against several of OpenAI’s models, but Cui and Ye say that they have since seen similar results with models made by Anthropic, Alibaba, and DeepSeek.

Cui and her colleagues wanted to find out why an attack like chain-of-thought forgery was so effective. They suspected it had something to do with the mechanism that LLMs use to keep track of where their instructions are coming from.

But what Cui and her colleagues discovered is that LLMs are in fact very bad at keeping track of different roles. In a series of experiments that looked at what was going on inside a handful of different models, the researchers found that LLMs seem to identify the role of a specific chunk of text not by the tags around it but by the style of that text and the words it contains.

The upshot, the researchers claim, is that all an attacker needs to do to hack an LLM is write text that spoofs a certain role. And because roles are a fundamental part of how LLMs work, no amount of training will fully solve the problem.

Ye is worried that nobody is ready for what’s coming. “There’s going to be a huge economic incentive for people to do jailbreaks and prompt injections,” he says. The best defense could be to expect the worst. Organizations shouldn’t trust LLMs, and they should expect that anything done by agents could be unsafe, he says: “That’s not a great solution, but it just might be what we have to do.”

“It’s really incredible that these things are being deployed everywhere to control super-critical systems,” he adds. “There’s been no study of the fundamental science here. We’re all doing it ad hoc.”

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