Waymo doesn't drive in bad weather. And you talk like it's the humans choice, but life doesn't stop because the weather is bad. People have to go out in bad weather.
If the weather is bad enough, people choose not to go out in it. Unless someone has a gun to your head, you always have a choice.
If Waymo's argument is valid, then humans shouldn't be allowed to drive.
Heh, there's some validity to that. Human drivers are a daily rolling disaster that society tolerates only because there hasn't been any reasonable alternative. If-and-when autonomous vehicles actually become cheap and reliable enough, I suspect that human driving will gradually start to be curtailed -- not necessarily by banning it outright, but by making licensing requirements more restrictive, by making insurance costs more onerous, and/or by "nerfing" the cars such that they simply refuse to perform dangerous maneuvers.
What this country needs is a good two-dollar red-team AI, that will try to create an exploit based on a submitted bug report and use the exploit to compromise a Mac in the QA lab. If it succeeds, the bug report is definitely genuine and should be prioritized.
Getting the votes to impeach is easy. Getting the votes to convict is de facto impossible.
I agree that has historically been the case, but OTOH Trump is deteriorating so rapidly (both psychologically and in terms of his level of popular support) that after November's bloodbath (and whatever Trump's unhinged response to that will be), the remaining Republicans may well decide it's in their own interest to get him out of office sooner rather than later.
We've reached the "Pope is selling indulgences" phase of the American government's decent into blatant corruption.
It doesn't mention that the manager makes minimal wage with no health care. He's going to be hard to replace.
Considering Excel encryption/protection has been broken on every version of Excel from day 1, if that is what they are relying on, I think their security consultants may need some training.
Russia has assassinated former Russian citizens outside of Russia before, it would be unsurprising if they did it again.
I suppose they could do that, but I don't know what it would accomplish. Telegram is already written and functional; murdering Durov wouldn't uninstall it anywhere. I suppose it might intimidate the next guy who is considering writing a secure messaging app, but I don't think Russia is playing that kind of decades-long game anymore. Their main goal now is short-term: figure out how survive the Ukraine debacle without getting strung up by their own citizenry.
It absolutely is a crime to intentionally destroy evidence.
This could have been avoided; instead of erasing the drive, the duress password could have been set to load a "clean" partition with nothing on it that the defendant didn't want the US government to see.
... but Dear Leader will keep us safe from the dangerous and corrupt outside world. Juche!
Just wait until you try to download the bootleg video and end up with a copy of Musk's AI-generated "historically accurate" version instead. D'oh!
They don't usually do this at a border check, but if they use a forensics terminal it's not running the OS, they basically do a backdoor boot and look at what the hardware reports.
The key point here is that data's security isn't enforced by the OS, but rather by the encryption algorithm itself. A non-OS forensics terminal would see the raw contents of the hard drive, which is to say, blocks of random-looking bytes that might be encrypted data or might just be truly random; without the corresponding password, there is no way to to tell.
Without any password (and assuming a robust encryption implementation), that's as far as they'd get. With a password, they'd be able to decrypt the blocks associated with that password and view the files for that account, but not any of the other blocks/accounts.
At that point, the FBI's nerds might well suspect that there are other accounts on the phone that they don't know about, but short of coercing the phone's owner into providing additional passwords, that's as far as they could get.
If they plugged it into a forensics terminal they'd likely see right away that the device OS isn't reporting the correct blocks.
The goal would be to have a device OS with no concept of "correct blocks", i.e. there are only a bunch of blocks, all equally correct, and the OS uses some subset of them based on the password that was entered. Ideally the OS wouldn't even have the ability to tell anyone how many viable subsets there are.
Of course, "more cost-effective than SLS" is a pretty low bar. The actual goal would be "more cost effective than Falcon 9".
To me, it sounds like "well, we thought we had it isolated..."
"It might help if we ran the MBA's out of Washington." -- Admiral Grace Hopper
