So...it's NSA's fault when foreign intelligence services conduct espionage against US political parties, media organizations, etc., and actively try to influence the outcomes of US elections, and manipulate the opinions of US citizens? You realize that no matter who wins in November, possibly millions of Americans will believe the election was stolen or rigged, and possibly by foreign influence?
I know, I know -- in this crowd, the US is the enemy, here, and we don't actually need to have any kind of foreign intelligence capability; NSA's sole purpose for being is to figure out ways to illegally spy on Americans so it can solidify the power base of shadowy elites. Or something. Whenever I need to be reminded of just how out of touch many people are with history, reality, or both, I read Slashdot comments.
Yes, the Russian intelligence services have the best interests of democracy and the United States at heart!
Note to nimbius: look up the term "useful idiot".
I guess law enforcement shouldn't be able to use aircraft or cameras. Maybe they shouldn't be able to use cars or computers, either.
I'll say it again: it is not the technology or capability that is at issue. In a free society governed by the rule of law, it is the LAW that is paramount.
It is a remotely-controlled device, jury rigged for a purpose that is not at all its use.
I know people will become uncontrollably outraged about this, but it's a standoff weapon. Just like a spear, a bow and arrow, an explosive tossed through a door or window, a gun, or even a vehicle employed as a weapon.
The legal standard for lethal force is the same. Beware of academics or other commentators who will claim this is some kind of new territory for which there is no legal standard and that we have no idea how to approach.
But by all means: pretend this is an "Unprecedented Shift in Policing" instead of an improvisation under nightmarish circumstances.
But what do I know?
As to my absence I've been a bit overwhelmed by work stuff, sorry about that, it's no excuse
I was referring to the iOS 7 device, which they can easily unlock/break (see Section I), but declined to do so this time (the EDNY case).
The combination of iOS 8/9 with iPhone 6 and newer (HW security enclave) is designed to not be able to be broken by Apple, even if it wanted to.
That's not to say that nothing is breakable, ever; it's all about the level of effort required and whether or not one can bypass the crypto altogether.
No, the phone is running iOS 9 -- this is the San Bernardino phone. The phone running iOS 7 was the case in the Eastern District of New York -- which of course Apple's own law enforcement compliance statement says it will unlock when presented with a warrant, but I guess it didn't feel like it this time.
The next release of what? The iPhone 5c? Remember that part of the shortcoming here isn't in crypto or the OS, it was a combination of the newer iOS (8/9) with older hardware without the new security enclave (iPhone 5 and older).
Section 702 facilitates targeting and collection on non-US Persons outside the United States whose communications enters, traverses, or otherwise touches the United States, as over 70% of international internet traffic does, or as does any non-US Person outside the US using any US-based cloud or internet service.
Where US Persons come in is because US corporations and organizations are also "US Persons". But if we suddenly say that doing foreign intelligence collection on non-US Persons outside the US should require the same individualized warrant protections as Americans citizens living in the US, it absurdly turns the entire purpose and function of foreign intelligence collection on its head.
And if you already don't trust the government, you won't care about anything in this explanation anyway.
...I guess it's time for Apple to update its law enforcement compliance guide:
I. Extracting Data from Passcode Locked iOS Devices
For iOS devices running iOS versions earlier than iOS 8.0, upon receipt of a valid search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, Apple can extract certain categories of active data from passcode locked iOS devices. Specifically, the user generated active files on an iOS device that are contained in Appleâ(TM)s native apps and for which the data is not encrypted using the passcode (âoeuser generated active filesâ), can be extracted and provided to law enforcement on external media. Apple can perform this data extraction process on iOS devices running iOS 4 through iOS 7. Please note the only categories of user generated active files that can be provided to law enforcement, pursuant to a valid search warrant, are: SMS, iMessage, MMS, photos, videos, contacts, audio recording, and call history. Apple cannot provide: email, calendar entries, or any third-party app data.
DEC diagnostics would run on a dead whale. -- Mel Ferentz