That is the notable part. Right now, a lot of token use doesn't move much... but it does. Add LLM optimization, new ways of doing things like tensors instead of matrix multiplication with carry, or 1 bit LLMs like BitNet, and those relatively small attacks against weakened versions can pile up, especially because as mentioned in other spots, the whole is not just the sum of the parts. Sometimes one math operation can be considered a "group", where there is a shortcut around it that may require far fewer keys in the key space.
Cryptographic attacks never get weaker over time.
Right now, with Grover's algorithm or Simon's Algorithm, AES-256 is effectively AES-128. Combine that with other keyspace reducing attacks, and it might be wise to start considering what is going to be what comes after AES, and maybe even look at larger keyspaces like 384 or 512. It might even be wise to look at cascades, similar to how VeraCrypt has that as an option. A cryptographic cascade of three algorithms isn't going to give 768 bits... but more of 257-258 bits. However, if one algorithm is completely broken, the others should make up for it, or even worse, all three are partially broken, but combined, they keep the keyspace beyond what brute-forcing can fix.