I think a home charger is more likely for Pwn2Own. Winning an L3 DC fast-charger is cool and all, but it's not likely that the successful hacker is going to be able to do much more with it that use it as a garden ornament or oversized door stop, unless they offer a cash alternative, because things like DC fast chargers should absolutely be subjected to this kind of thing just as much as the typical consumer tools that make up most of the targets.
A cybersec seminar I was at last yeaar had a speaker from a major pen-testing company describing how they had got a L3 DC EV charger setup into a Faraday cage to see if it could be exploited (they didn't state which make, before you ask, presumably because they are in active use, but they did say that the charging network operator was their client, which is not necessarily the same as the manufacturer of the equipment, so I'm guessing probably NOT Tesla). Turns out these things were a comms nightmare, and despite the fact that they often have to have buried HV cables due to their location on the forecourt, they use wireless data links rather than hardwiring then via a secondary LV cable duct). This is broken down into:
Usage/payment processing. You'd expect this to be secure because of standards like PCI-DSS and because it's a glorified version of those remote card terminals you see everywhere, so a known tech that has been audited over and over, and that was mostly true - they couldn't get at the payment info - but they were still able to interfere with it and create a DoS and extract an awful lot of PII from users of the charging pods sent from their phone apps.
Management. These things often sit out on a forecourt, but there is usually also a management terminal located somewhere onsite showing status info, etc.. This proved to be woefully insecure, and they were able to send bogus data to the management console, and get it to show whatever status info they wanted, which is important because of the third data network.
Power supply regulation. When installed in a group, the chargers "chat" amongst themselves to optimise the distribution of the available power from the grid when the bank is close to maxing it out so that you can have a car arriving with an almost flat battery prioritised over one that is already 80% full, as well general management and heat regulation through redistribution of supply current so that nothing gets too hot. Turns out this was woefully insecure too.
By the culmination of their exercise, they were able to combine the hacks and were able to both take arbitrary charge pods offline, fiddle with the power regulation to generate potentially dangerous current draw scenarios, and simultaneously present the operator dashboard with information indicating that everything was just fine. While some of that did require opening a panel and connecting to a USB debug port in one of the pods, with a variety of vehicles parked up and a pre-attack recon of the CCTV setup, I suspect it wouldn't be too hard to engineer things so that one of the pods was hidden from the cameras long enough for you to attach the required cable and replicate the attack in the wild.