United States is in there because some collapsed local economies have vacated population; United States population is increasing.
Despite ever increasing population in the US, some American municipalities (city limits) have shrunk due to white flight and urban decay.
Japan is in there, due to a recent inflection. 128.1 million in 2010, 127 million in 2016. It's more horizontal than downward.
Russia went from 148.7 million in 1992 (collapse of the USSR) to a decline bottoming at 142.7 in 2008. It's up to 144.3 million now, slowly climbing. A comparison to their unemployment rates is interesting: as Russia's population fell initially, unemployment ramped up; the inflection point where population begun to climb again came at 2007, and population continued to climb even though unemployment spiked again in 2009 and then immediately begun to fall again (it's lower in 2010 and 2011, and has recovered by 2012).
It looks like the sudden difficulty in finding employment after the 1992 collapse of the USSR is directly time-correlated to the sharp collapse in Russian population. That's a trend in the poverty- and conflict-stricken Eastern European Bloc:
Much of Eastern Europe has lost population due to migration to Western Europe. In Eastern Europe and Russia, natality fell abruptly after the end of the Soviet Union, and death rates generally rose.
Ukraine also experienced an unemployment spike in 2009, right after recovery; they have only recovered to 2005 levels, and are still in decline. Between 2003 and 2009, they lost 1.7 million population; between 2009 and 2016, only 1 million. That decline is slowing, but Ukraine is a war-torn country with a poverty-stricken economy. Ukraine's GDP fell 50% between 2013 and 2015; so did its GDP-per-capita. It is currently 20% below 2009 levels of economic production and productivity.
Gerogia and Armenia have declining population. Georgia's unemployment rate is 12.5%; Armenia's unemployment rate remains at 18%. Armenia and others in the region experienced a drop in GDP-per-capita and the beginning of population decline in 1990; the decline slowed around 1996, although it didn't reverse to follow the great growth of GDP and GDP-per-capita. Armenia's low point was 2.876 million in 2011,and is 2.925 million now. Georgia flattened its decline in 2014, but has not begun progressing. Peoples in this country struggle for jobs.
Compare that to Azerbaijan's growing population. Their unemployment rate was 6.3% in 2007, and fell continuously to 4.9% in 2014. It's 5.1% now.
So, nations with high unemployment, falling GDP-per-capita, or both have falling populations; many of these nations began their decline after crippling economic collapse. Nations with stable unemployment and growing GDP-per-capita have stable and growing populations. United States population isn't in decline; Japan's has leveled, but hasn't started a visible trend of negative growth yet.
The data seems to confirm Malthusian growth, unless you want to go day-by-day and claim that population doesn't fluctuate up and down in absolute lockstep with the daily GDP--because of course it doesn't. The fact is a nation's population will expand if the nation grows in wealth--not the same day, but over time, growing toward that goal. Likewise, its population growth will slow when it reaches carry capacity, and shrink if the economy falters over a long enough time scale.
That means, yes, if you manage to make a nation of such wealth that there are more jobs than people, just wait a few years: you'll have more people than jobs again soon. It's not even just fertility rate; folks will flee the crippled Eastern Bloc to come to America for all those jobs, and American corporations will cite the -5% unemployment rate as an obvious indicator that, no, in fact, there aren't Americans to work these jobs.
Eventually, as your population grows, you hit carry capacity. Doubling the volume of production doesn't necessarily double the amount of labor involved; it can take more than twice the human labor hours to make twice as much stuff. Food is the obvious example: you run out of good farm land, you have to farm on the land that yields less and uses more irrigation and fertilizer, and that's more fertilizer production (labor), more power pumping the water (labor), more time spent fertilizing and irrigating (labor), and the same amount of time spent harvesting to get lower yield--which in turn means getting the same yield requires increasing all of these factors (labor). People have to pay for those labor wages when they buy the product, so prices of such things go up relative to incomes, and folks become poorer. The population can keep growing because things are abundant, but the standard-of-living will fall--and jobs will become more-scarce. Standard of living eventually becomes contemporarily-intolerable to some.
So far I've seen no evidence against this. Do note that the Malthusian model suggests populations simply expand exponentially, and more-complex versions have made other interesting but easily-refuted suggestions. The base Malthusian growth concept that population expands relative to abundance has always proved valid; it's not particularly-interesting to anyone except policymakers, so it's never been generalized that way. I'm kind of abusing the term in that aspect.
Finally, most economists like to explore GDP and income-per-capita, but not things like unemployment and general economic stability; I like to ask questions like: "do people feel secure in the belief that their current standard-of-living will persist?" This has frequently lead me to identify correlated economic indicators nobody cares about, mostly because the correlations are too weak (unemployment is correlated to population growth in shorter term than it is to decline, but largely shows that your economy is faltering and indicates that other factors are probably also present which influence population in a given direction). I often suggest I more need an understanding of causality more than a crystal ball to predict every movement of the future.