Students vs. Hackers 83
sethfogie wrote to mention Informit.com's coverage of the Mid-Atlantic Regional Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition. Students put their skills to the test, trying to lock down systems against intrusion from an invading hacker team. All in the name of learning. From the article: "When the three hour grace period was over, the Red Team slowly worked their way into attack mode. One member started to sort through the information they gleaned from their scans and investigated each possible exploit. Another member fired up a MySQL database client and started to poke around the students databases looking for sensitive data. The two others were adding/changing accounts to routers, firewalls, and systems. However, for the most part, the students were not being pelted with attacks. And this continued for the next several hours."
Nice rules (Score:1, Informative)
The rules were fairly simple -- at least at first glance. Basically, the Red Team could do anything but hurt someone or perform a denial of service attack (network flood). The student teams were a bit restricted, with regard to changing IP addresses and messing with the infrastructure.
Communication was allowed between team members, but only the team leader could talk to the white cell members about problems, etc. The feds could be called o
Re:Nice rules (Score:2)
First thing the students should have done was change EVERYTHING - the subnets, the IPs, maybe even the software being used. That would have forced the hackers to have to relearn everything they thought they knew.
And the winners are... (Score:1)
Simulations are lacking, here's why (Score:5, Insightful)
It's one thing to pit technical skill againt the threat of hacking, but it's been done over and over, all that technical skill accounts for nothing if you have a user that has his/her password written down on a sticky - on thier MONITOR!
Users must be educated and kept up to task on things like this, and it's my opinion that the IT/Security industry does not place enough emphasis in that arena, And to thier detriment...
Re:Simulations are lacking, here's why (Score:1)
Re:Simulations are lacking, here's why (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Simulations are lacking, here's why (Score:1)
"Another member fired up a MySQL database client and started to poke around the students databases looking for sensitive data."
This looks like social engineering to me.
Re:Simulations are lacking, here's why (Score:2, Informative)
Re:Simulations are lacking, here's why (Score:1)
"Social engineering is the practice of obtaining confidential information by manipulation of legitimate users. A social engineer will commonly use the telephone or Internet to trick people into revealing sensitive information or getting them to do something that is against typical policies."
Examples cited in the article include e-mail and web page social engineering and also your
Re:Simulations are lacking, here's why (Score:1)
Turns out the RED team (ISS Xforce & PWC @ our competition), got bored after they destroyed everyone's setup... so they went out and walked into rooms and some folks they were able to sit down and plug in the network.
Re:Simulations are lacking, here's why (Score:4, Interesting)
Re:Simulations are lacking, here's why (Score:1)
Just because you CAN do a thing doesn't mean you MUST do a thing, and I think the natural reaction from most admins is to not think further about the impacts their changes will make.
Things like "something you have, something you know" - use a hardware key along w
Re:Simulations are lacking, here's why (Score:1)
I'd call that jumping all over IT.
Being from IT myself and having to implement a more complex password policy, it's not like we wanted folks to have a convoluted password. In our case, we got several branches involved, and had to make a tradeoff between security and usability, and it's something that we've had to struggle with for a long time. It's been a challenge for us AND our users.
Similarly, we investigated implementing a certi
Re:Simulations are lacking, here's why (Score:1)
I know what you say is indeed true - it's just frustrating that's all, that policy is usually dictated by people who don't have to access these systems on a daily basis but who will also not release the funds to implement systems to do it right.
Again, I apologize for sounding like an ass...
Re:Simulations are lacking, here's why (Score:1)
I understand it's difficult when you don't have the administrative privileges. Certainly, when I go into systems that I don't have privilege, it feels cramped. Cryptic password policies don't help much either.
Re:Simulations are lacking, here's why (Score:3, Insightful)
In a similulation as described in the article everyone is hyper vigilant and actively looking at all aspects of security. In the normal world it is rare that the enti
Re:Simulations are lacking, here's why (Score:2, Interesting)
Re:Simulations are lacking, here's why (Score:1)
of course, the people that had their teams switched would be "let go" from the security team - accounts locked down/deleted, escorted "out of the building" so as to not steal anything on the way out, etc.
The user is the weak point! (Score:5, Informative)
In other words, it's a trivial matter to get into somebody's system; it takes a whole 'nother skill set to convince that person to hand you the keys to their data.
I wonder if tech-savvy folks (the students referred to in TFA fior example) are as good at "locking themselves down" as they are at securing their computers. Have any studies been done on the credulosity of geeks?
Actually, this was allowed. (Score:3, Informative)
Re:Actually, this was allowed. (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Actually, this was allowed. (Score:1)
Re:Actually, this was allowed. (Score:2)
every collegiate social event I attended served alcahol, were they allowed to buy drinks? (having a a little nip now, thanks for noticing my great spelling.)
Re:The user is the weak point! (Score:2)
He next reached inside his bag and pulled out a complete description of the student's setup, including all operating systems, services, web applications, and IP addresses he had obtained from an anonymous source. Everyone in the room immediately got a slightly evil grin on their face as they realized the results of this social engineering reward.
Re:The user is the weak point! (Score:2)
Ratio of people who visit slashdot to people who take slashdot seriously?
Re:The user is the weak point! (Score:1, Funny)
Re:The user is the weak point! (Score:2)
Brandt: [speaks into Preston's ear.] You ask him for it.
In the social engineering context, I guess you give him chocolate for it.
GO MILLERSVILLE! (Score:1, Interesting)
Re:GO MILLERSVILLE! (Score:2)
It is one thing to know it is coming... (Score:5, Insightful)
Sounds like fun though, kinda like the CS programming competitions I went to in high school
Re:Students vs. Hackers? (Score:5, Informative)
Only if you didn't, like, read it. The red team were not students.
Red Team:
Joe Harwell: Joe is a Security Specialist for Nortel Government Solutions. He currently is responsible for design, integration and testing of many of the "three letter agencies" security systems, and has over 15 years of experience in the field. He was CERT penetration tester for the US Army in a previous life.
Ryan Trost: Ryan is a Senior Security Engineer for Criterion Systems, currently working on a DHS contract. When not overseeing the security architecture of his team, he spends his free time developing a Network Security Snap-on Application that involves IDS Geocoding (patent pending). Ryan will be graduating from George Washington University this May with a Masters in Computer Science.
Adam Meyers, CCE, IAM, IEM: As an information security professional and consultant, Adam Meyers provides clients with complete security expertise, ranging from assessments, forensics, incident response, penetration testing, and security architecture. Additionally he provides physical security assessments and threat analysis. Mr. Meyers is a Certified Computer Examiner (CCE). Prior to joining SRA, he worked with the George Washington University Security Team, as the Network Manager for the 2000 National Democratic Convention, and as a private security consultant, all while pursuing a degree in political science with specific attention to inter-state information warfare.
Tom Parker: Tom is a computer security analyst who, alongside his work providing integral security services for some of the world's largest organizations, is widely known for his vulnerability research on a wide range of platforms and commercial products. Tom regularly presents at closed-door and public security conferences, including the Blackhat briefings, and is often referenced by the world's media on matters relating to computer security.
Re:Students vs. Hackers? (Score:2)
Hacking at school... (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Hacking at school... (Score:2, Informative)
Re:Hacking at school... (Score:1)
Re:Hacking at school... (Score:1)
Re:Hacking at school... (Score:2)
At City College of San Francisco, one of our teachers sort of teaches "Script Kiddies 101". His computer security courses teaches how various simple tricks can be used to trick a sys admin into giving you root access (e.g., tricking him into running a standard command with root privilege which you have tricked out as a script that copies a shell with his privilege and then runs the command he thought he was running before erasing itself - stuff like that.
It's very introductory, but it's better than the Wind
Re:Lunix servers (Score:4, Interesting)
Other recent security competition (Score:1)
Not exactly fair, was it? (Score:3, Insightful)
The easiest way to defeat the attackers would be to lock them out at the firewall or router. Then all the sql-injection vulnerabilities wouldn't matter.
And when your database app has those vulnerabilities, there isn't much the average network admin can do.
This calls for... (Score:2)
Students:
2,890,000,000 results
Hackers:
87,700,000 results
No contest.
Finally did something slashdot-worthy! (Score:5, Insightful)
It was very fun. We really expected the hackers to be exploiting vulnerabilities much more than social engineering and such. Our downfalls were a) not changing the passwords of the users fast enough b) forgetting to configure the obscure mail server software. It was called "post.office"; never heard of it. By the time we remembered about it, the hackers had changed the password on it, although we (naively) assumed it had just been locked down somehow.
What's your background? (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:What's your background? (Score:5, Interesting)
All of our knowledge from this competition is from experience outside of school. A little hands-on knowledge can go a long way. I worked primarily on the Linux servers (but also the e-commerce site on Windows). My knowledge of that is just through personal experience. I've been using Linux for a long time.
I know at least one person on the team has a lot of certifications (Microsoft). Another person was trained on routers by the national guard. Although I have experience from a Cisco class in highschool, I let other guys who knew it better handle it. As a funny note, we locked ourselves out of our firewall almost immediately (due to mistyping the new password). We didn't attempt to reset it while we were in first place.
So, our backgrounds are all pretty unique to answer your question. As a side note, we do have a security class offered at our school, but it is heavily based on theory.
That makes me want to smack people. (Score:2)
I'm impressed that you lasted that long.
Seriously, aside from the physical entry (extremely uncommon in the Real World), a quick class on firewall/router configuration would have stopped the attackers.
I think you guys were setup to fail on this. You gave an impressive performance, but the skills needed weren't what you were going to school for and, in the Real World, you wouldn't be limited to those "rules".
Congrats!
Re:That makes me want to smack people. (Score:2, Interesting)
Re:That makes me want to smack people. (Score:2)
Re:That makes me want to smack people. (Score:1)
That's just wrong. (Score:2)
The first rule of security is to restrict the avenues of attack. You weren't allowed to do that.
The second rule is to run only what you absolutely need. But without the install media, that's not very easy to do.
The third rule is
Re:That makes me want to smack people. (Score:2)
One of the caveats of the firewall is that we couldn't block by source ip -- so, while it sounds like you can just stop any attack at will, that is not the case. Someone came up with the suggestion of blocking by destination ip... but I don't think the white team would have been very amused.
Re:That makes me want to smack people. (Score:2)
That would have forced the hacker team back into information gathering mode for a longer time, and it's clear from the story that even though the students had three hours without attacks, they needed more time.
Re:What's your background? (Score:3, Funny)
As a funny note, we locked ourselves out of our firewall almost immediately
Are you sure you don't work for my company? They call this a security feature where I work,
Re:Finally did something slashdot-worthy! (Score:2)
kashani
Re:Finally did something slashdot-worthy! (Score:1)
My question to you is this: Was your contest a totally unorganized snafu?
At our competition, none of the machines were configured right, the scoring engine they used was pathetic (and constantly scoring teams incorrectly), and the rules were randomly enforced. Although teams hacking other teams was prohibited, our Red team openly discussed the fact that mo
Re:Finally did something slashdot-worthy! (Score:2)
My only real complaint is that we didn't see anything the scorebot was doing. For a while, t
Re:Finally did something slashdot-worthy! (Score:1)
Start Reading From the Description (Score:2)
How to win. (Score:1)
1. Obtain an OpenVMS Alpha system [islandco.com].
2. Read the docs [hp.com].
3. Install the patches [hp.com].
4. Let 'em try their damnedest to break in.
5. TEH WIN!!!!!1111
Not impressed (Score:1)
Re:Not impressed (Score:2)
Re:Not impressed (Score:2, Informative)
Though, for reasons even they can't comprehend, they were constantly consulted on what to install on them, and even were asked for *binary* install packages.... If you want to blame someone, blame the organizers, not the red team. I mean, c'mon, what would *you* do?
Yeah, one of the Red Team members is a friend/co-worker of mine.
Re:Not impressed (Score:1)
RTFA? (Score:2, Insightful)
This wasn't a competition to spawn a generation of script-kiddies.
Social engineering played a part in the competition.
When the article says "restrictions," it's not saying we weren't allowed to change shit. The "no changing ip's" business was that we had to have services on a certain IP for the duration of the competition.
"The easiest way to defeat the attackers would be to lock them out at the firewall or router. Then all the sql-injection vulnerabiliti
Re:RTFA? (Score:2)
Oh, okay - if it had to be a public accessible service such as the Web server - but could you change the ports? No reason to use the standard ports for services if you don't have to and clobber the banners, too.
"I'm convinced that the only secure computer is one that's not plugged in."
That's about right. And the only secure computer that is running is the one that doesn't have anything on i
Re:RTFA? (Score:1)
"Security by obscurity" - not necessarily using a program that few people know and assuming they don't know the exploits, but rather being inconsequential enough that no one will take the time to hack your ass.
red herrings? (Score:2)
Re:red herrings? (Score:2)