An anonymous reader shares a report: In what is being called the largest supply chain attack in history, attackers have injected malware into NPM packages with over 2.6 billion weekly downloads after compromising a maintainer's account in a phishing attack.

The package maintainer whose accounts were hijacked in this supply-chain attack confirmed the incident earlier today, stating that he was aware of the compromise and adding that the phishing email came from support [at] npmjs [dot] help, a domain that hosts a website impersonating the legitimate npmjs.com domain.

In the emails, the attackers threatened that the targeted maintainers' accounts would be locked on September 10th, 2025, as a scare tactic to get them to click on the link redirecting them to the phishing sites.

This week Google's Open Source Security Team announced "a new project to strengthen trust in open source package ecosystems" — by reproducing upstream artifacts.

It includes automation to derive declarative build definitions, new "build observability and verification tools" for security teams, and even "infrastructure definitions" to help organizations rebuild, sign, and distribute provenance by running their own OSS Rebuild instances. (And as part of the initiative, the team also published SLSA Provenance attestations "for thousands of packages across our supported ecosystems.") Our aim with OSS Rebuild is to empower the security community to deeply understand and control their supply chains by making package consumption as transparent as using a source repository. Our rebuild platform unlocks this transparency by utilizing a declarative build process, build instrumentation, and network monitoring capabilities which, within the SLSA Build framework, produces fine-grained, durable, trustworthy security metadata. Building on the hosted infrastructure model that we pioneered with OSS Fuzz for memory issue detection, OSS Rebuild similarly seeks to use hosted resources to address security challenges in open source, this time aimed at securing the software supply chain... We are committed to bringing supply chain transparency and security to all open source software development. Our initial support for the PyPI (Python), npm (JS/TS), and Crates.io (Rust) package registries — providing rebuild provenance for many of their most popular packages — is just the beginning of our journey...

OSS Rebuild helps detect several classes of supply chain compromise:

- Unsubmitted Source Code: When published packages contain code not present in the public source repository, OSS Rebuild will not attest to the artifact.

- Build Environment Compromise: By creating standardized, minimal build environments with comprehensive monitoring, OSS Rebuild can detect suspicious build activity or avoid exposure to compromised components altogether.

- Stealthy Backdoors: Even sophisticated backdoors like xz often exhibit anomalous behavioral patterns during builds. OSS Rebuild's dynamic analysis capabilities can detect unusual execution paths or suspicious operations that are otherwise impractical to identify through manual review.


For enterprises and security professionals, OSS Rebuild can...

— Enhance metadata without changing registries by enriching data for upstream packages. No need to maintain custom registries or migrate to a new package ecosystem.

— Augment SBOMs by adding detailed build observability information to existing Software Bills of Materials, creating a more complete security picture...

- Accelerate vulnerability response by providing a path to vendor, patch, and re-host upstream packages using our verifiable build definitions...


The easiest (but not only!) way to access OSS Rebuild attestations is to use the provided Go-based command-line interface.
"With OSS Rebuild's existing automation for PyPI, npm, and Crates.io, most packages obtain protection effortlessly without user or maintainer intervention."

Google has announced OSS Rebuild, a new project designed to detect supply chain attacks in open source software by independently reproducing and verifying package builds across major repositories. The initiative, unveiled by the company's Open Source Security Team, targets PyPI (Python), npm (JavaScript/TypeScript), and Crates.io (Rust) packages.

The system, the company said, automatically creates standardized build environments to rebuild packages and compare them against published versions. OSS Rebuild generates SLSA Provenance attestations for thousands of packages, meeting SLSA Build Level 3 requirements without requiring publisher intervention. The project can identify three classes of compromise: unsubmitted source code not present in public repositories, build environment tampering, and sophisticated backdoors that exhibit unusual execution patterns during builds.

Google cited recent real-world attacks including solana/webjs (2024), tj-actions/changed-files (2025), and xz-utils (2024) as examples of threats the system addresses. Open source components now account for 77% of modern applications with an estimated value exceeding $12 trillion. The project builds on Google's hosted infrastructure model previously used for OSS Fuzz memory issue detection.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from Ars Technica: Researchers have found malicious software that received more than 6,000 downloads from the NPM repository over a two-year span, in yet another discovery showing the hidden threats users of such open source archives face. Eight packages using names that closely mimicked those of widely used legitimate packages contained destructive payloads designed to corrupt or delete important data and crash systems, Kush Pandya, a researcher at security firm Socket, reported Thursday. The packages have been available for download for more than two years and accrued roughly 6,200 downloads over that time.

"What makes this campaign particularly concerning is the diversity of attack vectors -- from subtle data corruption to aggressive system shutdowns and file deletion," Pandya wrote. "The packages were designed to target different parts of the JavaScript ecosystem with varied tactics." [...] Some of the payloads were limited to detonate only on specific dates in 2023, but in some cases a phase that was scheduled to begin in July of that year was given no termination date. Pandya said that means the threat remains persistent, although in an email he also wrote: "Since all activation dates have passed (June 2023-August 2024), any developer following normal package usage today would immediately trigger destructive payloads including system shutdowns, file deletion, and JavaScript prototype corruption." The list of malicious packages included js-bomb, js-hood, vite-plugin-bomb-extend, vite-plugin-bomb, vite-plugin-react-extend, vite-plugin-vue-extend, vue-plugin-bomb, and quill-image-downloader.

Cybersecurity researchers have flagged three malicious npm packages that target the macOS version of AI-powered code-editing tool Cursor, reports The Hacker News: "Disguised as developer tools offering 'the cheapest Cursor API,' these packages steal user credentials, fetch an encrypted payload from threat actor-controlled infrastructure, overwrite Cursor's main.js file, and disable auto-updates to maintain persistence," Socket researcher Kirill Boychenko said. All three packages continue to be available for download from the npm registry. "Aiide-cur" was first published on February 14, 2025...

In total, the three packages have been downloaded over 3,200 times to date.... The findings point to an emerging trend where threat actors are using rogue npm packages as a way to introduce malicious modifications to other legitimate libraries or software already installed on developer systems... "By operating inside a legitimate parent process — an IDE or shared library — the malicious logic inherits the application's trust, maintains persistence even after the offending package is removed, and automatically gains whatever privileges that software holds, from API tokens and signing keys to outbound network access," Socket told The Hacker News.

"This campaign highlights a growing supply chain threat, with threat actors increasingly using malicious patches to compromise trusted local software," Boychenko said.
The npm packages "restart the application so that the patched code takes effect," letting the threat actor "execute arbitrary code within the context of the platform."

The JavaScript package world is heating up as startups attempt to challenge npm's long-standing dominance. While npm remains the backbone of JavaScript dependency management, Deno's JSR and vlt's vsr have entered the scene with impressive backing and even more impressive leadership -- JSR comes from Node.js creator Ryan Dahl, while npm's own creator Isaac Schlueter is behind vsr. Neither aims to completely replace npm, instead building compatible layers that promise better developer experiences.

Many developers feel GitHub has left npm to stagnate since its 2020 acquisition, doing just enough to keep it running while neglecting innovations. Security problems and package spam have only intensified these frustrations. Yet these newcomers face the same harsh reality that pushed npm into GitHub's arms: running a package registry costs serious money -- not just for servers, but for lawyers handling trademark fights and content moderation.

A Snyk security researcher has published malicious NPM packages targeting Cursor, an AI coding startup, in what appears to be a dependency confusion attack. The packages, which collect and transmit system data to an attacker-controlled server, were published under a verified Snyk email address, according to security researcher Paul McCarty.

The OpenSSF package analysis scanner flagged three packages as malicious, generating advisories MAL-2025-27, MAL-2025-28 and MAL-2025-29. The researcher deployed the packages "cursor-retrieval," "cursor-always-local" and "cursor-shadow-workspace," likely attempting to exploit Cursor's private NPM packages of the same names.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from Ars Technica: A sophisticated and ongoing supply-chain attack operating for the past year has been stealing sensitive login credentials from both malicious and benevolent security personnel by infecting them with Trojanized versions of open source software from GitHub and NPM, researchers said. The campaign, first reported three weeks ago by security firm Checkmarx and again on Friday by Datadog Security Labs, uses multiple avenues to infect the devices of researchers in security and other technical fields. One is through packages that have been available on open source repositories for over a year. They install a professionally developed backdoor that takes pains to conceal its presence. The unknown threat actors behind the campaign have also employed spear phishing that targets thousands of researchers who publish papers on the arXiv platform.

The objectives of the threat actors are also multifaceted. One is the collection of SSH private keys, Amazon Web Services access keys, command histories, and other sensitive information from infected devices every 12 hours. When this post went live, dozens of machines remained infected, and an online account on Dropbox contained some 390,000 credentials for WordPress websites taken by the attackers, most likely by stealing them from fellow malicious threat actors. The malware used in the campaign also installs cryptomining software that was present on at least 68 machines as of last month. It's unclear who the threat actors are or what their motives may be. Datadog researchers have designated the group MUT-1244, with MUT short for "mysterious unattributed threat."

The Solana JavaScript SDK "was temporarily compromised yesterday in a supply chain attack," reports BleepingComputer, "with the library backdoored with malicious code to steal cryptocurrency private keys and drain wallets." Solana offers an SDK called "@solana/web3.js" used by decentralized applications (dApps) to connect and interact with the Solana blockchain. Supply chain security firm Socket reports that Solana's Web3.js library was hijacked to push out two malicious versions to steal private and secret cryptography keys to secure wallets and sign transactions... Solana confirmed the breach, stating that one of their publish-access accounts was compromised, allowing the attackers to publish two malicious versions of the library... Solana is warning developers who suspect they were compromised to immediately upgrade to the latest v1.95.8 release and to rotate any keys, including multisigs, program authorities, and server keypairs...

Once the threat actors gain access to these keys, they can load them into their own wallets and remotely drain all stored cryptocurrency and NFTs... Socket says the attack has been traced to the FnvLGtucz4E1ppJHRTev6Qv4X7g8Pw6WPStHCcbAKbfx Solana address, which currently contains 674.86 Solana and varying amounts of the Irish Pepe , Star Atlas, Jupiter, USD Coin, Santa Hat, Pepe on Fire, Bonk, catwifhat, and Genopets Ki tokens. Solscan shows that the estimated value of the stolen cryptocurrency is $184,000 at the time of this writing.

For anyone whose wallets were compromised in this supply chain attack, you should immediately transfer any remaining funds to a new wallet and discontinue the use of the old one as the private keys are now compromised.
Ars Technica adds that "In social media posts, one person claimed to have lost $20,000 in the hack."

The compromised library "receives more than ~350,000 weekly downloads on npm," Socket posted. (Although Solana's statement says the compromised versions "were caught within hours and have since been unpublished."

WordPress.org has seized control of WP Engine's Advanced Custom Fields plugin, renaming it "Secure Custom Fields" and removing commercial elements, according to WordPress co-founder Matt Mullenweg. The move, justified by alleged security concerns and linked to ongoing litigation between WP Engine and Automattic, marks an unprecedented forcible takeover in the WordPress ecosystem.

David Heinemeier Hansson, creator of Ruby on Rails and co-founder and chief technology officer of Basecamp-maker 37signals, opines on the situation: For a dispute that started with a claim of "trademark confusion", there's an incredible irony in the fact that Automattic is now hijacking users looking for ACF onto their own plugin. And providing as rational for this unprecedented breach of open source norms that ACF needs maintenance, and since WPE is no longer able to provide that (given that they were blocked!), Automattic has to step in to do so. I mean, what?!

Imagine this happening on npm? Imagine Meta getting into a legal dispute with Microsoft (the owners of GitHub, who in turn own npm), and Microsoft responding by directing GitHub to ban all Meta employees from accessing their repositories. And then Microsoft just takes over the official React repository, pointing it to their own Super React fork. This is the kind of crazy we're talking about.

Weaponizing open source code registries is something we simply cannot allow to form precedence. They must remain neutral territory. Little Switzerlands in a world of constant commercial skirmishes.

And that's really the main reason I care to comment on this whole sordid ordeal. If this fight was just one between two billion-dollar companies, as Automattic and WPE both are, I would not have cared to wade in. But the principles at stake extend far beyond the two of them.

Using an open source project like WordPress as leverage in this contract dispute, and weaponizing its plugin registry, is an endangerment of an open source peace that has reigned decades, with peace-time dividends for all. Not since the SCO-Linux nonsense of the early 2000s have we faced such a potential explosion in fear, doubt, and uncertainty in the open source realm on basic matters everyone thought they could take for granted.

"New malicious software packages tied to the North Korean Lazarus Group were observed posing as a Python coding skills test for developers seeking a new job at Capital One, but were tracked to GitHub projects with embedded malware," reports SC magazine: Researchers at ReversingLabs explained in a September 10 blog post that the scheme was a follow-on to the VMConnect campaign that they first identified in August 2023 in which developers were lured into downloading malicious code via fake job interviews.
More details from The Hacker News These packages, for their part, have been published directly on public repositories like npm and PyPI, or hosted on GitHub repositories under their control. ReversingLabs said it identified malicious code embedded within modified versions of legitimate PyPI libraries such as pyperclip and pyrebase... It's implemented in the form of a Base64-encoded string that obscures a downloader function, which establishes contact with a command-and-control server in order to execute commands received as a response.

In one instance of the coding assignment identified by the software supply chain firm, the threat actors sought to create a false sense of urgency by requiring job seekers to build a Python project shared in the form of a ZIP file within five minutes and find and fix a coding flaw in the next 15 minutes. This makes it "more likely that he or she would execute the package without performing any type of security or even source code review first," Zanki said, adding "that ensures the malicious actors behind this campaign that the embedded malware would be executed on the developer's system."
Tom's Hardware reports that "The capacity for exploitation at that point is pretty much unlimited, due to the flexibility of Python and how it interacts with the underlying OS. This is a good time to refer to PEP 668 which enforces virtual environments for non-system wide Python installs."

More from The Hacker News Some of the aforementioned tests claimed to be a technical interview for financial institutions like Capital One and Rookery Capital Limited, underscoring how the threat actors are impersonating legitimate companies in the sector to pull off the operation. It's currently not clear how widespread these campaigns are, although prospective targets are scouted and contacted using LinkedIn, as recently also highlighted by Google-owned Mandiant.

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) will start providing more hands-on support to open-source software developers as they work to better secure their projects, the agency said. From a report: CISA hosted a two-day, invite-only summit this week with leaders in the open-source software community and other federal officials. During the private event, the agency also ran what's likely the first tabletop exercise to assess how well the government and the open-source community would respond to a cyberattack targeting one of their projects.

During the summit, CISA and a handful of package repositories unveiled new initiatives to help secure open-source projects. CISA is working on a new communication channel where open-source software developers can share threat intelligence and ask the agency for assistance during an incident. The Rust Foundation is developing new public key infrastructure for its repository, which will help ensure that the code developers are uploading isn't malicious and is coming from legitimate users.

npm, which manages the JavaScript programming language, is requiring project maintainers to enroll in multi-factor authentication and is rolling out a tool to generate "software bills of materials," which provide a recipe list of what code and other elements are in a project. Additional repositories -- including the Python Software Foundation, Packagist, Composer and Maven Central -- are pursuing similar projects and also also rolling out tools to help detect and report malware and other security vulnerabilities.

The cybersecurity site SC Media reports that NPM registry users "download deprecated packages an estimated 2.1 billion times weekly, according to a statistical analysis of the top 50,000 most-downloaded packages in the registry." Deprecated, archived and "orphaned" NPM packages can contain unpatched and/or unreported vulnerabilities that pose a risk to the projects that depend on them, warned the researchers from Aqua Security's Team Nautilus, who published their findings in a blog post on Sunday... In conjunction with their research, Aqua Nautilus has released an open-source tool that can help developers identify deprecated dependencies in their projects.

Open-source software may stop receiving updates for a variety of reasons, and it is up to developers/maintainers to communicate this maintenance status to users. As the researchers pointed out, not all developers are transparent about potential risks to users who download or depend on their outdated NPM packages. Aqua Nautilus researchers kicked off their analysis after finding that one open-source software maintainer responded to a report about a vulnerability Nautilus discovered by archiving the vulnerable repository the same day. By archiving the repository without fixing the security flaw or assigning it a CVE, the owner leaves developers of dependent projects in the dark about the risks, the researchers said...

Taking into consideration both deprecated packages and active packages that have a direct dependency on deprecated projects, the researchers found about 4,100 (8.2%) of the top 50,000 most-downloaded NPM packages fell under the category of "official" deprecation. However, adding archived repositories to the definition of "deprecated" increased the number of packages affected by deprecation and deprecated dependencies to 6,400 (12.8%)... Including packages with linked repositories that are shown as unavailable (404 error) on GitHub increases the deprecation rate to 15% (7,500 packages), according to the Nautilus analysis. Encompassing packages without any linked repository brings the final number of deprecated packages to 10,600, or 21.2% of the top 50,000. Team Nautilus estimated that under this broader understanding of package deprecation, about 2.1 billion downloads of deprecated packages are made on the NPM registry weekly.

"A recent analysis accounting for nearly 1.2 million open source software projects primarily across four major ecosystems found that only about 11% of projects were actively maintained," reports InfoWorld: In its 9th Annual State of the Software Supply Chain report, published October 3, software supply chain management company Sonatype assessed 1,176,407 projects and reported an 18% decline this year in actively maintained projects. Just 11% of projects — 118,028 — were receiving active maintenance.

The report also found some new projects, unmaintained in 2022, now being maintained.

The four ecosystems included JavaScript, via NPM; Java, via the Maven project management tool; Python, via the PyPI package index; and .NET, through the NuGet gallery. Some Go projects also were included. According to the report, 18.6% of Java and JavaScript projects that were being maintained in 2022 are no longer being maintained today.
Other interesting findings:

• Nearly 10% reported security breaches due to open source vulnerabilities in the past 12 months.

• Use of AI and machine learning software components within corporate environments surged 135% over the last year.

On Saturday PyPI, the official third-party registry of open source Python packages, "temporarily suspended new users from signing up, and new projects from being uploaded to the platform" reports BleepingComputer.

"The volume of malicious users and malicious projects being created on the index in the past week has outpaced our ability to respond to it in a timely fashion, especially with multiple PyPI administrators on leave," stated an incident notice posted by PyPI admins Saturday.

Hours ago they posted a four-word update: "Suspension has been lifted." No details were provided, but The Hacker News writes the incident "comes as software registries such as PyPI have proven time and time again to be a popular target for attackers looking to poison the software supply chain and compromise developer environments." Earlier this week, Israeli cybersecurity startup Phylum uncovered an active malware campaign that leverages OpenAI ChatGPT-themed lures to bait developers into downloading a malicious Python module capable of stealing clipboard content in order to hijack cryptocurrency transactions. ReversingLabs, in a similar discovery, identified multiple npm packages named nodejs-encrypt-agent and nodejs-cookie-proxy-agent in the npm repository that drops a trojan called TurkoRat.

Veteran open source report Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, writing at The Register: We can all agree that securing our software is a good thing. Thanks to one security fiasco after another -- the SolarWinds software supply chain attack, the perpetual Log4j vulnerability, and the npm maintainer protest code gone wrong -- we know we must secure our code. But the European Union's proposed Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) goes way, way too far in trying to regulate software security. At the top level, it looks good. Brussels states that before "products with digital elements" are allowed on the EU market, manufacturers must follow best practices in four areas. Secure the product over its whole life; follow a coherent cybersecurity framework; show cybersecurity transparency; and ensure customers can use products securely. Sounds great, doesn't it? But the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The devil, as always, is in the details. Some of this has nothing to do with open source software. Good luck creating any program in any way that a clueless user can't screw up.

But the EU commissioners don't have a clue about how open source software works. Or, frankly, what it is. They think that open source is the same as proprietary software with a single company behind it that's responsible for the work and then monetizes it. Nope. Open source, as I've said over and over again, is not a business model. Sure, you can build businesses around it. Who doesn't these days? But just as the AWSes, Googles, and Facebooks of the world depend on open source software, they also use programs written by Tom, Denise, and Harry from around the world. The CRA's underlying assumption is that you can just add security to software, like adding a new color option to your car's paint job. We wish!

Securing software is a long, painful process. Many open source developers have neither the revenue nor resources to secure their programs to a government standard. The notional open source developer in Nebraska, thanklessly maintaining a vital small program, may not even know where Brussels is (it's in Belgium). They can't afford to secure their software to meet EU specifications. They often have no revenue. They certainly have no control over who uses their software. It's open source, for pity's sake! As open source developer Thomas Depierre recently blogged: "We are not suppliers. All the people writing and maintaining these projects, we are not suppliers. We do not have a business relationship with all these organizations. We are volunteers, writing code and putting it online under these Licenses." Exactly.

Gabi Dobocan, writing at auditing firm Sandworm: More than half of all new packages that are currently (29 Mar 2023) being submitted to npm are SEO spam. That is - empty packages, with just a single README file that contains links to various malicious websites. Out of the ~320k new npm packages or versions that Sandworm has scanned over the past week, at least ~185k were labeled as SEO spam. Just in the last hour as of writing this article, 1583 new e-book spam packages have been published. All the identified spam packages are currently live on npmjs.com.

An anonymous reader shares a report: Socket has found a way to protect developers from npm, GitHub's insufficiently safe JavaScript package manager, by wrapping it in a security blanket. The npm registry, operated by NPM until the security biz was acquired by Microsoft's GitHub in 2020, hosts software packages for the JavaScript ecosystem. It is, by its own account, "the world's largest software registry." In the past few years, the maliciously inclined have increasingly focused on compromising package registries like npm in what's known as a supply chain attack. Subverting a popular software library has the potential to enable widespread viral distribution. Those running the npm registry have put in place various defenses over the years, such as npm audit, a vulnerability scanning command in the npm command line interface (CLI). But the tool's implementation leaves something to be desired and developers often ignore audit warning messages, particularly if automated resolution doesn't work.

Socket built its own vulnerability scanning system and last year made it available for free (with paid tiers for teams and organizations) for open source projects. Its scanner runs as a GitHub app on code repositories when changes are made. It catches more issues than npm audit -- covering not just supply chain risk but also quality, maintenance, vulnerability, and license concerns. But Socket's scanner is also now available as a CLI that developers can install on their machines. On Thursday, Socket updated its CLI with a safe npm command that defends developers whenever they invoke npm install or npm uninstall, which perversely can install packages amid removing others. "npm creates what is called the 'ideal tree' for a given package.json," explained Feross Aboukhadijeh, told The Register. "So by removing a package you might actually change what the ideal tree is. Removing a package may remove a constraint which is keeping a package on an older version, so then npm may update those packages to a more ideal/recent version."

74.48% of developers use Microsoft's Visual Studio Code, according to one survey conducted by StackOverflow. And besides GitHub Copilot, there's over 40,000 other extensions in the VSCode Marketplace.

Unfortunately, InfoWorld reports, "Researchers at Aqua Nautilus say they have found that attackers could easily impersonate popular extensions and trick unknowing developers into downloading them." It can be challenging to distinguish between malicious and benign extensions, and the lack of sandbox capabilities means that extensions could install ransomware, wipers, and other malicious code, Aqua security researcher Ilay Goldman wrote in a January 6 blog post. ["In fact, it can access and even alter all the code that you have locally and even use your SSH key to change the code in all your organization's repositories."] VS Code extensions, which provide capabilities ranging from Python language support to JSON file editing, can be downloaded from Microsoft's Visual Studio Code Marketplace.

Aqua Nautilus uploaded an extension masquerading as the Prettier code formatter and saw more than 1,000 installs in less than 48 hours, from around the world. The spoof extension has been removed.

Goldman noted that the Visual Studio Code Marketplace runs a virus scan for each new extension and subsequent updates, and removes malicious extensions when it finds them. Users can report suspicious-looking extensions via a Report Abuse link.
"While the media is full of stories about malicious packages that have been uploaded to popular package managers such as NPM and PyPI, there is very little information about malicious VSCode extension," the blog post notes. Yet it points out that a blue checkmark on a VSCode extension "merely means that whoever the publisher is has proven the ownership of a domain. That means any domain."

And even Microsoft acknowledged to InfoWorld that social engineering techniques have been used to persuade victims to download malicious extensions — though they point out that Microsoft confirms that each extension has a Marketplace certificate and verifiable signature before being installed. "To help make informed decisions, we recommend consumers review information, such as domain verification, ratings and feedback to prevent unwanted downloads."

"If combating attacks and hijackings of legitimate software on open source registries like npm weren't challenging enough, app makers are increasingly experiencing the consequences of software self-sabotage," writes security researcher and reporter Ax Sharma via TechCrunch. "A developer can, on a whim, change their mind and do whatever they want with their open source code that, most of the time anyway, comes 'as is' without any warranty. Or, as seen by a growing trend this year, developers deliberately sabotaging their own software libraries as a means of protest -- turning software into 'protestware.'"

One of the many examples Sharma mentions happened during the first week of 2022, when thousands of applications that rely on the heavily used npm projects colors and faker broke and began printing gibberish text on users' screens. "It wasn't a malicious actor hijacking and altering these legitimate libraries," writes Sharma. "It turned out the projects' developer Mark Squires had intentionally corrupted his own work to send a message of protest to big corporations..." An anonymous reader shares an excerpt from his report: Open source developers are discovering new and creative avenues that no longer limit them to implementing new features for their projects, but to actively express their views on larger social matters by modifying their projects for a cause. And, unlike proprietary code that has to function in line with a paying customer's expectations, most open source licenses are quite permissive -- both for the consumer and the developer -- offering their code with licenses that offer no guarantees as to what a developer is not supposed to and will never do with their code, making protestware a gray area for defenders. In fact, as a security researcher at Sonatype, I observed how protestware posed a challenge for us in the early stages and how we would tweak our automated malware detection algorithms to now catch self-sabotages with projects like colors and faker. Traditionally, the system was designed to spot typosquatting malware uploaded to open source repositories, but cases like malicious hijacks or developers modifying their own libraries without warning required a deeper understanding of the intricacies of how protestware works.

The theme has also put major open source registries like npm -- owned by GitHub, a Microsoft subsidiary -- at a crossroads when having to deal with these edge cases. Socket's founder Feross Aboukhadijeh told TechCrunch that registries like GitHub are in a difficult position. "On the one hand, they want to support maintainers' right to freedom of expression and the ability to use their platform to support the causes they believe in. But on the other hand, GitHub has a responsibility to npm users to ensure that malicious code isn't served from npm servers. It's sometimes a difficult balancing act," said Aboukhadijeh. A simple solution to ensuring you are getting only vetted versions of a component in your build is to pin your npm dependency versions. That way, even if future versions of a project are sabotaged or hijacked, your build continues to use the "pinned" version as opposed to fetching the latest, tainted one. But this may not always be an effective strategy for all ecosystems, like PyPI, where existing versions of a component can be republished -- as we saw in the case of the hijacking of the ctx PyPI project.

"The conversation around 'protestware' is really a conversation about software supply chain security. You can't trust what you can't verify," Dan Lorenc, the co-founder and chief executive at Chainguard, a startup that specializes in software supply chain security, told TechCrunch. Lorenc's advice against preventing protestware is to follow good open source security hygiene and best practices that can help developers develop protestware more easily and early on. "Knowing and understanding your dependencies, conducting regular scans and audits of open source code you are using in your environments are a start." But Lorenc warns the debate about protestware could draw in copycats who would contribute to the problem and detract open source software defenders from focusing on tackling what's truly important -- keeping malicious actors at bay. And with protestware there remain unknown unknowns. What issue is too small -- or too big -- for protestware? While no one can practically dictate what an open source developer can do with their code -- it is a power developers have always possessed, but are now just beginning to harness.