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Comment: Re:Batteries with Solar Systems = No Net-metering (Score 1) 128

by DerekLyons (#49609191) Attached to: Tesla's Household Battery: Costs, Prices, and Tradeoffs

Companies like SolarCity basically install solar systems for no money up front, and then lease them back to you for a period. For many houses, even with these fees, the SolarCity systems will save the homeowner quite a bit of money.

No, SolarCity doesn't lease the panels back to you - they sell the power from the panels to you. And they control the rate you pay and have the ability to raise it annually (up to 2.9% per annum).

Comment: Re:This again? (Score 1) 430

by Lord Apathy (#49605433) Attached to: New Test Supports NASA's Controversial EM Drive

Oh and your definition of magic might also need adjusting using the same declination.

My definition of "magic" doesn't need to be adjusted. There is no such thing as magic. Just laws and principals that we do not understand at this current time. To define them as "magic" would put us on the same level as the homo erectus cowering caves as the thunder and lightning flashed in the storm.

Comment: Went to Smithsonian Air/Space Museum for research (Score 1) 160

by billstewart (#49604361) Attached to: US Switches Air Traffic Control To New Computer System

Back in the late 80s, when I was working on that decade's failed project to replace the 360/90-based systems, my coworker and I were in DC for a meeting on some phase of the project (or one of the related projects), and we had half a day spare, so we went to the Smithsonian Air&Space Museum to do "research". They didn't have examples of the system we were working on, but they did have some other air traffic control systems (Tracon, I think), and other cool stuff like astronaut ice cream. After that we went to the National Gallery, because Van Gogh.

Comment: Redundancy is really hard. (Score 1) 160

by billstewart (#49604347) Attached to: US Switches Air Traffic Control To New Computer System

That's not even counting the huge amount of code that's designed to make sure all the other parts of the code are working, and to do something appropriate if they're not, and the code that's designed to make sure that code is also working. That stuff's a lot harder than the basic code, and getting it right is the difference between a system with double- or triple-redundant hardware that gets you the 8 9s of reliability the FAA naively thought was possible with 1980s hardware and a air-traffic control system that had triple-redundant hardware running an operating system that crashed weekly (that one was in Singapore, but I don't know if it was actually deployed; I assume they killed it long before it hit the field.)

The 1980s attempt at developing this was only going to be deployed at the ~25 En-Route control centers (with simpler components at the several hundred radar sites feeding each one); it's not intended to be at every airport tower, which was a bunch of different systems.

It's interesting to see how much this thing has grown into, beyond the initial "get radar signals onto the board and replace paper flight-strips and never ever ever crash" goals.

Comment: LOTSa Naivete was involved. (Score 1) 160

by billstewart (#49604335) Attached to: US Switches Air Traffic Control To New Computer System

Most of it on the part of the people who started the original project, who thought it would be done in 3-4 years, made way too many incorrect decisions for the wrong reasons, specified lots of requirements without understanding how impossible they were to meet, picked multiple sets of pie from multiple sets of skies, and didn't start with the ability to get kinds of budget they would have needed to do the job right (if they'd picked a definition of "right" that could have been implemented in the 1980s, when they were trying to replace a 1960s system that had much lower ambitions when it was built, but was still a big upgrade over the 1950s predecessor), but the one thing everybody knew was that if airplanes fall out of the sky or crash into each other, the FAA gets blamed, and if the system's late, the FAA gets blamed, and if it's over budget, the FAA gets blamed, and if the budget had been bigger to start with, the FAA would have been blamed, and if the FAA's going to get blamed, then you can be the contractors trying to design the system are going to get blamed a lot, even just for asking questions when they're working on the thing.

Projects with a scope of tens of millions of dollars are much much different than projects with a scope of a few billions or a few tens of billions. A couple of years after I worked on my part of that fiasco, one of the directors for information systems for one of the National Labs was telling us that he was trying to restructure things to be done in small manageable projects, because he'd never seen the government do a billion-dollar computer project that didn't fail. And all that ancient "Mythical Man-Month" stuff said things you probably already knew about projects in the $10m range sometimes being too large; I remember one much less critical project that had 30 people working on it, so it had to grow to 150 people before it totally failed; if it had started with 5 people instead of 30 and had a budget limiting it to a max of 10, it might have worked. But projects that know they're legitimately in the billion-dollar scale are really really hard.

Comment: Ada's no more verbose than C++ or Java (Score 1) 160

by billstewart (#49604311) Attached to: US Switches Air Traffic Control To New Computer System

It's designed for object-oriented use, with lots of type specification and such upfront, to push decisions into upfront design time rather than coding time, and it's not as terse as C or APL, but it's nowhere near as verbose as COBOL. I wouldn't use it today (mostly because its main uses are for military stuff I won't do, and for antique maintenance, and it doesn't have all the friendly libraries that I'm used to and probably doesn't easily link to non-Ada systems), but it's a fairly cromulent language.

Comment: Oh, my! Re: Glitches (Score 1) 160

by billstewart (#49604277) Attached to: US Switches Air Traffic Control To New Computer System

The article you're pointing to was about how one of the ERAM systems crashed trying to cope with a bizarre flight plan for a U-2 spy plane.

When I was working on AAS in the late 80s, one thing I was mildly concerned about was that the planned "upgrade" our project was trying to design wouldn't really be able to cope with super-sonic aircraft over the continental US. The requirements for how much area had to show on a controller's screen and how fast the radar sweeps were meant that anything at Concorde speeds would kind of blip onto the screen, maybe bounce once or twice more, and then be gone by the next refresh, either to somebody else's screen or another regional center. Economics and politics (sonic booms, restrictions on what nations' airlines could compete for US markets, etc.) meant that it wasn't a likely prospect anyway, but U-2 spy planes operate under different economics and politics.

Comment: I worked on the 1980s version (Score 1) 160

by billstewart (#49604259) Attached to: US Switches Air Traffic Control To New Computer System

Back in the 1980s, the FAA's shiny new Advanced Automation System project (AAS) was being designed to replace the 1960s-vintage En-Route system, which used IBM 360/90 and 360/50 computers that were getting to be old, unmaintainable, and unreplaceable. (It was getting hard to even get cable connectors for components - imagine coming up with new SCSI-1 terminators these days.)

As with many military aircraft system contracts, they ran a design competition, which had funneled down from 4 bidders to two by the time I was there. I worked for a subcontractor on one of the teams bidding on AAS. We were the lucky ones who lost; IBM were the poor suckers who won the deal. We learned many lessons about how not to do large software projects. The requirements weren't very well-defined, but the one thing that was certain was that if yet another airplane crash happened, the FAA would take lots of political heat, so everything had to be totally bullet-proof, and every bureaucratic ass had to be covered in triplicate. The phase we were working on was already behind schedule and over budget, and once IBM won it got much farther behind, way farther over budget, and it kind of slunk into the 90s, the 2000s, and the articles referenced above make it sound like Lockheed-Martin bought the IBM Federal division that was working on this debacle.

Originally, the requirements were for 8 9s of reliability (so 99.999999%), but what was worse was that there was no definition of what a failure event was. If a failure meant "each individual radar needed to meet 8 9s", that was hard enough, but if a failure meant "ANY radar's connection was down", that meant the system had to meet 10 9s, not just 8, since there were O(100) radars. Everything had to be triple-redundant to meet those numbers, because taking down any component of a dual-redundant system for maintenance for 5 minutes would blow your reliability for the year. We later found out that the existing 1960s-vintage system that AAS was supposed to replace was shut down for 4 hours per night, replaced by EDARC (a ~1970s upgrade to the ~1950s DARC radar controllers), to make sure that the EDARC system was available as a working backup and that personnel stayed trained in using and maintaining it. (And of course the radars only had dual access lines, with a typical reliability of 3-4 9s each, so 8 9s per radar was already overkill. Phone company equipment with the famous 5 9s of uptime got that by using lots of dual redundancy in appropriate places.)

AAS was originally required to use DOD-STD-2167 software development methodology, a 1985 standard that the DOD replaced in 1988 with 2167A because 2167 was unusable. (You're having trouble dealing with Agile? This is way way far out the other direction.) Both were cumbersome waterfall processes, 2167 requiring something like 180 documents over the predicted 3-year development period, so every week, there'd be one or more new documents, hundreds of pages long, that were all ironclad requirements for all remaining development; developers wouldn't have the time to read and analyze each document and still get their work done, and if they determined down the road that a previous decision had undesirable consequences, there was no way to go back and change it. For example, a decision about whether a given calculation should be done out at the remote radar site, or on one of several central processing computers, or on the computer that drove a given operator console, might turn out to make several hundred milliseconds difference in processing time, but any given radar signal had to get from the remote radar to the console in under 1 second. The subcontractor designing the display consoles knew they wouldn't have the horsepower to do it in time, so they bounced it to the central processors early in the requirement process; those didn't even have an architecture that met the redundancy specs yet, so we didn't know if they'd have the resources to do it in time either. (We later offered to move a bit more of their processing into the central system, because we could do the combined calculations faster than having to split them.)

(And no, we didn't have to walk uphill both ways through the snow to work on it, but I did have to fly to Chicago for a weekend kickoff meeting in the winter, there was snow there and I had a bad cold, and stuff that looked really good and feasible on a sales VP's slide-show presentation didn't actually look so good when you tried to map it to reality. And we had to fly out to California weekly for months, back when you could listen to the Air Traffic channel on the plane's sound system and get an idea of what you were working on, which we decided was intended to make us take this stuff seriously. One reason we'd gotten picked, besides having lots of other Air Traffic Control and system integration experience, was because we had a floating-point chip that calculated trig functions really fast. It turned out that all the "floating-point" data was coming from 12-bit ADCs, and it's much faster to use a lookup table than wedge in a floating-point chip :-) )

Comment: This was SUPPOSED to be hypothetical (Score 1) 300

A week or so ago, my wife's Lenovo let some magic smoke out of the charger connection, and yesterday we heard back from the repair folks who are saying that the motherboard is shorted, not just the jack, so depending on how much they want to charge, it's probably new laptop time. What would be really nice would be an Apple magnetic power cord connector on the replacement, but of course patents mean that's not going to happen.

Meanwhile, what I really want for my work laptop is a description of exactly which ports are which; it's an HP ZBook of some sort, but doesn't seem to exactly match any of the diagrams only (G1, G2, etc.) One port is definitely USB3, and talks at high speeds to my external backup drive, and it's likely that one of the other two USB ports can do higher-current charging, but I can't tell which one, or how much higher (500mA instead of 100??) There's some kind of HDMI, and something I don't recognize that's probably a DisplayPort. And there's an SDHC slot, which has turned out to be really useful, because it can hold a 128GB card that lets me keep music, experimental virtual machines, and other space hogs online (the laptop has a 256GB SSD, while its predecessor had a 320GB spinning disk.) And yes, there's an Ethernet port, and a docking-station port, so I've got reliable high-speed alternatives to WiFi.

Half the thing I want to do with USB would probably work fine with MicroUSB (and maybe a USB-to-Go cable) if it were short on space. Mice and keyboards don't really need a lot of power. OTOH, I've started to like the fact that Lightning cables work either way up.

+ - How Silicon Valley got that way -- and why it will continue to rule.->

Submitted by Anonymous Coward
An anonymous reader writes: Lots of places want to be "the next Silicon Valley." But the Valley's top historian looks back (even talks to Steve Jobs about his respect for the past!) to explain why SV is unique. While there are threats to continued dominance, she thinks its just too hard for another region to challenge SV's supremacy.
Link to Original Source

Comment: Re:I don't understand (Score 1) 62

by DerekLyons (#49597535) Attached to: Game:ref's Hardware Solution To Cheating In eSports

Of course, the tournament could audit the config files to insure no cheating, but there's a lot of gray area in there (e.g. having a specific combination of player events tied to one key or click that can perform fairly incredible stunts, etc).

I don't see any gray areas - require each player to use the same config (other than what can be accessed through the game UI) as every other player, the same as pretty much any other serious sport puts the players on a level playing field. If the game allows it, and players fail to take advantage of it, that's on the player - he shouldn't be competing at that level.

Comment: Re:This again? (Score 1) 430

by Lord Apathy (#49596619) Attached to: New Test Supports NASA's Controversial EM Drive

Tests are showing the damn thing works. When the Chinese said worked I would have rather believed there where fairies flying out someones ass. But now that NASA tests are showing repeatable results there might be something here.

But no matter what, if the damn thing does work, it does not defy the laws of physics. It might work based on some laws we don't understand or some principal that we haven't thought of. But it isn't magic.

Life in the state of nature is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. - Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan