I'm guessing it was an implementation blunder.
I don't want to believe the Iranians have a GPS spoofing system so advanced it can migrate a GPS-initialized inertial system from a good solution to a spoofed solution.
I, therefore, rather suspect they jammed GPS long enough for the bird's INS to lose initialization, and then introduced a spoofed solution. I call this an implementation blunder because if this form of attack had been predicted one would respond in a "safe" manner to loss of GPS.
Question, though, is where was their spoofing equipment? Off-the-shelf GPS antennas from Trimble have quite good radio-absorbing ground planes. This is used to prevent GPS multipath when working near the ground, but would be quite effective at rejecting terrestrial transmission of false GPS signals. Does this mean Iran had one or more airplanes flying over the drone? Interesting, interesting.