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Comment: Re:HIPAA EDI (Score 1) 210

by Qzukk (#48041459) Attached to: Back To Faxes: Doctors Can't Exchange Digital Medical Records

the HIPAA EDI transaction codes are X12 837 (claim/encounter transactions), X12 270 and 271 (eligibility inquiries and responses), X12 276 and 277 (claim status inquiries and responses), X12 278 (referrals and prior authorization transactions), X12 835 (health care payment and remittance information), and X12 275 (health claims attachments).

Huh. Which of those do I use to order a CBC? Which one sends a history and physical to the hospital? Which one does the MRI machine use to send me the picture of your brain? (trick question!)

Everyone's been using these transactions for years, but they are not relevant to the issue being discussed here.

Comment: Re:Devil's advocate here... (Score 1) 125

by Qzukk (#48016445) Attached to: FCC To Rule On "Paid Prioritization" Deals By Internet Service Providers

I had to use a certain brand of detergent or specific equipment in my imaginary dry cleaning business, or that I couldn't charge an extra 5.99 for express cleaning service or 2.99 delivery fee

Of course, of course. But you know, that $7.99 "throw that other guy's laundry in the trash so you can do yours right now" fee, that's over the top.

Comment: Re:No Worky (Score 5, Informative) 179

by Qzukk (#47995469) Attached to: Ask Slashdot: Is Reporting Still Relevant?

While laziness and not wanting to wait 5 extra seconds for number crunching are certainly a factor, I've got customers who are paranoid that we might pull one over on them and retroactively change the data so when they go back to last quarter's numbers they won't be the same.

I set up a cronjob to wget the dashboard weekly, feed it to html2pdf, and email the result to the stakeholders.

Comment: Re:Lie. (Score 1) 191

by Qzukk (#47920415) Attached to: Tim Cook Says Apple Can't Read Users' Emails, That iCloud Wasn't Hacked

I wonder if there would be a way with https to store an encrypted mail

Short answer: No.
Long answer: SSL makes use of a temporary session key that is calculated between the client and the server at the time of the connection. Once the connection is over that key is (ideally) destroyed. If the email was encrypted with my session key when I sent it to the server (and somehow not decrypted by the server at this point) your session key that you create when you connect to the server won't do the job.

This is what S/MIME is for. The email body (and optionally some headers) is encrypted with a session key which is encrypted with your public key (rather than the server's key). Then it is sent through regular email channels. You receive the email and decrypt the session key with your private key, and use it to decrypt the message.

Comment: Re:The Real Reason? (Score 2) 108

by Qzukk (#47858421) Attached to: Why Google Is Pushing For a Web Free of SHA-1

Except that it's honestly a shitty idea given the history of witness unreliability. The human mind is pretty shit at remembering a real human's face you've only seen once. Worse, an uncanny valley fake face is going to look like every other uncanny valley fake face, especially without additional visible features like hair or glasses (and even then the memory is likely to recall "wears glasses" not a specific style or color).

Also, the guy never explained what the hell the problem was that he wants the engineers to make a solution for, other than "it doesn't use this cool face-making library I wrote." Clearly we are all too stupid to see the value of having lawnmower man's face shown when we log into our banking website, if only we weren't engineers instead of PhDs.

Thus spake the master programmer: "After three days without programming, life becomes meaningless." -- Geoffrey James, "The Tao of Programming"