What a pointless thing to argue. In the 1980 paper, he does indeed spend a great deal of time defending the proposition -- he doesn't provide the formal argument everyone is familiar with until later (1990), where it is indeed taken as axiomatic. However, as early as 1983 Searle writes "2. Syntax is not sufficient for semantics. That proposition is a conceptual truth. It just articulates our distinction between the notion of what is purely formal and what has content." from Minds, Brains, and Science pp. 28-41

So, yes, I stand by my assertion that the illustration is indeed a waste of time to argue about -- all that matters to the argument is the proposition.

To the computer, there is no "real world" there is no distinction between data pulled into memory from a video camera or a stack of Hollerith cards nor from data already in memory or data being gathered at the time it's accessed -- there is no distinction. The computer is just manipulating meaningless symbols (and even that's a stretch, as the computer can't make such a distinction!) Meaningless symbols in relation to one another are ... meaningless symbols, being manipulated meaninglessly.

Even given relationships between the symbols (as you would expect from a program at a particular level of description), all you manage is a syntactic relationship! I hate to use this example, but it's the best I can think of right now: Given a chinese-chinese dictionary, you have very clear relationships between the various symbols, from which you can't ascribe meaning. The best you could hope to come up with is a grammar -- which is still purely syntactic.

The temptation to define semantics comes from incorrectly attributing the semantics extrinsically attributed as being intrinsic to the program at a particular level of description. Chalmers uses this confusion to argue that "sub symbolic computation" is not subject to Searle's Chinese Room argument. (He does not deny the premise in question outright)

Chalmers assumes that the function of a program is objective and that it applies to all levels of description of the program. This is wrong. Any interpretation of the function of a program, like the inputs passed to it, are extrinsically applied. What a program does is a matter of interpretation, there is way to objectively determine what a program is intended to do. Obviously, merely changing the level of description in no way affects the program.

[ Chalmers denies that subsymbolic computation applies to "real-world" implementations of programs (which have immediately identifiable lower levels of description, for example, in hardware) as the individual constituents of the higher level symbols are operated upon as a group and can be interpreted as distinct (they are still atomic). His mistake, of course, is that the same applies to any subsymbolic computational system as can be seen from the initial higher level description of the program. ]

Of course, no level of description of a program or symbol set is privilaged above another. Symbols are only atomic as they apply to a particular level of description. However, Chalmers assumes a different level of description for the symbols and the program as to discriminate the internal representation of the symbols in the lower-level description of the program with the description of the symbols in a higher level description of the program.

At the lower level Chalmers uses, the program manipulates a different set of symbols even though groups of those lower-level symbols can be interpreted as being identical as the programs are computationally identical (they're the same program, after all).

In short, Chalmers identifies the extrinsically applied semantics of the initial higher-level description as relationships between the symbols at a lower-level of description. It's a mistake, as the semantics are indeed NOT intrinsic or derived -- they're still just as extrinsic as before!

Not the clearest, but I hope that helps.

The alternative is to posit a non-physical explanation. Searle doesn't deny that brains cause minds -- he only argues that what brains do to cause minds can not be computation alone. I don't have the answer, and neither does anyone else. I suspect that the answer will not come from philosophy or neuroscience, but from physics as a necessary consequence of some undiscovered bit of reality.

I also did not avert an internet meltdown in the 1980s.

I don't know that I've ever seen the other two disputed. Still, if you want to take a shot at them, give it a go.

Well, the axiom carrying the most weight has stood for the past 30 years. Still, as you seem to think that it's easy to refute, I'd love to see you take down this particular giant -- as would a good bit of the AI community: "Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics"

Good luck, you'll need it.

I give up. Twice now some mysterious gesture that I apparently don't know about has refreshed the page and destroyed my reply. Here's the short, "type what I remember writing before a stray movement inexplicably eliminates it" version.

You seem to be hung up on the illustration, which I agree has caused more confusion that clarity. Again, the illustration has nothing to do with the argument, the claim in question "syntactic content is insufficient for semantic content" is taken as axiomatic in the argument proper. The room, the paper, etc., is completely irrelevant. Clearly, it's caused you some confusion, as you seem inexplicably focused on language.

This is the only bit of your explanation that is really relevant. See, this is where you introduce semantics seemingly out-of-nowhere. If you can get semantics from a computational system, you don't need to say anything else. The problem, of course, is how do you get semantics from the "visual system"? Can congenitally blind people have intentional states? "It just happens" isn't much of an argument!

In another post I mention Jacoby, take a look at his research. To kill computationalism, check out Fetzer and then Bringsjord.

Okay ... so ... you do you dispute the actual claim?

You're clearly quite confused...

Really? The whole point of the illustration (the room, paper, etc.) is to help explain/bolster the assertion that syntax is insufficient for semantics. You're confusing the example for the claim. Hence, you fall under #2 above.

You have that backwards. Searle's argument isn't confused, you're confused about Searle's argument.

Indeed, I am.

Someday, if I encounter an attentive and responsible motorcyclist, I'll surely regret making that post.

As a cager that has to contend with motorcyclists paying insufficient attention to the road on a daily basis, I have to state the the driver did us all a service by removing two dangerous hazards from the road.

I pay a great deal of attention to motorcycles when I drive -- though for my own protection. Motorcyclists seem to do incredibly stupid and dangerous things every time they're around me.

Just a few days ago, for example, some moron on a motorcycle decided to pass me on the right (the shoulder, not a different lane) while I was making a right turn on to a busy highway. Had I not expected him to do something incredibly stupid when I saw him behind me, I'd have run right in to him. (What's worse, he shouted some obscenity at me as he drove past, as though it was my fault he was putting his life and my fender unnecessarily at risk.)