Just placing your assertion in the settling pond with the rest.

you can still buy a game in Russia and play it in the US.

One can be "in Russia" (virtually) quite easily, and use a Russian payment method as well. So what does this accomplish?

To implement an agenda of draconian regulation than use the "Sony Crisis" as an excuse.

So, you're saying this is a false flag operation by the shadow government to instill more fear in people, and to allow the passing of additional laws which expands their power and further justifies their abuse of the law and our rights?

I like your ideas, and would like to subscribe to your news letter.

The really scary thing is no matter how paranoid the scenario you come up with these days, reality might be trying even harder. What was batshit crazy stuff a decade ago is pretty much commonplace now after Snowden told us about it.

When the going gets weird, the weird turn pro.

--Hunter S. Thompson

Are you joking? I thought it was well established that there were chemical weapons in Iraq we just only found weapons designed by us, built by Europeans in factories in Iraq. And therefore the US didn't trumpet their achievements. In the case of Iraqi chemical weapons, the US established that Iraq had chemical weapons not because they said so but because Western countries had all the receipts.

If the wireless cards don't have ample protection against copying of information and forging then the platform design is flawed.

Of course it's flawed. It's been flawed since it was introduced. This was introduced by credit/debit companies to make it more convenient so people would use it more so they'd collect more fees.

The first time I saw one I thought it was dangerous and idiotic. I largely still do because it's un-authenticated. Sadly, pretty much every card comes with it now.

When will people understand ... companies who create these products don't give a damn about security, they care about getting people to use shiny new baubles. Security comes much later after it's been hacked.

We know all this. We discuss it every time this topic comes up. It's well traveled stuff around here.

But, dude, you're missing the big picture here ... freakin' tinfoil pants. How awesome is that? I mean, now we can have an entire fashion line of tinfoil clothing so we can go out and look normal.

That styling cap I'm wearing? Yeah, it looks like a hipster fashion statement, 'cuz that's how I roll. Inside? Tinfoil hat bitches.

No more strange looks when I go grocery shopping. Now, all of your paranoid needs can be met while still remaining fashionable and discrete ... which has the added benefit of remaining inconspicuous so they Aliens don't even notice you.

Hmmm ... what's that van parked outside my house for?

Bremsstrahlung does not need vacuum.
How do you come to that idea? You have a fast moving particle and you "brems" it, slow it down, somewhere its energy needs to go. E.g. sending electrons in any material will slow them and produce Bremsstrahlung, that is how the phenomena was discovered.

Gamma rays are produced by many processes, not only nuclear fusion.

In this case they are very likely produced by simple ionization of gases and extreme acceleration of electrons. So, yes it is electric.

The distinction between X-Rays and gamma rays is not the way how they are produced but the energy level.

It is the same type of interaction like high atmosphere gamma rays that are produced by very high energetic solar wind particles.

How does this support your contention that history has a liberal bias, then? You've called Obama a conservative; are you confessing that you think "liberal" means "conservative"?

You certainly can't top the absurdity of the Jarrett Administration.

I recently moved from hand-written HTML for my personal site to Jekyll, which is the engine that powers GitHub pages. It does exactly what I want from a CMS:

• Cleanly separate content and presentation.
• Provide easy-to-edit templates.
• Allows all of the content to be stored in a VCS.
• Generates entirely static content, so none of its code is in the TCB for the site.

The one thing that it doesn't provide is a comment system, but I'd be quite happy for that to be provided by a separate package if I need one. In particular, it means that even if the comment system is hacked, it won't have access to the source for the site so it's easy to restore.

How is your LAN secured? If it's wired, then I assume that you know about ARP poisoning attacks. If it's wireless, then I assume that your post was intended as a joke.

That's the best way of securing a connection, but it doesn't scale. You need some out-of-band mechanism for distributing the certificate hash. It's trivial for your own site if you're the only user (but even then, the right thing for the browser to do is warn the first time it sees the cert), but it's much harder if you have even a dozen or so clients.

The 'brought to you by' box on that site lists Mozilla, Akamai, Cisco, EFF, and IdenTrust. I don't see Google pushing it. They're not listed as a sponsor.

That said, it is pushing Certificate Transparency, which is something that is largely led by Ben Laurie at Google and is a very good idea (it aims to use a distributed Merkel Tree to let you track what certificates other people are seeing for a site and what certs are offered for a site, so that servers can tell if someone is issuing bad certs and clients can see if they're the only one getting a different cert).

It depends on your adversary model. Encryption without authentication is good protection against passive adversaries, no protection against active adversaries. If someone can get traffic logs, or sits on the same network as you and gets your packets broadcast, then encryption protects you. If they're in control of one of your routers and are willing to modify traffic, then it doesn't.

The thing that's changed recently is that the global passive adversary has been shown to really exist. Various intelligence agencies really are scooping up all traffic and scanning it. Even a self-signed cert makes this hard, because the overhead of sitting in the middle of every SSL negotiation and doing a separate negotiation with the client and server is huge, especially as you can't tell which clients are using certificate pinning and so will spot it.

Every HTTP request I send to Slashdot contains my cookie, which contains my login credentials. When I do this over a public WiFi network, it's trivial for any passive member of the network to sniff it, as it is for any intermediary. Worse, because it uses AJAX stuff in the background, if I briefly connect to a malicious access point by accident, there's a good chance that it will immediately send that AP's proxy my credentials. I've been using this account for a decade or so. I don't want some random person to be able to hijack it so trivially.