RockDoctor writes:
Rob Enderle, writing at security blog "Dark REading", discusses the problems of R.I.M. with the Saudis and others and thinks that the company may be repeating the errors that Palm made towards the end of their major position in the handheld computer market.Of the handset choices that are sold broadly on the market, the BlackBerry platform is the most inherently secure. To appeal to the business market it targets, it had to be better than any other handset or mobile solutions vendor. But with Saudi Arabia blocking the service and other countries expected to follow — coupled with mistakes on its new flagship Blackberry Torch — RIM could be on the brink of a Palm-like failure.
The main punch of Rob's discussion is that if R.I.M. did deploy a technical fix that created a space for a master decryption key for any particular country, than that would be the end of R.I.M.'s technical lead in the market in that country, and rapidly in the world. Without that technical lead, R.I.M's other, Palm-like, failings would show, and ... splat.
I'm just wondering if the opposite could be true : if the Saudi government get (for example) a RIM server to which they have keys which allow them into any message, then could the CIA (for example) buy up large quantities of Saudi-configured Blackberries and flood their domestic market with them at reduced price, then simply pay the Saudi security services to send them the plain text of all messages. I don't know if it's possible, but it could be cheaper than trying to challenge that pesky Constitution thing. And it would make RIM an awful lot of money. And the Saudis. And wherever there is bribe money to be dispensed, there will be intermediaries happy to line their pockets from the flow.