My point wasn't about criticizing the degree of agreement they uncovered, it was about their characterization of "wealthy". The group they call "wealthy" and where they imply domination by an "economic elite" is simply older, educated upper-middle class folks.
I agree that you can't really call them the "economic elite". The poor wealth resolution is a weakness that should be addressed. Still, one would hope that not only the 10% richest would be able to influence political decisions.
They claim that those preferences correlate with those of the "truly wealthy", but even if that correlation were perfect, it wouldn't mean that the US is run according to the wishes of the "truly wealthy", it would mean that the US is run according to the preferences of the upper middle class and that the "truly wealthy" happen to share upper middle class preferences.
I think you're being too quick here. It *might* be as you say, that the US is run according to the preferences of the upper middle class, with the very rich just agreeing with them. Or it might be the other way around. One can test this by looking at what happens when they disagree. If the 90% quantile and the 99% quantile agree 70% of the time, but the 1% quantile has its way for those 30% when they disagree, then clearly the opinion of the 90% quantile does not matter. Conversely, if the 90% quantile has its way when they disagree, then they are the ones calling the shots. If something intermediate happens, then they share power. This needs to be measured.
First of all, high earners don't even exist as a stable group to express preferences, so they can't form an oligarchy. High earners each year are a temporary subset of older professionals and small business owners, people who have a few good years.
I dispute that. That isn't the norm among high earners. Even if it were, the fact that the 90% quantile's preferences correlate more strongly with the richest and the median shows that either they do form a distinct, stable group, or their preferences change while they are in that quantile. In any case, they empirically have different interests than those in lower quantiles, which is all that matters here.
Conversely, it is wrong to identify the preferences of people around the median income with "the majority". The group of people near the median income is no larger than the group of people near the 90th percentile. People around the median income aren't even a useful social group with common interests. For example, assume that the US consisted only of two groups, high income earners and low income earners, each with their own set of preferences, and each equally listened to by politicians, with the median income earner being equally likely to come from either group. If you did the same analysis as in the paper, you'd find the same result: their model would show domination by an economic elite, even though there is none.
The reason why they use the preferences of the median is because some of the theories they are trying to test in this article predict that political decisions should follow the opinion of the median citizen. That requires assumptions, and those assumptions can be wrong. It would be interesting to see the same calculation done for other percentiles, or for everybody below the 90% quantile as a whole. But there are good reasons for believing the 50% quantile to be more representative of the people as a whole than the 90% quantile (and especially the 99% quantile). The income distribution curve is much flatter at that point - i.e. the 49% quantile and the 51% quantile are much more similar to the 50% quantile than the 89% and 91% quantiles are to the 90% quantile. Here is an illustrative (if a bit slow) illustration of the distribution. So many more people have similar lives to the 50% quantile than the 90% quantile, though the latter still isn't as special as the 99% quantile or higher, of course.
The paper implicitly assumes that preferences and policies are rational, zero sum, can be traded off, are consistent, and can be traded off. But the preferences of small businesses and intellectuals may simply be more consistent with each other and may actually be objectively the right policies, whereas people near the median income may be objectively not the right policies to implement.
Oh, sure, people can be wrong - they often are. And large groups of people can be less informed than a few experts. I don't dispute that. The paper isn't implicit about that - it discusses this explicitly. They did not think there was any evidence that richer people were wiser on general policy issues. But I don't think that's the point. The point is where the power is. If a majority of the population's wishes are consistently overruled by their representatives, then they aren't actually being represented. The paper has only shown this for the 50% quantile, though, not for a majority, though I would be surprised if the picture is different for the majority.
The paper counts stated preferences as rational self "interest". But clearly many people vote against their interest, in particular in upper income brackets. High income earners, for example, don't have to worry as much about taxes as median income earners, which is why many high income earners vote for politicians favoring tax increases, although objectively, that is not in their narrow self interest and is intended to help median income earners.
The article discusses this too. By the way, are you sure about rich people tending to vote in favor of more tax? I thought there was a significant correlation between increasing wealth and opposition to tax increases. Especially so for progressive tax.
The paper assumes that stated preferences all count equally. But just because I state a preference for gay marriage doesn't mean that I actually care strongly about whether my politicians implement it. Median income earners are likely a highly diverse group, and even if you identify issues on which their stated preferences differ significantly from the 90th percentile as a group, that doesn't mean that they assign a consistently high weight to it. As a result, politicians would have no consistent preference of "the" median income earner to implement as policy.
So you're claiming that the explanation for the lack of influence of the 50th percentile is that they don't care about politics, while the 90th percentile does? I think that's very unrealistic - certainly not something one would think a priori without evidence backing it up.
Even the choice of model name, "economic elite domination", is wrong. The 90th income percentile isn't an "economic elite"
They aren't claiming that the 90% quantile is an elite. They are using it as a proxy for the opinions of those much richer because their data set does not include the real economic elite. They justify this by showing that in a much smaller auxiliary data set, the real economic elite's opinions do strongly correlate with those of the 90% quantile. But of course this should be followed up with a better data set.
and correlation of their preferences with policies isn't "domination". "Domination" implies active, forcible policy setting against the interests being dominated, and there is not a shred of evidence for that.
This isn't just correlation with preferences. What they found was that when the 90% quantile and the 50% quantile disagree, then the 50% quantile always loses. That's domination. Nothing "active, forcible" is needed. Just one group's interests counting much more than those of another group.
What they call "economic elite domination" is completely consistent with the way a representative democracy is supposed to function. That's the point of electing representatives after all: have people with a bit more time and smarts look at the issues and then make decisions on our behalf, and that group happens to be around the 90th percentile.
The point of representative democracy is that each person doesn't have the time or interest to form an informed opinion about every issue, so we offload that on representatives who we trust to vote as we would have if we did take the time to do things ourselves. But just because we don't care about *every* issue doesn't mean that there aren't many issues where an average person can have an informed opinion. In those cases, you would expect the representative's opinions to represent those of those he represents. The issues included in this article are first and foremost that kind of issue - they are issues that were important enough for opinion surveys to be conduced, making them at least much more interesting than the average question a representative has to consider. Yet despite this, the representatives' political decisions consistently align with the richest 10% instead on these issues. That is a problem because representative democracy relies on the correspondence between voter opinions and representative opinions in order to work.
The paper is absolutely worthless because even the question it asks is meaningless. It's the political science equivalent of doing experimental studies in biology on intelligent design; if the entire framework in which you design your experiments is wrong or meaningless, it doesn't matter how good your correlations are.
No, the correct response to this paper is "That's intriguing and somewhat worrying. A more detailed follow-up study is needed".