So to the extent this conversation does make sense (it is pretty nonsensical in a lot of areas), it refers to a phenomenon I find annoying as hell: application vendors bundle all their OS bits.
Before, if you wanted to run vendor X's software stack, you might have to mate it with a supported OS, but at least vendor X was *only* responsible for the code they produced. Now increasingly vendor X *only* releases an 'appliance and are in practice responsible for the full OS stack despite having no competency to be in that position'. Let's see the anatomy of a recent example of critical update, OpenSSL.
For the systems where the OS has applications installed on top, patches were ready to deploy pretty much immediately, within days of the problem. It was a relatively no-muss affair. Certificate regeneration was an unfortunate hoop to go through, but it's about as painless as it could have been given the circumstances.
For the 'appliances', some *still* do not even have an update for *Heartbleed* (and many more didn't bother with the other OpenSSL updates). Some have updates, but only in versions that also have functional changes in the application that are not desired, and the vendor refuses to backport the relatively simple library change. In many cases, applying an 'update' actually resembles a reinstall. Having to download a full copy of the new image and doing some 'migration' work to have data continuity.
Vendors have traded generally low amounts of effort in initial deployment for unmaintainable messes with respect to updates.