'Multiple flush volumes' is completely different from the controllable flush volumes the European, or at least the German, toilets provide (you should look it up, YOU'RE ON THE INTERNET). Whenever any sort of fixed-volume flush is inadequate for the task, x*(flush volume) must be used to finish the job (no less than twice the volume), whereas with a controllable flush volume, if the task only requires 10% more volume to complete the job, then only 1.1*(flush volume) is used. I posit that even when compared to multiple flush volume toilets, the controllable flush volume toilet will require less water.

If I hadn't just left a comment in this article, I would totally have used mod points. That's a great feed.

I worked in Germany for a few months and I actually really liked their toilets. I've always wanted to do a comparison of the real-world performance of our U.S. fixed-flush-volume toilets with the German (okay, European - I was working and didn't have much time to travel) toilets. They keep reducing the allowable flush volume in the U.S. to the point that adult-sized excrement and attendant tissue creates trouble and often requires consideration of the appropriate stages to flush (multiple flushes required), not to mention that the U.S. toilet uses a ton of water to get rid of urine, which is completely unnecessary and comprises the majority of total flushes.

Perhaps a practical project for the Internet of Toilets would be to compare efficiencies of various toilets. I think it would be pretty clear that fixed-volume flush toilets are terribly inefficient.

I want to point out that the Wikipedia article on toilets is outstanding and even includes an audio sample of a toilet flushing. Someone really deserves some recognition here.

Has there been an airline bailout since 2001? A problem with justifying airline bailouts is the 41 consecutive years of profitability that Southwest touts.

Air China heavily overbooks their flights. One of my flights from SFO to Shanghai took me 4 days to get onto. They basically just overbook the flights so much that they eventually end up filling a new plane with the spillover. That's one way to increase profits.

The coffee table between each seat seems objectively better.

You are confusing sales people with order takers. They are not the same. I think you have very little small business experience, as most have many vendors through which they do business with a sales person, and it ain't stoppin' any time soon.

Anyone who thinks they are going to sell products to businesses (of any size) without using sales people will be going out of business, fast. That is how it has always been and will be for a very, very long time.

Yes, there are no car lots with sales people at them because they are such an unnecessary expense.

Salespeople will be among the very last to be replaced by something else.

Are you supporting the claim that hardware manufacturers do everything to spec? That the hardware doesn't have to interface with software?

I find it rather concerning that so many people place so much faith in so many strangers that they would forgo a 60-second attendant procedure that would nearly totally ensure against data leakage.

This gets back to my whole point that when I am giving up control of the device, I would rather have full confidence, and what you are describing likely relies on various softwares that I cannot know if they are trustworthy.

To fully embrace my paranoia, your rather authoritative tone makes it sound as if I should not wipe the device and instead wholly rely on an unprovable method of protection, thus making a casual reader find your method superior. I will continue to rely on both erasing keys and wiping devices as the best method to protect data on devices I am giving up control of.

If this hardware encryption/decryption is trustworthy, then what is the difference between it and TPM, which few data experts are willing to trust?

I have recently been playing with hdparm and ATA secure erase and enhanced secure erase. As I understand it, issuing the command for enhanced secure erase returns the drive to a condition defined by the manufacturer of the device, presumably one which does not retain any data. Additionally, I found a blog post by Bruce Schneier discussing a report from a trusted security company which stated that traditional full disk wipe methods for HDDs are also effective on SSDs. The notable exception is that the security company did not find any delete-based wipe methods effective on SSDs (meaning, you have to wipe the whole disk to completely erase data). That last bit annoys me: everyone is so concerned with deleting data on far-away devices, yet we can't even delete specific data on local devices without wiping the entire device.

I have not played around with wiping data from phones, so I don't know how any that applies, but I suspect the concepts are the same. Also, as far as the time component goes, it's unattended time, so little measurable cost to the user.

FFS, it's on a time delay, not GPS (that can be spoofed).

Yes, much more so than the ones at OpenSSL (IIRC, the Heartbleed bug was reportedly caused by not checking code originally submitted by an intern).