That's the opposite of how that works. It's LGPL 2 or later. That means you can follow the terms of redistribution from either license. Either. Or.

It will do the same jobs. Most of the software on which we depend predates the GPL3 and/or uses an even more permissive license without an anti-tivoization clause.

Was it the monopoly that made the difference? Or was it simply management smart enough to not only not kill the goose, but also to feed it? They had wins, they got more funding, they had more wins, repeat until they no longer got more funding and stopped getting wins. What's probably more important than why they succeeded is what happened at the end.

If you're a Debian derivative user, it's called Devuan.

Otherwise...*

* Note: Removing systemd from a systemd-based system is madness. There's a reason Devuan exists, and it is that simply changing the init system on Debian results in a lot of breakage, which best illustrates the biggest problem with systemd.

Yes, that is literally the entire ethos behind systemd.

Yes, that is literally the entire situation with systemd.

This change literally could not be more on brand for systemd.

That's systemd in a nutshell. Only people like that would willingly work on a project like that.

The Linux kernel is GPL2 and glibc is LGPL, and you can construct a complete userland without any GPL3 components. Also, you seem to be under some weird misapprehension that the federal government will follow the law, which it has never done across the board.

Amendment XIII
Section 1: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction".
Section 2: "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation".

Emphasis mine.

Collaborators can get it.

Everyone is doing it wrong, that's why we need to sandbox.

Even if you were perfect, you wouldn't have time to do everything yourself, so you would still want sandboxing to protect you from the efforts of others.

I think you're describing the models from a year ago. Most of the improvements in capability since then (and the improvements have been really large) are directly due to changes that have the AI model talk to itself to better reason out its response before providing it, and one of the results of that is that most of the time they absolutely can explain why they did what they did. There are exceptions, but they are the exception, not the rule.

It's interesting to compare this with humans. Humans generally can give you an explanation for why they did what they did, but research has demonstrated pretty conclusively that a large majority of the time those explanations are made up after the fact, they're actually post-hoc justifications for decisions that were made in some subconscious process. Researchers have demonstrated that people are just as good at coming up with explanations for decisions they didn't make as for decisions they did! The bottom line is that people can't really provide useful insights on why they did what they did, they're just really good at inventing post-hoc rationales.

If you're asserting that Greg Kroah-Hartman can't code worth a damn, you might want to find out who he is and think again.

And the law of large numbers. Statistically, there will but patch clusters, the same way there are clusters of every other random-ish event. The fact that one happens to occur right after Microsoft promises a commitment to predictable patch schedules means not just nothing the but opposite. Any commitment to doing better means that they recognize they haven't been doing well enough, and obviously it's not possible to do significantly better immediately; changing processes takes time, and observing the effects of those changes takes even longer.

So, no, this cluster of patches doesn't tell us anything in particular beyond what we already knew: That emergency patches are relatively common.

Yes, but... I think you're confusing some things. We're talking about AES, which is a symmetric encryption algorithm, not asymmetric.

Of course, no cryptographic construction has been "proven" secure, in the sense that mathematicians use the word "prove", not symmetric or asymmetric. Asymmetric schemes have an additional challenge, though, which is they have to have some sort of "trapdoor function" that mathematically relates a public key and a private key, and the public key has to be published to the attacker. Classical asymmetric cryptography is built by finding a hard math problem and building a scheme around it -- which means that a solution to the math problem breaks the algorithm.

Symmetric systems have it a bit easier, because the attacker doesn't get to see any part of the key or anything related to the key other than plaintext and corresponding ciphertext (though the standard bar is to assume the attacker has an oracle that allows them to get plaintext of arbitrary ciphertexts, i.e. the Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext attack, IND-CCA2). And the structure of symmetric ciphers isn't usually built around a specific math problem. Instead, they tend to just mangle the input in extremely complex ways. It's hard to model these mathematically, which makes attacking them with math hard.

In both cases, we are unable to prove that they're secure. When I started working on cryptography, the only basis for trust in algorithms was that they'd stood up to scrutiny for a long period of time. That was it. Over the last 20 years or so, we've gotten more rigorous, and "security proofs" are basically required for anyone to take your algorithm seriously today... but they aren't quite like "proofs" in the usual sense. They're more precisely called "reductions". They're mathematically-rigorous proofs that the security of the algorithm (or protocol) is reducible to a small set of assumptions -- but we have to assume those, because we can't prove them.

For most asymmetric schemes, the primary underlying assumption is that the mathematical problem at the heart of the scheme is "hard". Interestingly, there is one family of asymmetric signature schemes for which this is not true. SLH-DSA, one of the post-quantum algorithms recently standardized by NIST, provably reduces to one assumption: That the hash algorithm used is secure, meaning that it has both second pre-image resistance plus a more advanced form of second pre-image resistance. Collision resistance isn't even required! This is striking because we actually have quite a lot of confidence in our secure hash algorithms. Secure hash algorithms are among the easiest to create because all you need is a one-way function with some additional properties. And we've been studying hash functions very hard, for quite a long time, and understand them pretty well.

This means that one of our "new" post-quantum asymmetric algorithms is probably the very strongest we have, not only less likely to be broken than our other asymmetric algorithms, but less likely to be broken than our symmetric algorithms. If it were broken, it would be because someone broke SHA-256 (which, BTW, would break enormous swaths of modern cryptography; it's extremely hard to find a cryptographic security protocol that doesn't use SHA-256 somewhere), and unless that same research result somehow broke all secure hash functions, we could trivially repair SLH-DSA simply by swapping out the broken hash function for a secure one.

This is an entirely different model from the way we looked at cryptography early in my career. SLH-DSA doesn't have decades of use and attack research behind it. Oh, the basic concept of hash-based signatures dates back to the late 70s, but the crucial innovations that make SPHINCS and its descendants workable are barely a decade old! BUT we have a rigorous and carefully peer-reviewed security proof that demonstrates with absolute mathematical rigor that SLH-DSA is secure iff the hash function used in it is secure.

So... a relative newcomer is more trustworthy than the algorithms we've used for decades, precisely because we no longer rely on "hasn't been broken so far" as our only evidence of security.

As for AES, the subject of the discussion above, there is no security proof for AES. There's nothing to reduce it to. There are proofs that it is secure against specific attack techniques (linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis) that were able to defeat other block ciphers, but those proofs only prove security against those specific attacks, not other attacks that are not yet known. So for AES we really do rely on the fact that it has withstood 20+ years of focused cryptanalysis, and that no one has managed to find an attack that significantly weakens it. That could change at any time, with or without quantum computers.

SLH-DSA, however, is one that very well may be secure forever, against both classical and quantum attacks. The security proof doesn't even care about classical vs quantum, it just proves that any successful attack, no matter how it's performed, provides a way to break the underlying hash function. Therefore, if the hash function is secure, SLH-DSA is secure. It's an incredibly powerful proof, like many proofs by contradiction.

If Putin had been around, he'd have been in the Epstein files, too. It's vanishingly-unlikely that any strongman like that wouldn't also be a sexual abuser. It's all part of the same disrespect for others.

Linux has a large number of highly-paid developers. If you look at the kernel, specifically, there are basically no unpaid volunteers contributing significantly to it, and there haven't been for a long time. The right way to understand kernel development is as a collaboration between a large number of corporations, each of whom contributes the paid work of skilled engineers and most of which also contribute cash to a foundation that employs the highly-paid engineers who coordinate all of the work (notably Linus, who makes a seven figure salary -- honestly, ought to be eight figures, but he's certainly not hurting).

If you look beyond the kernel to the other tools and desktop environments, the volunteer participation rises significantly, but there's also a lot of paid work.