Replying "Fuck Off!" to political/charity/marketing SMS spam usually gets me "you have been unsubscribed from this list."

https://www.usatoday.com/story...

It'll be harder for them to compromise SKor. But seriously, given the hacker haven that North Korea is, you'd think South Korea would be a lot more careful with computer security regulation.

My take-away from the various comments on my parent post is there are clearly multiple auto markets: US/North America, Europe, China, Third World (and I'm sure that's an over-simplification, particularly that last category.) Those markets are defined by government policies, availability of various fuel sources, commitment to ecological goals, economics/consumer wealth, etc.

On a related note, I had a discussion with a classmate who owns a relatively large electrical contractor (residential/business/some industrial) firm. I asked what it would take to add a subpanel to support an EV Charger, an Induction range (current one is gas), and at least one mini-split. He pointed out that they used to do 200 amp panels, but now for a house my size, the default is 400 amps, because of all that stuff that I'd like to add that raises electrical consumption (and therefore electrical generation and supply demand.)

I wonder how much a EU move away from EVs is motivated by EU auto companies having the same problems competing with Chinese EV manufacturers that US automakers are having. My guess is that EU countries, particularly Germany, are even more dependent on their automakers (as a percentage of GDP) than the US is.

Even if they get substantial subsidies and trade protection in the US, their products can't compete in the rest of the world.

Now there's significant defense value in the domestic auto industry. But we can't maintain the defense value without an economically viable industry that includes both R&D and production.

This goes to the heart of why the Trump Tariffs are a failed economic strategy. They're all stick, with no carrot to establish and maintain the domestic industries that Trump claims he wants.

It makes sense to me that a relatively narrowly focused/narrowly trained AI system eventually beats humans for vulnerability detection. And significant false positives are in this scenario probably acceptable, much more than false negatives. Someone will have to work off those false positives (and presumably feed them back so the tool learns and gets better.)

But at the end of the day, the question is "How do you trust the tool is correct?" Here, at least, you can write a reasonably testable requirement. "Must detect security vulnerabilities" and provide a definition of (which I'm probably not qualified to write :-) ) for 'security vulnerability'. But then someone has to figure out what the verification approach will be, and how that's established/documented. Should there be a formal registry of 'trusted AI vulnerability scanners"? Certainly if we expect such tools to be used for product qualification ("Your website must be shown to contain no vulnerabilities, as inspected by this tool and set of procedures we trust."), we have to have a way to establish that trust.

This is a good news story, but there's much more work to be done to turn this into production. And a lot of that work is not strictly technical, but managerial (probably including government participation, e.g. a NIST set of qualification criteria and maybe even a registry of tools that meet those criteria.)

OR, companies will have to pay Apple to put their AI applications onto Apple devices, the same way that Google now pays for search placement on iOS.

I suspect big LLMs will be desperate for customers, given the huge revenues they need to pay off that investment.

My money (literally) is on Apple here.

https://earthquake.usgs.gov/ea... The USGS earthquake.usgs.gov site does a great job tracking earthquakes worldwide. There's valuable information for both casual readers and for geologists. (Even though we covered 'beachball' moment tensors in my Structural Geology course, I never really grokked how to interpret the diagrams, and always have to look up samples to see which way the slip is going.)

And I don't think I'd hire anyone who worked for Meta, either. To me, that's a reflection of "ethical failure".

Fortunately, I'm now retired.

dave

Zuck couldn't pay me enough to work for him. YMMV, of course.

Gruber is probably the best connected of those who blog on Apple. See https://daringfireball.net/202...
Alan Dye is not untalented. But his talents at Apple were in politics. His political skill was so profound that it was his decision to leave, despite the fact that his tenure is considered a disaster by actual designers inside and outside the company. He obviously figured out how to please Apple’s senior leadership. His departure today landed as a total surprise because his stature within the company seemed so secure. And so I think he might do very well at Meta. Not because he can bring world-class interaction design expertise—because he obviously can’t—but because the path to success at Meta has never been driven by design. It’s about getting done what Zuck wants done. Dye might excel at that. Dye was an anchor holding Apple back, but might elevate design at Meta.

(Personally, I think anyone who would go to work for Zuckerberg/Meta is someone I'm glad is not remaining at Apple. "Don't let the door hit you on the way out.")

Well, frankly, given the choice between UK as an ally, and the EU countries, I'd probably go for the UK. UK punches well above its weight in defense technology, and has a well trained, but diminished army. RAF and RN are also quite valuable, even for European continental defense.

But if Continental Europe really does think they can go it alone, all I can say is "Good luck, you'll need it!" To repeat an old story: "The French admiral was complaining at a NATO meeting. 'Why do we have to speak English all the time?' The Dutch admiral responded, "Because the UK, Canada, and US made sure we're not all speaking German."

You're attributing to me, that which I'm attributing to political leaders after the fall of the Soviet Union. I thought Russia might be able to change its spots, but their actions starting in the late 200x showed otherwise.

Let me repeat Pug Ismay's characterization of NATO: "US in, Germany down, Russia out" NATO succeeded for a long time, but it's not clear to me now NATO is working. Hungary & Turkey have at various times been the primary impediment to NATO consensus on various missions.

Of course, roughly half the population of the US shares the view that Trump has been an appalling reset, both domestically and internationally. I do note, though, that other nations have undergone significant political changes, as is their right. DeGaulle tossing the Americans out of France is the best example (a neighbor talks about being in the US Army at that time and moving rapidly from Orleans to Kaiserslautern.) I'm sure there are others in post WWII Europe. Europeans should not be surprised if the US democracy enables a significant/radical political shift, and more importantly should accept it's the right of any democracy to significantly change its mind. It's always bothered me how so many people outside the US feel entitled to tell the US how its voters should behave.

The problem with being a kept woman is that the "keeper" has already established the moral imperative to do whatever is expedient solely for the keeper, so the kept woman can't be too surprised if the keeper decides to spend on someone else, or no one at all.