I'm not sure why you think that. It wouldn't be surprising if Israel has access to Signal App chats, and other things. But you don't need quantum computers for that. The vast majority of penetrations of secure systems involve finding implementation bugs, or infecting machines thought to be secure, or social engineering, or given how the beeper operation went, possibly just compromising phones at their source before they even get to the targets. And we have good evidence that the governments have not yet built quantum computers on a scale that can decrypt anything substantial. There are two major lines of evidence.
First, while we've seen some government investment in quantum computing, we're seeing scientists and engineers there publish in the open. When they get really close, some of that will start getting classified. That's happened with a bunch of techs before. Georgy Flerov was able to detect that the US was working on an atomic bomb because all of the apparent public nuclear research stopped. Similarly, a sign in the 1970s to the US that the Soviets were *not* working on stealth aircraft was that the work on related ideas such as the work by Ufimstev and related work had not been classified https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyotr_Ufimtsev.
Second, the US and its allies have built giant data storage facilities and are still expanding those. The Utah Data Center is the obvious big example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utah_Data_Center but other governments have built similar smaller facilities. This doesn't make much sense if one has quantum computers. But it makes a lot of sense if one is expecting to get quantum computers a few years from now since it lets one do the strategy of storing massive numbers of messages now for later decryption https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvest_now,_decrypt_later.
There is however one argument in your favor. If one looks at the history of declassified material from the NSA, material from GCHQ (the British analog of the NSA), and looks also at declassified Soviet material, anthe pattern seems to be that the classified version is generally 10 to 20 years ahead of the unclassified work on a bunch of things. (For the Soviet end, this stops being the case in the 1980s it seems, but I don't know how much of that is that the USSR is just falling apart and how much of this them failing to archive things well, or make their archives available, or failure to declassify things. Also, the Soviets were never quite as good at a lot of cryptography things. For example, while both NSA and GCHQ came up with a lot of ideas about public key cryptography before it was public, I'm not aware of any evidence the Soviets did.) So by that logic, if one thinks that quantum computers will be practically able to do some decryption within 15 years or so, then that's an argument that it should be plausible that the NSA can do it now.