Like how would this attack work in reality? It's not like the car would have a keyboard inviting spurious input. Or perhaps there's an assumption that some network interface should be available for arbitrary input. In both cases, the problem wouldn't be the LLM but the system design that allows arbitrary and totally unneeded input.

There's all this hand-wringing over the collection and sale of personal data, but I really have to wonder if there's any point to it. I couldn't tell you the last time advertising affected my decision to purchase (or not) any particular product or service. It doesn't matter how many ads Levi's throws on my browser when I already know I'll be picking up my next pair of jeans at Costco, nor Sony when I'm not even interested in a gaming console, nor anybody else. Google reads my email and knows I'm registered for a coaching clinic? More power to them... good luck getting me to register for that second clinic six months from now halfway across the country, 'cause no matter how many times they shill it, my budget's not going to allow it. My purchasing either goes through a programmatic decision tree (i want a compact car with minimum t mpg and features r, s, and x... these are the models which satisfy, go test drive), or are literally "I have the munchies for chocolate crunchies, and Butterfinger has never failed me."

Using X25519Kyber768 adds over a kilobyte of extra data to the TLS ClientHello message due to the addition of the Kyber-encapsulated key material. Our earlier experiments with CECPQ2 demonstrated that the vast majority of TLS implementations are compatible with this size increase; however, in certain limited cases, TLS middleboxes failed due to improperly hardcoded restrictions on message size.