There was a GNU project to create free software for online voting. In 2002, Jason Kitcat the project coordinator abandoned development, pointing to this quote from Bruce Schneier: "a secure Internet voting system is theoretically possible, but it would be the first secure networked application ever created in the history of computers."
I don't see anything having changed in the intervening fourteen years, other than perhaps attackers getting more sophisticated. We may not have internet voting, but the idea that voting machines or those used in the tabulation of votes are connected to the internet is madness.
I still believe that regulators should require that, if a caller ID is to be presented, it should be traceable to an individual in the originating country (with the carrier responsible if it's not). A carrier should be able to warrant this to its interconnects - if it can't, that carrier's calls will all be presented with no caller ID.
Customers can then reject calls without caller ID or from other countries if necessary.,Where caller ID is presented it is then traceable to a person, enabling existing state rules about such calls to be enforced.
There is no good reason that I should be able to buy a VOIP account for a couple of dollars a month and spoof any caller ID.
Perhaps, but if you read the thread you will recognize that I am referring to the OPs use of purpose.
So, in the alternate, you could say that it's purpose it to intelligently respond to natural language after hearing a wake word. A cynic may go further and suggest that the intelligent response will be determined in part by Amazon's ability to monetize the response.
Nonetheless, the design and intent are for the device to transmit language after hearing a wake word. If it operates outside that design and intent, this should be detectable if your router is secure and able to track outbound usage on a per device basis.
Actually, its purpose is to listen for a wake word, then send the next sentence to the cloud for processing.
For someone concerned about wiretapping, it would make sense to monitor outbound data use by the echo. Spikes caused by wiretapping should be obvious since it does not normally transmit everything it hears.
But what do I know?
As to my absence I've been a bit overwhelmed by work stuff, sorry about that, it's no excuse
Read 28 U.S.C. Â 1746 and 18 U.S.C. Â 1621.
Under Federal law you can be fined, imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
While dated, much of FYI-28 / RFC 1855 is still applicable and the world would be a better place if more folk followed it.
If somehow you could have gotten all of this done with a client and an IMAP server (at least for individuals without intra-user shared data) maybe a more open client model would have held on to some of the market because the back-end could have been a single system and not a mashup of a half-dozen different services.
Why would a bandwidth heavy standard like IMAP support have saved things? We already have open standards for calendar and contacts, CalDAV and CardDAV respectfully. And there are open source server solutions that implement them, such as Zimbra.
Google's offering was an April Fool, though a strange one given this was already happening.
I've had the original, the 4S and when 6 came out I decided against it on two reasons and got a 5s - I don't need a door to carry in my pocket and I don't need a snitch that can be read by any passer by. So if they put the innards of whatever 6 or 6s in the SE without removing the NFC I am not going to get one. NFC and wallet and fingerprint reader are bad for security
So let's get this right, you're comfortable with your phone broadcasting over bluetooth, wireless 802.11 a,b,c,g and n, 2g, 3g and LTE wireless signals in CDMA and GSM etc. But when it comes to NFC you draw a line? That makes perfect sense.
As in certain cults it is possible to kill a process if you know its true name. -- Ken Thompson and Dennis M. Ritchie