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Comment The US gov tried their best (Score 2) 118

to ensure the people hired by the USA in 1950-90's after Operation Paperclip had the best skills to carry on the German vision of total internal quality control over any project.
What went wrong in the 1980-90's with the post German generations of US gov staff testing?
Top US universities educated many of the worlds best graduates based academic merit over the decades.
Did all the great people go to the private sector, starving the US gov of needed skills? Did the NRO make a better offer to the very top % considering gov work?
Who or what is holding back the best US graduates from finding top jobs and working on gov projects that once had effortless internal institutional support?

Comment Re:Smart nation (TM)!!! (Score 1) 35

Singapore got on the office and gov networking aspect investing in IT early and fully. eg Land Data Hub project.
Other nations sold or opened their networks allowing for some easy, deep and amazing finds with human and computer networks.
Australia had its gov, shared mil networks totally mapped out over decades by a few other nations. A mix of human access and classic computer work showed huge gaps in most nations efforts to secure their own mil and gov networks from low level insiders wondering around and long term covert outside computer access efforts.
With the news about what the NSA, GCHQ can do now and what Singapore saw under the Chai Keng GCHQ/RAF days the only smart way out is to say no open networks. Singapore has some insight into what the US and UK did to the Indonesia mil and gov telco systems over the decades (late 1940's~70's).
Having seen what the NSA, GCHQ can do and what could be done to vast wide open networks in nations like Australia, removing the "net" is the only way to be sure :)

Comment Re:Cut out the middle man (Score 1) 90

AC re "member of a criminal network was an informant or agent from another agency."
That happened in East Germany a lot. So many people got an offer to turn and become informants that peace protest groups and church groups got filled with ever more informants.
Add in a layer of more traditional police like undercover work and even soon smaller groups had a few informants mostly generating gossip on each other to induce the ability to get deeper into a network or find another nations help.
It was hard work with limited databases and compartmentalized file access to totally map out who was really of interest and who was just improving their cover.
The UK had the right idea to give total bulk domestic collection to one group, sneak and peak to one group, classic police work to other groups.
Then everybody had some idea who was doing what and what their role was without city, state, federal and mil overlap and related budget issues.

Comment Re:Fake Accounts (Score 1) 331

If you really need to enter the USA just create a business web 2.0 account that links back to the same very public people on the business .com homepage.
No need to actually use it, just have the friends lists as an online place holder account.
Fill the accounts up with charity and fundraisers, community events over the years, good press, years of decades of marketing, lots of big scanned in print ads :)
If an older brand, find the classic ads, add video clips.
Turn the staff only social media accounts into publicity accounts. No messages or any logs, just huge lists of very public promotional material.
For clients in the US, its easy to show them the brand on fancy bright web 2.0... factual charts, spreadsheets, accounts not needed so much.

Comment So other governments (Score 1) 61

Can get into US think tanks, gov sector, private servers at will. Never detected as they enter, stay in.
Over time vast amount of data in plain text is collected on internal networks. No decryption is needed, no strange bulk decryption requested detected.
This bulk information collection in plain text is then networked out of the US servers without notice for some time.
Well understood, older hacking tools are presented as proof in to the waiting US press at the very start of "secret" investigations to find out who did what.
Smart enough to get in, stay in, extract bulk data totally undetected. Strange extra network use never noted, but then fail and drop the tools and ip's all over logs and networks to be found without much effort?
If any nations state actors are that lacking in needed skills they would have never got in.

Comment Re:Cut out the middle man (Score 1) 90

The US has so many "other" agencies operating domestically that nobody can keep up with all the mil, mil/gov, gov, private sector informants.
Everyone is flooding the internet with bait and the FBI has to respond to it all only to discover its all from the US gov, mil as part of domestic missions to keep budgets and make great over time.
Great for the growth and funding of each agency but the FBI then has to work out what is a crime or just another US agency creating a legend around some other mil/gov backed informants or some decade long deep cover effort. Thats expensive, risky and a massive duplication of effort. Everyone under watch needs 6-9 person teams, support, over time and has to be undetected in very invite only closed groups under investigation that are run like cults or other spy rings..
If the group been watched for months turns out to be another US agency/US mil front, a friendly gov operating in the US with the total blessing of another part of the US gov, thats an epic waste of expert skill for months or years.
Such other agencies used to operate internationally as that was their mission. Now the same work load and limited domestic funding that was once all the FBI's has to be shared with ever more bureaucrats, mil and other new intelligence teams, contractors, private academics, politically backed think tanks, ex mil now fronting private sector groups, well connected dual citizens offering front companies.
The only way to get that budget back is to get good domestic press that political leaders can understand.
If not other agencies will hold the keys to decryption, tracking, support services, intelligence gathering and keep running informants that totally clog up the FBI's own complex case load.
Decades of experience is lost to well funded groups in the US mil/gov who never expected to have any role in the USA then get more of the domestic budgets.
Long term the FBI seeks total encryption access without any difficult requests to other US agencies, bulk data collection domestically and internationally, voice prints for everyone entering the US, been in the US or talking about the US.
The aim is to bring it all back to the FBI, spy hunting, crime, total decryption, international intrigue. Even local city and state task forces case loads are now expanding US wide without needing FBI level funding or even sharing details about operations in the same areas.
The trust issue over informants, methods, funding, budget expanding good news in the press is getting very complex.

Comment Re:Were these actions necessary? (Score 2) 90

Its parallel construction to induce a crime that would have happened. To have the ability to be ready when an informant has set up a crime that gets "discovered" and can be seen as court ready from the origin of the very public, formal case.
No issues around evidence that is tainted or flowed from gov/mil illegal action, all search warrants are ready, all interviews and comments got witness by two or more federal law enforcement officials.
Methods, effortless and constant decryption, years of beacon tracking and mapping of friends, hardware computer access to get passwords, other agency help can stay hidden and a protected informant can be the court presentable origin of the case.
Methods like ability to take over sites, forums, chat rooms, follow any onion routing back to an original ip can then be masked with a simple note to legal teams about an informant been the start of the case.

Comment Don't use Microsoft (Score 1) 394

for anything other than enjoying computer games or ensuring games created are well coded and are ready to sell.
Move any real work over to an OS you have full control over.
Use and enjoy Microsoft for games, end user testing, just move the real world important work away from any MS product.
Trying to work around and with mandated, pushed updates is extra work. That time could go to product testing, development on any better OS that is totally controlled in house.

Comment Re:And you thought drone warfare was bad? (Score 1) 117

Re "Someone hacks a vulnerability in your control system and takes over the entire fleet"
Thats why nations are so careful about how much encryption to add. If a drone is captured, lost, induced to land in another nation or staff walk out with the codes thats an expected loss.
The loss of US drones in the past shows the US thinking on the issue. The drone has just the right amount of crypto to fly for a long time and anything lost is only sensitive to that mission. No need to pack in, power and keep an extra smart computer system flying.
The US likes its flight time, loitering, ammo count over the need to protect from smarter staff in another nation setting new missions or an early return default.
Having drones return mid mission or before a mission starts would be a creative alteration option.
Other nations now fully understand that US design ideas and can work on their own systems to alter course or take over.
Japan really has to consider what it buys in from the US or the US allows Japan to use.
Weak crypto networks used to avoid a loss if captured could be very interesting due to its lack of protection in flight from smarter surrounding nations :)

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