If we had meat, we could make a sandwich, if we had bread...

"It said last night on Twitter that Samantha Lewthwaite, the ‘white widow’ of London 7/7 bomber Jermaine Lindsay, was ‘in their ranks’ and a ‘brave lady’."

Lewthwaite. The "other" David Headly.

Amazing that people fall for these CIA/Mossad stooge-games.

Either way? Tastes like anus.

But they just can't kill the beast.

Or is it bad money, after worse?

Either way, get ready for the "great landfill contribution of 2014" from Microsoft.

http://news.yahoo.com/kenya-cases-stir-african-backlash-against-icc-064129121.html

Resale value.

I have been through 4 previous generations - without ever having seen a buck come in.

I give them away, or trade them up. I don't foresee a change in this pattern.

But it's too big to fit the reader...

The Gestapo office of "Civic Concern and Redress" is looking for an administrative leader.

Or install the .deb for Vidalia, which is a worthwhile console...

Yes! And lift them from your +5 Vorpal Blade!

Trivial will be running a crack on the limited number of hashes that can be generated by the phone's sampler for fingerprint images.

The problem with this is not where it has started, as a simple PIN replacement for iPhones. It is where this is headed, now that Apple has used their marketing position to deliver Biometric authentication as a security technology in the mainstream.

People who are good at technology problem-solving are often equipped with exactly wrong type of mental orientation for examining implication or cross-disciplinary context. So? You get a reasonable PIN replacement for your iPhone, that reduces auto-collisions by people unlocking their phones while driving. Nice.

You also get this as a cure-all for the password problem, as an option on every device you interact with, over the next 4 years. I don't care if it is thumbprint, retina-scan or gut-biome that is measured. This will lower security and introduce as-yet-unforseen compromises.

I'd paint the lens on this thing, with black enamel.

Right now, you don't need to be insured, and take your risks...

Known vector. Gummy-bear attack.

The core issue is that you leave copies of your authenticator EVERYWHERE. It's as if you dropped 85% accurate copies of your smartcard on every item you touched - with random 15% damage to the material - and a card reader designed for 15% error in reads.

Any such scheme is going to be subject to this kind of impersonation or gaming. This is why biometrics are always a bad ID choice. Also, the A/D conversion is low-entropy, among other problems.

There's a false assumption, that because I can uniquely identify another person with 99.999% accuracy, based on your sound, shape and appearance, that therefore this is the best way a machine should do so. It is a falsehood that is reinforced by a misleading intuitive perception. The core issue concerns the questions related to what constitutes "identity" and an "authentication factor" in systems. Neither of these correlate to actual persons or their real-world characteristics in a unique and meaningful way, that is not also subject to spoofing, injecting or revocation DoS.