If all of our stuff is going to be networked, having us be the gatekeepers for our own security is paramount.
Because you can't design something intended to be remotely accessible and not expect there is a likelihood of someone else being able to access it.
The problem is there's currently no model of security that works for nontechnical users that doesn't involve an outside party. As long as there's an outside party there's a vector of exploit, even if it's simply the field service consultant jotting-down the passwords and keeping his notes as he leaves.
What we need is a standard that allows for local-control to the exclusion of the original vendor or manufacturer for those of us that are capable of managing our own devices, while allowing nontechnical owner-users to use that vendor-provided support if they're unable or unwilling to do it themselves or to pay someone else to set it up privately. Right now we're not seeing that, and consuming these made-for-marketing brochures won't show us that even if the local-control aspect did exist.
It's not much of a router if it only has 2 ports.
My Cisco 2821 router has only two Ethernet ports. It routes packets just fine.
That's what he wants you to believe.
Every time I grow concerned that I've gone from skeptic to cynic something inevitably vindicates my position.
This situation with Mr. Assange is strange enough that I'm simply going to watch what happens. I also have a hard time believing that there is no way for him to leave the Embassy if Ecuador wanted to get him out of the Embassy. I have no doubt that they have either diplomatic means to move him or they have the ability to smuggle him in a way that the Brits could not investigate without causing a major diplomatic incident. If that's true then a lot of what we're seeing is theatrics on both sides.
Karl's version of Parkinson's Law: Work expands to exceed the time alloted it.