Depends on the number of realistically 'false positives'.
I've known a few people who find the kernel CVEs particularly unreasonable as they tend to aggressively assume security implications. If they grant a CVE to a 'mere bug', no one is going to get too grumpy over that specific item. If someone believes they have a vulnerability and do not see a CVE, then people get riled up. So some feel the kernel is just granting CVEs to avoid pushing back.
The other headache is the monolithic nature of the project. "Linux" covers just everything. A potential security issue in a device never seen outside of PA-RISC systems 20 years ago? It's a "Linux" issue, so every x86 system will be flagged as 'affected' by security software that cannot deal with nuance
Of course, we are here mainly because the kernel team largely recognizes the practice of trying to apply only security updates while avoiding 'only bug' fixes as pretty insane. So err on the side of caution make CVEs extra unmanageable because realistically it was a pretty crappy strategy for such a complex project anyway.
Broadly speaking, CVEs are usually pretty bogus, but a small percentage are very real and critical issues. You can't use the 'score' to really measure this either, it's not very good in the first place, and for example I saw the exact same issue in a C library and a python binding for that C library, and for whatever reason they graded the C library as 'minor' and python binding for that library 'critical', despite the python binding being nothing but a ctypes wrapper around the c library...