Comment Re:I think its hilarious... (Score 1) 155
A flamethrower negates this... Like instantly.
Which reminds me, almost never should you write a serious response to what at first appears as a genuinely clueless AC.
A flamethrower negates this... Like instantly.
Which reminds me, almost never should you write a serious response to what at first appears as a genuinely clueless AC.
Whereas with, say, nuclear, there are a significant number of people who just don't think it should be done anywhere, whether or not it's within 100 miles of them. Same with oil. Same with coal.
IMHO, looking at the picture, they're not well protected, however it would be fairly clumsy to switch both of them off accidentally.
I imagine that is why they were supposed to have that locking mechanism. Someone else mentioned that Airbuses have an additional safety mechanism that the switches cannot be moved to OFF until the throttle is set to 0. That might be a suggestion for future redesign.
Things that make you go hmm...
1) Fuel switches do not look like the landing gear switch on this plane. Fuel switch: black knobs. Landing gear: grey disc. They are not located even in the same place. Fuel switch, under throttle. Landing gear: Between the two pilot displays. I am not sure why you even hint they "look like" each other. 2) The landing gear switch would be in the down position until the pilot moves them UP to retract them after takeoff. To start the engines, the fuel switches must be moved to RUN (UP). Even if somehow a pilot confused the two during takeoff and wanted to retract the gear but instead reached for the fuel switch, he would try to move the fuel switch UP. It would already be UP. If the pilot meant to turn the fuel on, he would not needed to do that as the engine should have already been started.
I’ve already told you. ENG SHUTDOWN. No one here thinks or requires that the warning is Fuel Cutoff Active (or similar) for any argument or point being made.
Again you do not seem to understand the point. "Cutoff" is very specific jargon for a Boeing. For these specific controls switches. If the display does not mention "CUTOFF" why would the pilot use that term? He wouldn't.
The words he blurted out, in English or other language, as paraphrased on the interim report, refer to “cutoff”. That is correct. That’s all we know
Again not everyone uses American English phrasing in an airplane environment. As international pilots, they would use airplane terminology like "turn off", "disable", "power down", "trim", etc.
The cutoff switches are probably around 70 degrees from the primary attention axis towards the HUD, depending on seat position and pilot physiology. This is easy for the pilot to check via retina saccade and/or small head motion AFTER they suspect a problem (as you point out). However, it is likely outside the field of vision where changes are likely to noticed if the other pilot flipped switches while the pilot flying was focussed on HUD and PFD.
Think for a second about the situation. You are a pilot in a Boeing 787. You've lost engine power. You can hear it. You can feel it. But according to you, you would NEVER look 70 degrees from primary attention to check the throttle or fuel supply switches even for a moment to determine why you have no power.
...since that advisory was issues, for reasons unrelated to the switches. Hard to see how this advisory would be relevant.
Er what? The advisory were for these exact switches. It even listed the part numbers that could be affected. Without the locking feature, these switches could be easy to flip accidentally by a pilot. Also the plane was 12 years old with 11 years of service. Without the locking feature (after all those years of service), how much vibration would flip the switches? That's the relevance.
They found the bloody switches. They would have known immediately if they were the wrong type, and somehow I think that information would have found its way into the preliminary report.
The switches were not installed with the "wrong type". The switches may been incorrectly installed that disabled the safety feature. That is a different matter.
They have recovered the switches, and they are quite intact. As shown in this video [youtu.be]. They will absolutely know if these had the safety mechanism or not.
The problem with the safety mechanism was not it was missing but it was "disengaged" when installed. It might be harder to determine if the damaged switches could show that.
That's a pretty big assumption at this point. What if it wasn't a mistake.
And you assuming is wasn't a mistake at all. That is also a very big assumption
Both switches failed? That's a highly improbable dual failure without some external influence.
The final report would delve into probabilities of failure. Remember that the plane was not new. It was 12 years old with 11 years of service and over 41,000 hours. Also the report mentions the possibility the switches were installed incorrectly.
"In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff. The other pilot responded that he did not do so."
There are two positions for that switch. RUN or CUTOFF. As far as I know the switch must be in RUN position to start the engines. CUTOFF as far as I know is not used for any other control. So what else could have happened other than the pilot noticing these specific switches were flipped. It is possible that the computer registered the switch positions incorrectly. We will have to wait for the final report if that is possible.
Listen to whatever you want, it is a free world.
No your point is that we should not listen to others on this forum. But you. What makes your opinion more valid than others? Nothing from my viewpoint. All are equally worthless (even mine) when it comes to aviation safety. Now some opinions are worthless because they are based entirely on assumptions and misinformation but that is a different matter.
Should the pilot learn an interface that can lead them into a deadly error, or should a more appropriate redesign of a problematic interface be considered is an old argument,
The interface is there for a reason. How would a pilot turn off fuel supply to an engine when it is on fire? Also the solution should be somewhat quick as fire tends to spread fast. Please enlighten us with your solution.
and an appropriate redesign has tended to lower the death toll.
The point you seem to miss is this interface may have been installed incorrectly and if it was installed correctly, there may not be a need for redesign.
(1) Never draw what you can copy. (2) Never copy what you can trace. (3) Never trace what you can cut out and paste down.