Be aware of the boondoggle and rent seeking contractors and brands they front for or watch over for mil and gov interests.
The mainstream phone ecosystem is now well understood to track, gps, record, locate and log all material for later review over years.
So keep that phone when just working or walking.
If your meeting a journalist be aware of what kind of tracking they bring to a meeting and the tracking you will face after that meeting.
Rethink any mainstream phone devices during that contact and be aware of CCTV and all other tracking systems in the area.
Re "bit of space to myself" really depends on the activity. Surfing the web now and been logged then been found talking to a member of the press in a few years?
The use of Informants online? Be aware of new online friends that just keep chatting.
For anything else use one time pads and number stations. Expect every network and computer like device sold to be crypto aware and leak plain text by default as shipped.

Re: "They probably also write some of the more popular free games/apps out there as well. Not a great way of bugging a phone but still a way of getting their malware out there. Or at least it wouldn't hurt..."
The telco network tracks a person, the soft glowing power down and sealed battery design ensure a device is always network ready, the hardware is mic, text, gps gov wiretap friendly as designed. Games help keep a person wanting to ensure the device is powered and in use during the day and into the night :)

How many methods can ensure every product ships with a tame always ready trap door and back door for the US gov?
The US gov has a few options as the public history of the NSA and GCHQ shows.
Ensure the product design is set to a standard thats open to the security services.
Generations of brand staff help the security services with every product and network as developed.
The security services set up their own front company and sell to the world over decades setting tame junk standards.
Any other method will require a change in the software or hardware after shipping that would make a device unique.
If every device from a brand is crypto junk as shipped, a user can swap, rebuild, buy or upgrade all they like.
The security services will be back with that connection and user of interest no matter the brand, product, year, version or upgrade.

The value for this kind of interception is it gets the call details, voice print, location, unique id and numbers of interest with only law enforcement knowing.
The interception side will not need a telco database, any telco legal oversight, any staff at a telco understanding what cell users are of interest to law enforcement officials. No telco costs to a city or state, no other staff or teams to see the legal requests in advance or databases been set up to log users.
Has the US gov found leaks in the way local or national telcos log or store details about users under legal court surveillance?
No comment about discovery to a legal team before or during trial. A vast local and federal database can be constructed of calls, voice prints, locations, text and transcripts.
The published or in public court telecommunications providers assistance to law enforcement officials stats and costs look the same every year.

Trade, aid and diplomatic cables. Anything that could degrade NZ standing in the region and have it replaced by a France, EU, Japan or China.
NZ can also trade its geographic location to the US and UK to offer them full civil, naval and military satellite intercepts in the region.
For that NZ gets huge hardware and software upgrades it could never afford and gets to share in the raw material of interest to NZ.
US and UK staff also get to be "attached" to the NZ effort and can see the world and help with collection around the world. Generations of staff get an understanding of regional telco systems and bulk US/UK collection globally. NZ faced new cypher machines in Japan and had to work hard with the US and UK to get back in the 1980's.
NZ is looking for everything in real time just like the US and UK. Different diplomatic cables might be of more interest but NZ is getting everything in the region and beyond. The prestige of raw traffic.

The personal papers of a former NZ Prime Minister did have a top secret report about what NZ was doing in the 1980's.
Lange's secrets (15 January 2006) http://www.converge.org.nz/pma...
Of interest to NZ where Japanese and Philippines diplomatic cables, the government communications of Fiji, the Solomons, Tonga, "international organisations operating in the Pacific" and UN diplomatic cables.
It was interesting to see terms like "most of the raw traffic used" "South Pacific telex messages on satellite communications", "The raw traffic for this reporting provided by NSA the US National Security Agency).""
Japanese diplomatic cables, French Pacific satellite intercept, "French South Pacific civil, naval and military; French Antarctic civil; Vietnamese diplomatic; North Korean diplomatic; Egyptian diplomatic; Soviet merchant and scientific research shipping; Soviet Antarctic civil. Soviet fisheries; Argentine naval; Non-Soviet Antarctic civil; East German diplomatic; Japanese diplomatic; Philippine diplomatic; South African Armed Forces; Laotian diplomatic (and) UN diplomatic."
So the world has had some look at what NZ was interested in and how it was done in bulk years ago.

world wide wiretap AC

Each generation has its own ability to set aside the way a telco network can be used domestically.
The use was only for ww1, ww2, the Soviet Union, Russia, China, distant wars and long occupations.
Tame brands, academics, political leaders all thought their generation of secure hardware and software was been looked after by different brands, legal teams, oversight or respected international standards.
With the news of weak standards, academics been unaware or unsure where to look, brands letting other outside gov or mil networks just enter their internal secure networks people can grasp what weak security is over many generations.

It adds to the history of cryptography. The issues did not stop with an early cell phone, new hardware at an embassy in the 1970's or early banking codes.
Generations have been told to use, supplied with or trusted brands. The more weak tame code that is found, the more people can talk about how.

The linked http://blog.cryptographyengine... has some settings.
https://freakattack.com/

The cell phone is now a beacon, gps tracker, facial recognition system, keeps text and offers voice prints.
If a person is a journalist or meeting a journalist understand that just been near a journalist with a connected cell phone can be useful to track that meeting.
The ability to turn on the microphone is another issue.

In the past the local network dropped to an older standard depending on the version of the IMSI catcher and the network standard it used?
A few projects have been mentioned to help understand the local network conditions and then show the user changes.
Phone Firewall Identifies Rogue Cell Towers Trying To Intercept Your Calls (09.03.14)
http://www.wired.com/2014/09/c...

Re "Basically the keys to the castle without presenting any evidence that your doors are all open. as useful if not more so than UEFI takeover."
Ready to go after any wipe or AV or heuristics, behavioral analysis. Collecting data and waiting for a network or usb stick out.

Price and the design of the cell networks going back many years. The security services had a list of needs going back into the 1980's and for the UK it was all network use in Ireland.
As cell and sim systems advanced the security services just kept up with having total mastery of every aspect of all the different telco networks.
Now users and telcos have to consider who else has the security services methods? Ex staff, former staff, dual citizens, contractors, foreign contractors. People cults and brands able to pay for the skill sets of ex staff, former staff? Once a telco network is fully open to the security services other groups can buy or are given the same methods over the years.

Lets hope the certs for that end to end link are still good as offered :)
A lot of nations will now just go back to one time pads and number stations with all the junk Western networks used for quality disinformation.