The US gov seemed to have really understood all the issues the UK and other nations had with selecting and sorting cleared staff from the UK security issues of the 1930's to 1980's.
Full background interviews, real cleared US gov staff looking deep into a persons submitted life story and the looking at the facts on the ground anywhere in the US.
Life story, education, friends, mail, reading material, calls logs all allowed the US gov to select the more useful and smart people for sensitive positions.
Over the past decade the move was to finding staff with unique skills quickly and trying to ensure US security paperwork was not going to be any issue for contractors, ex staff, former staff, people moving from the private sector into gov or gov into the private sector. All while keeping or re using past security access.
The US gov and mil could ensure skilled staff from the public and private sector where ready, could be found and sorted regionally and quickly for any task in or out of the USA.
The problem for the US gov is it needed so many contractors quickly and hoped remote digital files could 'clear' a boss and their new company or past contractor/mil/gov staff for new gov/mil/contractor work.
Vast new online digital databases allowed for lucrative jobs to be handed out and any security issues to fixed quickly.
The down side of this rapid system what what is what was fully understood by the US, UK, Australian and many other nations since the 1950's from their WW2 and 1930's security issues. Dont hire or create security in haste and keep the files away from all other people in gov, mil, private sector and other nations. How or why the US gov ever let go if its most secure files for national remote access is a real mystery.
Other nations who kept their files safe from new contractors needs and within the gov seemed to have understood the issues of rapid security expansion expansion and all the remote database issues. Why did the US gov and mil think it was a good idea or safe to allow complex files of that nature to just move regional and national networks from the mid 1990's on?

The wider French public now understands more about the quality of French cryptography in use within France and that outside nations seem to have plain text access.

The French political elite are stuck. French cryptography was linked to US and UK methods and hardware from the early 1970's on.
If France wants to keep its top staff at the NSA/GCHQ standard to enjoy total network collection France will have to take into account how the US and UK will respond.
France should have fully understood what it was doing politically when it had its early 1970's French (~JIC) meeting with the GCHQ.
What was the French SDECE worked very well with the UK over the what would have been the UK Zircon sigint satellite projects and options for sharing resulting material with the French. The UK French deal and later sharing was more about making France dependent on US and UK access than helping France share with the UK.
Generations of French crypto officials have now worked with and under UK and US advisors and now like the US/UK systems France is using globally.
France was very happy to help with UK with all aspects and details of its weapons sales during the Falklands war.
The US did not help New Zealand re the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbour.
France cannot easily undo its linked hardware, access and software that the US and UK now offer.
It seems the French political elite understand what the French security services have been doing for decades and what France can do or will not have access to. France also seems more aware of just how deep the US is to French crypto and networks.
France should have understood the lessons from the 1950's when the US and UK had near total access to all French communications at all levels.
How or why the French left their secure networks so open to the US after the 1950-60's is a mystery. Decades later the upgraded French networks are still open to the US and UK??
French political policy has to always reflect on obligations back to the UK and UK for that collect it all sharing access.
The only long term option for France politically is to secure its own codes "again" and spend big on better quality French sigint for France globally.

re "global timing attacks to capture all and everything in a useable daily-database-task format with a spiffy frontend."
The UK has Tempora like cost effective efforts for just that kind of emerging networking issues. UK wide and ready for any packet tracking in and out of the UK.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
Re "could chain some vpn's" The UK has thought of that aspect too with US help
"Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security" (December 28, 2014 )
http://www.spiegel.de/internat...

The UK has the option to revert to the 1950's and have massive numbers of expensive undercover, informant, police, special forces teams in every community per village, town, city.
Find, follow, attract, use front groups (peace, human rights, anti war) and attract interested people in and give them safe busy work 'issues' over decades.
Anyone with any state connection would have understood network tracking since about the 1970's know to avoid any of the new hardware of software methods.
The other issue the UK has is CCTV and cell phone tracking. Any member of the press, a lawyer going out can be tracked and any meeting they have can be noted.
Networked office equipment, new office computer equipment that arrives been ordered online is another way in.
It all comes back to staff numbers the UK can offer good wages to for the skills of tracking most people within the UK for decades.
Hire too many new staff with skills and the UK cannot trust the vetting. The UK has a long issue with trying to secure its own gov workers.
The UK faced staff issues, working conditions and wage claims from its gov staff over many decades (1950's-early 1980's).
Growing the staff count to watch all of the UK all the time might be a budget and vetting issue long term.
Why watch everyone when the UK has front groups that can draw people in?
The UK will have an interesting question soon, find the cash to pay contractors and gov staff to watch the entire nation or find a very easy way to watch front 'groups' in the community.
Front groups are very tricky to keep public enough to attract new members but well away from the press and citizen journalists asking questions. re "Or they can just go into the woods and whisper to each other." The UK would offer both people a lot of cash/deals. Cell structures are easy to turn given time and a lot of cash. Once a few cells get turned the entire can be uncovered and turned.

Yes other governments will just enjoy secure one time pads, distant public radio broadcasts and number stations for all their international staff.
The result is just another huge investment in contractors as the UK offered in the 1970's, 80, 90's, 00's to track all emerging and long term digital networks.

The ability of the UK to reconcile every network packet in and out of the UK makes any message sent from an UK ip to an UK ip in the UK an easy daily database task.
The random path around the world does nothing to hide the UK origin and UK destination ip at a service provider level (a persons ~modem like device/residence/cell /phone id).

That was a given for the UK in Ireland from the 1960's on. All human rights groups, Irish peace groups, legal teams, Irish lawyers where under constant watch.
A lawyers ability to speak to gov issues, UK policy, cite international conventions in public, to contact the US and UK press on issues had to be contained.
How or why this generation of UK based legal teams and human rights groups thought they had been granted some fancy new freedoms is a real mystery.
The UK has always watched, shaped and infiltrated any groups of interest going back to WW1.
The internet has only made the network into legal teams digital files more simple. Cell phones allow the tracking of all meetings between lawyers and the press or people seeking legal help as they enter any office. The cell phone is taken to meetings?
UK based legal teams should have understood the longterm UK policy on peace groups and humans rights issues has never changed.
The history surrounding Irish legal policy was in the UK press, books and media over the past two decades.
The how (all phone and digital networks), why (collect it all) and when (collect it all) are easy questions.
Why where people in the UK legal profession not aware of the policy and powers to spy is the UK question given the amount of policy and history ?
UK lawyers may want to consider how the Irish files and legal meetings where used, tracked and the wider UK policy.

Yes people who are interested in a free internet will just pay under say $7-$20 a month for an encrypted network out of Canada.
All the Canadian provider and gov will see is a stream of encrypted data every month to an ip out of Canada.
The Canadian ISP is happy to block sites, the VPN is very happy with the new user, the user is enjoying the wider internet as normal.
A newer law to block any VPN provider getting funding from a Canadian bank or credit card?

The good part is people now know understand the junk encryption, the junk hardware as shipped, the software that is wide open to governments as designed.
People also have the option not to buy or support the big bands that have failed to secure their expensive systems over generations and decades.
Everyone can see the digital Berlin wall and who funded it and supports it.
Return to the number pad, number station, support people and buy from brands that warned generations of users.
The "toy" is a digital key to most big brand servers sold and installed globally.
The vast illegal domestic surveillance network keeps it funding and contractors but the rest of the world will just route around the junk standards.

How far back do you want to go? France had a very good understanding with Germany in WW2 after its surrender. France worked well with and helped Germany under occupation. The US also had Operation Paperclip and other technical needs that where filled by Germans after WW2.
The US was also aware of some early French atomic power work and patents from the 1940's that would have made total US control of post war nuclear power interesting. The US was not going to allow France get into the lucrative post war nuclear age with early French nuclear patents.
The US interest in French codes goes back to the TICOM https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... efforts at the end of ww2 to see what France (and free French during ww2) was going to do after ww2. The US and UK found a unit of Italian code experts that had an understanding of French methods in the 1940's and used them (under TICOM) to break French diplomatic traffic after ww2.
As France was rebuilding this flow of embassy traffic was vital to the US and UK as they got product from French embassies in eastern Europe.
At some point France finally worked out it was losing all its embassy traffic to the US and UK and finally worked out how to shield some of its crypto hardware (total tempest leaking is not good).
Into the 1950's the US put massive efforts into French product. By the early 1970's France was working well with the UK (at a JIC level) and US in all military and crypto areas.
France worked well with the UK over the Falklands, offering all technical details to the UK on systems delivered. The 1987 Libya and Chad boarder war saw the French, CIA and UK work very well together.
The US fear is that quality French brands and products will sell well at a good price and be in demand around the world. South America, Africa, Asia. All parts of the world the US expects to push new US products and services into.
So France and its top exporters are under constant surveillance by the US gov until the US can capture all French export markets.

It depends on who gets to see the data and why over time.
The political power structure in a city or county may not like protests by unions, human rights groups, peace protesters, people of faith or local bitter clingers out in public.
By collecting all data about transport in the area at the time a of a first amendment event a list of local people can be considered for visits or chat downs by local law enforcement.
Been seen with a DSLR or other HD video like camera on public land? Are you out of state press, a real journalist? Tame local press? A citizen journalist? On some first amendment audit? Doing another FOIA like state public records/open records request?
Just re play the local plate collection as see who was driving or who picked the person of interest up if they walked away.
The consensual contact with local law enforcement can then be shaped from no contact needed to a request to show ID or a more direct chat down until photo ID is "voluntarily" shown.
The other use of well funded cameras locally is to get a nice picture of the passenger and driver on select/the only main road. Add that with cell phone information (stingray) and a nice database can be constructed with federal grants at a very local level.

Or so many smart readers now have, want, need or will be needing Western gov security clearances. They feel they cannot comment on anything work related anymore.
Very chilling if you know your home network is your work network and every word that is seen is collected.

Re: "How long will it take before people finally see":
Internally the 1980's trade union ban was telling and the public could see the marching by UK staff to keep their union membership.
The union ban stayed in place for years and reflected on hours, working conditions and how the UK gov treated its own trusted security cleared staff.
The wider public and security researchers now fully understand cell-site tracking, dirtboxes, voice prints, junk global encryption standards, efforts against VPN, efforts to contain all security software, total recall of all networked communications within or out of the UK.
What seems to be new is understanding of the change from just total network collection to use of sock puppets and tracking of "thinking" or talking to the press or publishing domestically.
Methods once hinted at been reserved for foreign journalists or gov officials is now understood to be in use domestically for any domestic thought crime.
The methods seem to be reverting back to a 1920-50's idea to have total control over the press, new media and people using the domestic media.
People where much more easy to track if they thought they where "free" like in the and the UK gov fully understood that.
Once people understand the networks are all been tracked they will just stop using the effortless digital networks.
The UK will then be back to the expensive problem of having to use very traditional methods.