Corporations, PACs, trusts, and unions are all abstract concepts; they're all made of individuals, and it is the individuals who actually do anything.

Put another way--the people have the right to free speech, and they have the right to assemble peaceably. You propose forcing them to choose one or the other: "either speak, or assemble, but you can't assemble and then speak together!"

Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493; 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954).

How do ignorant comments like this get modded up to +5?

First of all, since you describe an offense involving driving, you should know that the implied consent laws passed by the states requires that you give consent to brethalyzer, etc. It'd be trivial for the legislatures to add a DNA sample to the list. You can still refuse, but you'll lose your license.

Second, the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment only applies to testimonial evidence. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Supreme Court held that extracting blood against the suspect's will was permissible: "On the other hand, both federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. . . . Not even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused was involved either in the extraction or in the chemical analysis. Petitioner's testimonial capacities were in no way implicated; indeed, his participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend on chemical analysis and on that alone. Since the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds."

More recently, Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988) cites Schmerber and others:

An examination of the Court's application of these [487 U.S. 201, 210] principles in other cases indicates the Court's recognition that, in order to be testimonial, an accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. 9 Only then is a person compelled to be a "witness" against himself.

This understanding is perhaps most clearly revealed in those cases in which the Court has held that certain acts, though incriminating, are not within the privilege. Thus, a suspect may be compelled to furnish a blood sample, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S., at 765 ; to provide a handwriting exemplar, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S., at 266 -267, or a voice exemplar, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973); to stand in a lineup, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S., at 221 -222; and to wear particular clothing, Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252 -253 (1910). These decisions are grounded on the proposition that "the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature." Schmerber, 384 U.S., at 761 . The Court accordingly held that the privilege [487 U.S. 201, 211] was not implicated in each of those cases, because the suspect was not required "to disclose any knowledge he might have," or "to speak his guilt," Wade, 388 U.S., at 222 -223. See Dionisio, 410 U.S., at 7 ; Gilbert, 388 U.S., at 266 -267. It is the "extortion of information from the accused," Couch v. United States, 409 U.S., at 328 , the attempt to force him "to disclose the contents of his own mind," Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957), that implicates the Self-Incrimination Clause. See also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972) (the privilege "protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used") (emphasis added). "Unless some attempt is made to secure a communication - written, oral or otherwise - upon which reliance is to be placed as involving [the accused's] consciousness of the facts and the operations of his mind in expressing it, the demand made upon him is not a testimonial one." 8 Wigmore 2265, p. 386. 10 [487 U.S. 201, 212]

So no, the Fifth Amendment doesn't mean they can't collect a DNA sample.

Finally, if you "fight back" as the officer tries to collect evidence, and if you live through the experience, you're not going to win a brutality suit--you don't have the right to resist an officer in the lawful performance of his duties.

The right to a trial by jury of your "peers" doesn't exist in the American system. "A jury of your peers" refers to those who have a peerage--that is, lords--not being tried by commoners. We don't have a noble class in America, so the point is moot. Everybody in the country is your peer by definition, thus there is no language about your "peers" anywhere in the Constitution.

Well, sure it possible--so is murder. Both are illegal, however. You can only sell to a resident of your state.

Oooh, can I play jailhouse lawyer too?

Let's start with links. You opened with Wikipedia; I'll see your Wikipedia and raise you Oklahoma's Legislative Service Bureau, http://www.lsb.state.ok.us/. Click the nifty underlined bit and it'll take you to the text of the entire body of Oklahoma statutes (I picked Oklahoma because it's a noted hotbed of tornado activity). "Reckless endangerment," by name or concept, didn't exist under Title 21, Crimes and Punishments, but Title 47, Motor Vehicles, contains "reckless driving:"

Now, that makes true reckless driving a misdemeanor. However, you're arguing that driving in a place where one has every legal right to be becomes reckless driving simply because of inclement weather. The courts disagree. To wit:

• Athey v. Bingham, 823 P.2d 347 (Okla. 1991). "Snow and sleet were falling on the ice-covered road. . . . The fact that a motor vehicle collision occurred does not necessarily raise the presumption that the defendant was following too closely, driving too fast to bring the car to a stop, or driving too fast for highway conditions." The Court did not even consider the idea that the driver shouldn't have been out in the weather at all.
• Wade v. Reimer, 359 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1961). "Shortly after they left [the city of] Yale it started raining hard and puddles of water began to accumulate on the surface of the highway. Defendant, driving at a speed estimated variously from 50 to 65 miles per hour, steered the vehicle so as to avoid these puddles. As they approached a point approximately 10 miles west of Yale, the two right wheels of the pick-up suddenly came off the pavement to the right shoulder of the road. The vehicle slid ‘sideways' back across the entire concrete width of the highway and then through the adjoining bar ditch crashing into a tree. . . . Before a driver may be found guilty of [reckless driving], the triers must necessarily conclude first that his actions amounted to ordinary common law negligence." The court held that even a guilty plea to reckless driving does not establish negligence per se; the jury still has to decide whether the specific actions were negligent. The jury did not find the defendant negligent. Again, the idea that "you shouldn't have been out in this weather" was never even considered, let alone seriously entertained by the Court.
• Green v. Thompson, 344 P.2d 272 (Okla. 1959). Holding that the fact that an accident occurred does not necessarily mean anybody was negligent; citations to Taylor v. Ray, 56 P.2d 376 (Okla 1936) and National Tank Co. v. Scott, 130 P.2d 316 (Okla. 1942) and Kraft Foods Co. v. Chadwell, 249 P.2d 1002 (Okla. 1952), all of which also held that the mere fact of an accident doesn't prove negligence or recklessness.

So, if you'll bother to read the provided cases, I think you'll find that chasing tornadoes does not ipso factor constitute "reckless endangerment" (or even the actual crime of reckless driving), nor the tort of negligence. The specific circumstances of the case may give rise to an action in either, but it's not "the literal definition."

Sorry to burst your bubble.

Most guns used in crimes aren't bought from a dealer, they're stolen. In fact, it's often cheaper to buy a gun "on the street" than it is to do so through a dealer...so much for markup or "inflated prices in a black market." Additionally, it's illegal to buy a handgun in any state other than your state of residence, so crossing state lines to buy handguns isn't a factor--dealers won't sell them without an in-state ID. Criminals--being the law-breaking sort, pretty much by definition--obtain them through (wait for it) illegal means. Long guns just don't turn up often in crimes (source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports).

Facts never were popular with your crowd, though.

3) Sell it all, invest heavily in hookers and blow.

(Side effect: if everybody tries to sell, the market tanks. Oh, and the earth didn't explode, so we're still here. Oops.)

Close. It's "these people have affirmatively chosen to separate themselves from the rest of us." The difference is subtle, but critical.

There's a little more to it than even that. (Caution: law student, and we were talking about nuisance in Property class just last night.)

In order to be a nuisance, the behavior has to create a substantial harm to a person of ordinary sensitivity. The classic case is Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 198 P.2d 847 (Ore. 1948), in which the defendant, a horse track, had bright lights which spilled over and illuminated plaintiff's drive-in movie screen. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the light spillover did not constitute a nuisance merely because it damaged one who was abnormally sensitive (emphasis mine). The analysis was somewhat more complicated, but that's the important bit: abnormal sensitivity creates a duty for the injured party to mitigate, not for the injuring party.

This, of course, assumes that Firstenberg is bringing his suit under nuisance; other standards apply to other claims.

Because not all of us subscribe to the theory that all money (or productive output) belongs to the government and that anything we keep is taken from our masters?

A tax deduction is not "passing on" a cost any more than not buying a hamburger is taking money from McDonald's.