RFID Passport Security "Poorly Conceived"

tonk writes, "European expert researchers on identity and identity management summarize their findings from an analysis of passports with RFID and biometrics — Machine Readable Travel Documents or MRTDs — and recommend corrective measures that 'need to be adopted by stakeholders in governments and industry to ameliorate outstanding issues... By failing to implement an appropriate security architecture, European governments have effectively forced citizens to adopt new international MTRDs which dramatically decrease their security and privacy and increases risk of identity theft. Simply put, the current implementation of the European passport utilizes technologies and standards that are poorly conceived for its purpose.' The European experts therefore come to similar conclusions as the Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee of the US Department of Homeland Security in a draft report, which seems to be delayed."

No shit.

[Omicron32]

People on Slashdot have been saying this since it was first announced.

They should talk to geeks more.

Is ECM Possible?

[powerlord]

I was RTFA:

"RFID chips are being used in the nation's passports, cards used to identify transportation workers and cards for federal employees, and may be features of the Registered Traveler program, the soon-to-be-released standards for all states' driver's licenses under the REAL-ID act, as well as proposed medical cards."

and I thought, "with so many RFIDs, couldn't they interfere with each other?" and then I started wondering ...

Most of the approaches people are talking about are "Passive Countermeasures" such as wrapping the RFIDs in a faraday cage.

What about Active Countermeasures? Broadcast so much garbage on the carrier frequencies that the RFID can't communicate? (the start of a Personal Privacy Shield perhaps?) Yes, it lights up the broadcaster in ambient noise, but it is this even possible (and what effect would it have on other things around you?