That's not a very useful statement.
Cyphers (*all* cyphers) are based on the *assumption* that it is easy to do one thing, but very hard to do the other; for instance, RSA is based on the assumption that it's easy to multiply one prime number by another, but that it's very hard to factor the resulting product into its two original prime numbers again.
This particular assumption about factoring is based on millenia of mathematical history on the subject; multiplication and factoring has been known since the time of the ancient greeks, but the academic world to this day does not know of a method to factor a product into its original prime numbers other than by multiplying a number of candidate prime numbers by other prime numbers and verifying whether it just happens to be correct.
That being said, for most of those millennia, there hasn't been a very great incentive to make factoring easy. As such, it's not impossible that there actually is a method to quickly factor a product into its prime numbers; and it's not impossible to think that the NSA (or some other organization) has discovered such a method. If they do, they have every (military) reason to keep that a secret. Unfortunately, it's impossible to disprove that possibility; you can't prove that there is no way to do a particular thing (you can only prove that it is, in fact, possible to do something, by actually doing it).
Obviously, the same is true for other crypto algorithms besides RSA.
(Not that I think this is the case, but the possibility certainly exists)