Comment Oh boy. (Score 3, Insightful) 52
At least no chicom lithium stealing your thoughts.
While this is true, being the subject of an experiment to see what happens when you do that is not something most people would choose for themselves. It's not *irrational* to be concerned. Absence of evidence on a largely unexplored question like microplastic infiltration in human bodies is not the moral equivalent of absence of evidence in an extensively studied question like a vaccine-autism link.
While it's true every issue has its own dimension, even if those dimensions are linearly independent, they're not necessarily orthogonal. Independent basis vectors can still have a non-zero dot product—in other words, issues which are distinct from each other can align to some degree.
They’ve spun a serious architectural and containment failure into a marketing triumph. Give a swarm of autonomous agents vast compute and web access, and the outcome isn't an eerie glimpse of emerging superintelligence—it’s just predictable, sloppy engineering dressed up as the first glimpse of an AI-driven economic singularity.
The spin makes sense when you look at management incentives: live like a king off of a speculative bubble. For their part, AI investors react to stories of the technology's apocalyptic potential the way a junkie reacts to warnings of fentanyl's potency: gimme some. Their game: to apply "move fast and break things" mantra to the economy as a whole, by obsoleting humans.
If the investors can own an AGI, the distinction between those who can do things and those who can't becomes irrelevant. The only distinction that would matter is between people who collect rent on the technology, and those who must pay that rent to live. AGI would destroy society as we know it, and whatever replaces it would be up for grabs — with people who own the technology dictating whatever follows. That's why they're spending so much money to build a post-scarcity economy. A post-scarcity economy is not necessarily an egalitarian one.
I don't think that scenario will actually happen: investors are projecting the immediate aftermath of a major advance in AI technology into something that can be transformed by brute force scaling into AGI. Remember: investors loved Theranos too — so much for the rational investment market.
But AI doesn't have to reach AGI to cause serious harm. The technology only needs to be ubiquitous, too behaviorally complex to predict, and too deeply integrated into everything we do. When it starts breaking things, the plan is for us to be too structurally dependent on AI to rein it in.
The business case for LLMs is a bit broader than that. They don't need to replace that many workers if they make enough workers more efficient or more reliable (such as simply having LLMs look over drafts).
As things stand 'reliable' is not a word you associate with AI.
That's why it is using it to look over drafts. You take the AI output and then go through its suggested edits or concerns. Essentially it functions as a very fast, half-way decent proof-reader. For example, my spouse looks over a lot of drafts of things I write, but if I give her a 15 page paper, there's good work on the first 8 or 9 pages, probably a joke on page 10 about my notation, one or two comments on the next page, and then a few comments on the bibliography. Claude is not as good a proof-reader as she is, but Claude doesn't poop out after a few pages. And Claude is much faster. So reliability goes up without having to rely on the AI being reliable itself.
And sometimes it catches subtle things. For example, not too long ago, I gave a paper draft to Claude, and it noted in the bibliography that the journal volume number seemed unlikely given the year; it turned out that the volume was correct, but I had actually written the wrong journal down in the entry. Another time, Claude noted that one entry in a bibliography was from a "borderline predatory" (its words but it wasn't wrong) journal, and since I wasn't using it for much other than as part of a list of "hey, here's prior literature" and the paper in question didn't prove anything interesting, I discussed just dropping it from the citation list. Claude then without me asking, pulled up preprint I already had on the arXiv and noted it saw that paper cited there and suggested we remove the paper there also. I didn't do so, but this is the sort of thing that it can suggest. One still has the human make the decisions, but the input itself is useful. And for the most part, verification by a human for most issues is much faster than finding the issues one self.
That's what I was talking about. You need smaller models specialised for the specific scientific/engineering problem they'll be used for.
Not really. It turns out that specialized models do not do as well as large general models. This is essentially a variant of the Bitter Lesson https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitter_lesson. In this case, there's other reason for it also. There's a lot of reasoning science and math discussions in non-specialized training data. For example, one paper I wrote with two coauthors started as a Reddit discussion. But there's also just a lot of subtle interaction that specialized models don't necessarily get. Math is easier to understand if one has a good command of physics. Engineering is better if one has math and physics. Etc. And sometimes a technique gets directly pulled over. For example, in the large OpenAI paper drop, one of the graph theory problems relied on a trick involving a weighing on the graph that involved complex numbers designed to cancel, where the trick came from a physics context that did something similar. A math specialized model would have been unlikely to find and import that trick.
The distinction between a commodity or tech bubble is interesting but in both cases you can have a tech or commodity which is definitely useful but whose usefulness is being overestimated, and tech or commodity which has very limited utility and whose current value is mostly based on hype. Bitcoin and especially NFT are good examples of the latter type.
Right, and the line here isn't clear. One take on NFTs is that they are nominally a tech but functioned purely as a commodity bubble. Or that NFT is a tech but it was used to make commodities which had a bubble. And the line between tech and commodity was blurry historically. When Spain entered the "platinum age," that was based in part on how to make nearly pure platinum was a tech, but the platinum itself was a commodity.
How much computing you get out of a token is surely a purely business decision by the company selling the tokens. Theoretically there's nothing stopping them from making a single token give you unlimited lifetime access to their AI - probably wouldn't make much business sense but I don't know how much sense any of this is making atm. Tokens giving you more bang for the buck may mean the tech is improving or there's more infrastructure or it may just be due to a business strategy this particular company is pursuing.
Since per a token output seems to be getting better also for open-weight models, this suggests this is more than just a business decision. And some of it is specific changes; we know that larger models with more training data for example will often produce higher quality output. But also aside from scaling, there have been architectural improvements. For example, one insight that occurred was that having lower precision weights which allowed more weights was often a positive tradeoff. That lead to changes in both the software and hardware ends, as the GPUs were modified as a result. Similar, there's been changes in what functions are used for the feedforward function.
"Yes, and I feel bad about rendering their useless carci into dogfood..." -- Badger comics