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In terms of Linux, it's not classical security through obscurity, it's security through diversity. One of the reasons Slammer was so painful a decade ago was that most institutions had a Windows monoculture. The time between one machine being infected on your network and every machine on your network being infected was about 10 minutes (a fresh Windows install on the network was compromised before it finished running Windows Update for the first time). If you'd had a network that was 50% Windows and 50% something else, then it would only have infected half of your infrastructure and you'd have been able to pull the plug on the Windows machines and start recovery. It's possible to write cross-platform malware, but it's a lot harder (though there's some fun stuff out of one of the recent DARPA programs writing exploit code that is valid x86 and ARM code, relying on encodings that are nops in one and valid in the other, interspersed with the converse). Writing malware that can attack half a dozen combinations of OS and application software is difficult.
This is why Verisign's root DNS runs 50% Linux, 50% FreeBSD and of those they run two or three userland DNS servers, so an attack on a particular OS or particular DNS server will only take out (at most) half of the machines. Even an attack on an OS combined with an independent attack on the DNS server will still leave them with about a quarter functional, which will result in a bit more latency for Internet users, but leave them functioning.
Most of them still use system call interposition. They're vulnerable to a whole raft of time-of-check to time-of-use errors, so the only part that actually catches things is the binary signature checking, and that requires you to install updates more frequently than malware authors release new versions - it's a losing battle.
They run some quite buggy code in high privilege. In the last year, all of the major AV vendors have had security vulnerabilities. My favourite one was Norton, which had a buffer overflow in their kernel-mode scanner. Providing crafted data to it allowed an attacker to get kernel privilege (higher than administrator privilege on Windows). You could send someone an email containing an image attachment and compromise their system as long as their mail client downloaded the image, even if they didn't open it. It's hard to argue that software that allows that makes your computer more secure.
The situation in most of the USA is that it's been done using the worst possible mixture of laissez-fair capitalism and central planning. Vast amounts of taxpayer money have been poured into the infrastructure, yet that infrastructure is owned by a few companies and they have geographical monopolies and are now owned by their customers, so have no incentive to improve it. Oh, and regulator capture means that it's actually illegal to fix the problem in a lot of places. You can provide an incentive in several ways:
Alas, it's a shame that it doesn't mean anything. The point here is that the Earth has undergone many shifts in its climate, sometimes in a startlingly short period of time
Except that the difference in temperature between the peak of the Medieval Warm Period and the bottom of the Little Ice Age were significantly smaller than the difference between the current temperature and the bottom of the Little Ice Age. The last time we saw an increase in temperature equivalent to the last 200 years it was over a period of tens of thousands of years.
Go and read a news story about an area of science that you know about and compare it to what the original research actually claimed. Now realise that press reports about climate change are no more accurate than that and go and read some of the papers. The models have been consistently refined for the last century, but the predictions are refinements (typically about specific local conditions and timescales), not complete reversals. Each year, there are more measurements that provide more evidence to support the core parts of the models.
Oh, and I don't think the words objectivist or dualistic mean what you think they mean. You can't discard evidence simply by throwing random words into a discussion.
Considering that the entire selling point behind Signal is that it's supposed to be resistant to "an adversary like the NSA," I would think their ability to trivially associate a key with a real person would kind of turn that on its head.
Any global passive adversary can do traffic analysis on any communication network. Signal's message encryption should stand up against the NSA unless there are any vulnerabilities in the implementation that the NSA has found and not told anyone about or unless they have some magical decryption power that we don't know about (unlikely). Protection of metadata is much harder. If you connect to the Signal server and they can watch your network traffic and that of other Signal users, then they can infer who you are talking to. If they can send men with lawyers, guns, or money around to OWS then they can coerce them into recording when your client connects and from what IP, even without this.
In contrast, Tox uses a DHT, which makes some kinds of interception easier and others harder. There's no central repository mapping between Tox IDs and other identifiable information, but when you push anything to the DHT that's signed with your public key then it identifies your endpoint so a global passive adversary can use this to track you (Tox over Tor, in theory, protects you against this, but in practice there are so few people doing this that it's probably trivial to track).
No system is completely secure, but my personal thread model doesn't include the NSA taking an active interest in me - if they did that then there are probably a few hundred bugs in the operating systems and other programs that I use that they could exploit to compromise the endpoint, without bothering to attack the protocol. I'd like to be relatively secure against bulk data collection though - I don't want any intelligence or law enforcement agency to be able intercept communications unless at least one participant is actively under suspicion, because if you allow that you end up with something like Hoover's FBI or the Stazi..
Anyway, your comment comes off as naive, immature raving.
Actually, a rather significant mark of immaturity is trying to pass off dull cynicism as wisdom.