Researchers from MITRE presented a proof of concept system management mode man in the middle (SMMMitM) attack, "Smite'em the Stealthy" that could hide an attacker in the BIOS/SMM from MITRE's own Copernicus, the open source Flashrom, and any other software-based BIOS capture or measurement systems. MITRE countered Smite'em with Copernicus 2, which is able to perform more trustworthy BIOS captures by building on the CMU open source Flicker project which uses Intel Trusted Execution Technology. In a separate talk, Intel researchers released a new open source tool Chipsec, which while still vulnerable by Smite'em, is focused instead at helping security researchers find new problems and helping OEMs check that their BIOSes are locked down before shipping. In the final talk Intel and MITRE researchers jointly spoke about problems they have disclosed to vendors that allow bypassing UEFI SecureBoot. They discussed a number of issues discovered by Intel, and one co-discovered by the MITRE team.